Wage v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

Wage v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2009-10-29
Neutral citation
2009 FC 1109
File numbers
IMM-1004-09
Decision Content
Federal Court
Cour fédérale
Date: 20091029
Docket: IMM-1004-09
Citation: 2009 FC 1109
Ottawa, Ontario, October 29, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
MELAKU KENENE WAGE
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION and
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1] Notes1 This is an application pursuant to subsection 72 (1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Act) for judicial review of the decision of the Applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment, dated January 9, 2009 (Decision), which refused the Applicant’s application to be deemed a Convention refugee or person in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
BACKGROUND
[2] The Applicant is an Ethiopian citizen who came to Canada as a visitor on August 17, 2002, as the head of Organization, Management and Training Services of the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority to attend a workshop in Montreal. The Applicant made a refugee claim on September 6, 2002. His claim was heard by the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) on February 20, 2004, and was rejected shortly thereafter. The Applicant’s application for leave for judicial review of this decision was denied.
[3] The Applicant then submitted an application for a PRRA. The PRRA Officer (Officer) rejected the Applicant’s application on January 9, 2009, finding that the application did not meet the requirements of sections 96 and 97 of the Act. On March 2, 2009, the Applicant filed an application for judicial review of the negative PRRA decision.
[4] Justice O’Keefe then granted the Applicant a stay of his removal order until the PRRA Decision had been judicially reviewed.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[5] The Officer did not consider the Applicant’s newly-submitted documentary evidence that pre-dated the RPD decision, since the Applicant had not provided any reason as to why the documents submitted had not been reasonably available to the RPD for its consideration.
[6] The Officer discusses briefly the decision made by the RPD and notes that the Applicant’s credibility was seriously doubted by the RPD, that the Applicant’s well-founded fear was not proven, and that the RPD had doubts as to the existence of both the subjective and objective basis of his claim.
[7] The Officer explains that a PRRA is not intended to be an appeal of the RPD decision. The RPD decision is final, except for any new or different risks that could not have been considered by the RPD in its determination.
[8] In her Decision, the Officer recognizes the evidence of the Applicant’s participation in a demonstration in Ottawa on May 20 of 2004, but notes that the Applicant has not participated in similar events since that demonstration. What is more, the Officer was not satisfied that the Applicant has shown that his participation in this demonstration had attracted the attention of the Ethiopian authorities, or that he had experienced any negative repercussions as a result of his participation. Moreover, the Officer cites what she considers to be current objective documentation to find that there is no proof of the surveillance of demonstrations by the Ethiopian government officials against Ethiopians in either Europe or North America.
[9] The Officer also makes note of the letter submitted by the chairman of the Advocacy for the Fundamental Rights of Oromos and Others (AFRO-O) which stated that, based on the assessment of the Applicant’s background and previous human rights violations in Ethiopia, the life and safely of the Applicant would be in danger if he were to return to Ethiopia. The Officer notes there are documents attached to this letter, including a letter from the Oromo Parliamentarians Council.
[10] The Officer was not satisfied that the author of the AFRO-O letter specified the basis on which the assessment was performed. Moreover, she notes that the organization’s address is in Maryland, U.S.A., and questions how the organization conducted its assessment of the Applicant. The Officer finds the Chairman’s assumption that the Applicant’s life and safety would be in danger if returned to Ethiopia speculative because he does not indicate any first-hand knowledge of the Applicant’s life situation in Ethiopia, or why he believes the Ethiopian government would be targeting the Applicant years after his departure. As a result, the Officer affords the document low probative value.
[11] The Officer also gives little weight to an undated letter from the Oromo-Canadian Cultural Association of Ottawa Carlton. The Officer dismisses this document as being self-serving, since it is signed by a friend of the Applicant. What is more, the Officer gives no weight to the Applicant’s submission that his friends had been dismissed from his employment due to his suspected support of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), since the Applicant provided no explanation as to how this information was received, nor any objective proof to support it.
[12] The Officer also considers a November 2008 report from the OLF which confirmed the arrest of the Applicant’s friend. The Officer notes that this report is not on official letterhead, there is no signature or name of the report writer on the document, and in one instance Oromo is misspelled. Additionally, the Officer finds that this report does not disclose the source of its information. Based on a consideration of all these factors, the Officer affords this document little weight.
[13] The Officer finds that, while the Applicant provided submissions describing the country conditions in Ethiopia, he failed to link this evidence to any personalized risk. Moreover, the Officer contends that the Applicant’s submissions do not provide new material evidence of a significant change in country conditions from those that existed at the time of the RPD decision. The Officer finds that the Applicant has failed to provide objective documentary evidence to show that his situation in Ethiopia would be similar to the situation of those in the country who are currently at risk of persecution or harm.
[14] The Officer takes account of the fact that the Applicant has not been in Ethiopia since 2002, and there is no evidence that the Ethiopian authorities have been seeking him because of his political activities. The Officer finds insufficient evidence to show that the Applicant faces a personalized, forward-looking risk of persecution if returned to Ethiopia.
[15] The Officer also canvasses evidence of current country conditions and finds that there are several domestic and international human rights groups operating in Ethiopia with only limited government restriction. The Officer finds that anyone who has been involved with (or is suspected to have been involved with) the non-combat activities of the OLF, and has previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities, is at real risk of persecution. However, the Officer finds that “ordinary, low-level non-combat members who have not previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities are unlikely to be at real risk of persecution.”
[16] In conclusion, the Officer determines that the evidence presented does not support the Applicant’s assertion of a personalized risk in Ethiopia based on his membership in the OLF, and that he faces “less than a mere possibility” of persecution. Moreover, there are no substantial grounds to support a finding that the Applicant may be facing a danger of torture, or a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment due to the inability of the state to provide protection. Accordingly, the Officer finds that the Applicant’s application does not meet the requirements set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act.
ISSUES
[17] The issues raised by the Applicant can be summarized as follows:
1) Whether the Officer ignored material evidence or incorrectly dismissed the probative value of certain documents that were before her when she rendered her Decision?
2) Whether the Officer was obliged to offer the Applicant an interview or hearing?
3) Whether the Officer erred in her application of section 96 and 97 of the Act?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[18] The following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Convention refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
Person in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
Person in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.
Définition de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Personne à protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[19] In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that, although the reasonableness simpliciter and patent unreasonableness standards are theoretically different, “the analytical problems that arise in trying to apply the different standards undercut any conceptual usefulness created by the inherently greater flexibility of having multiple standards of review” (Dunsmuir at paragraph 44). Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the two reasonableness standards should be collapsed into a single form of "reasonableness" review.
[20] The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir also held that the standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable to the particular question before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[21] Questions of fact, mixed law and fact, discretion and policy attract a standard of reasonableness (Zambrano v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 481; Dunsmuir at paragraphs 51 and 53). In considering whether the Officer ignored material evidence or incorrectly dismissed the probative value of certain documents, the appropriate standard is one of reasonableness.
[22] The Board’s application of sections 96 and 97 of the Act to the facts will also be considered on a standard of reasonableness (Dunsmuir at paragraph 164).
[23] When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir at paragraph 47). Put another way, the Court should only intervene if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
[24] The Applicant has also raised a procedural fairness issue to which the standard of review is correctness: see Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 2002 SCC 1, and Dunsmuir at paragraph 60.
ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
The Officer did not address, and incorrectly dismissed, material evidence
[25] The Applicant submits that the Officer ignored many pieces of material evidence that were brought before her regarding the risks faced by the Applicant if he is forced to return to Ethiopia.
Response to Information Request
[26] The evidence relied on by the Officer to dismiss the Applicant’s concern that the Ethiopian government may target him because of his attendance at the 2004 Ottawa demonstration was contrary to other evidence found in the same document. Paragraphs two and three of this document contain an explanation of the government’s “strategic plan” for foreign embassies to target Ethiopians who are perceived to be against the government. In this case, the Officer relied on the first paragraph of this evidence to infer that the Applicant’s presence at the demonstration would not have caught the attention of Ethiopian authorities, without having regard to the second and third paragraphs of the evidence which do not support this inference. The Applicant submits that the Officer used the portion of the evidence that supported her claim while ignoring the portions that did not, and this resulted in a perverse finding of fact. The Applicant suggests that the revelation of the government’s “strategic plan” demonstrates that there is more than a mere possibility that he will suffer persecution if he is returned to Ethiopia. Moreover, the Applicant submits that the evidence submitted as part of his PRRA application demonstrates that the extent of persecution experienced by the Oromo people has grown considerably worse since the RPD decision.
Letter from Friend
[27] The Applicant argues that the Officer’s lack of discussion of the letter sent to the Applicant by his friend was unacceptable. Based on the fact that the Officer discussed several other pieces of evidence and explained why she was affording little probative value to each document, the Applicant believes that the Officer either overlooked or ignored this letter. The Applicant submits that this letter demonstrates that the extent of persecution experienced by the Oromo has worsened since the time the RPD decision was made.
Spouse’s Story
[28] The Applicant also raises a concern that the Officer did not consider the evidence he had provided regarding the situation of his spouse. While the Applicant explained that his wife had left Ethiopia fearing persecution as an ethnic Oromo and because she was suspected of involvement with the OLF, the Officer neglected to consider these matters in her reasons. As such, there is no indication that the Officer was aware of the Applicant’s statements regarding his spouse. If the Officer was aware of the statements made by the Applicant’s spouse, but had discounted them for some reason, she should have said why in her reasons because these statements relate directly to the Applicant’s subjective fear of return to his country.
Letter from the Chairman of AFRO-O
[29] The Officer dismissed the letter written by the chairman of AFRO-O because of a lack of information concerning the basis upon which the assessment was performed, and because the author’s assumptions about the Applicant’s risk in Ethiopia were speculative. However, the Applicant submits that the letter clearly states that the assessment was based on the Applicant’s background and the human rights violations that occur in Ethiopia. The end of the letter discloses that the findings are based on AFRO-O’s study as well as the personal knowledge of the two Oromo American members of the Board of Directors. Moreover, there were documents attached which supported the contents of the letter.
[30] The Applicant submits that it was unreasonable for the Officer to find that there was no stated basis for the assessment. The express wording of the letter contradicts such a finding. The Officer’s finding that the author’s presumption of the Applicant’s risk was speculative is unreasonable, since the Applicant is a member of the Oromo community and there is much evidence to establish the risks faced by members of this group.
2008 OLF Report Confirming Arrest
[31] Although the Officer acknowledged this report, she gave it little weight because it was not on official letterhead, lacked a name or signature of the writer, and was silent as to the source of its information.
[32] The Applicant submits that this type of report is not one on which a signature would usually be found, just as other trustworthy documents - such as a United States Department of State report - would not contain a signature. Further, the author of the report was referred to on the report as the Oromo Parliamentarians Council at the bottom of the second page.
Dismissal of the 2008 Report
[33] The Applicant contends that the Officer made a credibility finding in dismissing the November 2008 report on the basis that there was no letterhead or signature. As such, the Applicant says that the duty of procedural fairness was breached because a finding of credibility requires a hearing. Moreover, if the Officer had concerns about the authenticity of this report, or doubted the friendship between Mr. Kitili and the Applicant, then the Officer should have posed these questions to the Applicant at an interview.
[34] The Applicant submits that if the report had been on official letterhead, or if it had contained a name and a signature, then the Officer would not have questioned the document’s authenticity. The Officer’s finding of fault with the report demonstrates the Officer’s disbelief in the Applicant’s credibility and make it clear that she might have believed the Applicant if the report had been more professional, with letterhead and a signature.
[35] The Applicant suggests that the Officer’s finding constitute a conclusion about his credibility. Accordingly, the Applicant says he should have been given a hearing. The case at hand is similar to Liban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1252, in which it was found that a finding of “insufficient objective evidence” was, in fact, a finding that the officer in that case disbelieved the applicant, and that if more objective evidence had been shown to support his assertions, then the officer would have believed him. It was found in Liban that these findings were actually conclusions about the applicant’s credibility. The Applicant submits that the same is true in the case at hand. In Liban, the officer had emphasized the credibility findings of the Immigration Appeal Division and found that the applicant had not provided sufficient objective evidence to support his claims. Moreover, the officer in Liban did not seem to accept that the groups to which the applicant belonged were subjected to mistreatment in Ethiopia.
[36] Each of the preceding points in Liban is similar to the points made and considered by the Officer in the case at hand. For instance, the Officer’s treatment of the Applicant’s evidence regarding his friends losing their jobs because of their ethnicity was similar to the impugned decision made in Liban. In the present case, the Officer found that the Applicant should have explained how he obtained his information, and because he did not provide objective evidence to support this statement, it was not given the weight it was due. The same issue arises over the Officer’s consideration of the evidence regarding the arrest of the Applicant’s friend.
[37] The findings of the Officer constitute a finding of credibility because the Officer insisted that if there had been documentary evidence to support the Applicant’s claims, then the Officer would have believed them. Accordingly, the Applicant was owed a hearing as a matter of procedural fairness.
The Officer misapplied sections 96 and 97 of the Act
[38] The Applicant also submits that the Officer misapplied sections 96 and 97 of the Act by failing to find that the Applicant would be targeted as a member of the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia, and by claiming that additional personalization was required. However, the Applicant submitted many items of evidence after the RPD hearing which the Officer accepted as legitimate and which identified the situation facing Oromo nationals in Ethiopia. The Applicant canvasses numerous examples of the documentary evidence before the Officer, including a report by Amnesty International, a Human Rights Watch report, an Ethiopian Human Rights Council report, and a United States Department of State report.
[39] The Applicant submits that Officer did not impugn these reports. She simply did not believe that this evidence specifically linked the Applicant to the risks each report described. Even though the Applicant was not mentioned specifically in any of the evidence provided, he submits that it was open to the Officer to find that he would be at risk upon his return to Ethiopia. However, the Officer found instead that the Applicant had not demonstrated a personalized risk, and that he had not proven that his profile was similar to those in Ethiopia who are at risk of persecution and harm.
[40] The Applicant submits that the Officer erred in not identifying him as a member of the Oromo subgroup which is targeted by agents of the Ethiopian government. The Officer committed an error of law by requiring that the Applicant prove a more specific personalization of risk than being a member of the Oromo community. In fact, the use of such a rule of “particularized evidence” was rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal in Salibian v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 250.
[41] The Applicant suggests that the Officer misapplied that portion of the PRRA Manual that discusses the personalization of risk. The Applicant says he does not need to prove that he, as an individual, would be at risk. He only needs to show that he is part of a larger group of people who are at risk, as opposed to other groups in the country. Neither the RPD nor the Officer ever disputed that the Applicant is an ethnic Oromo national. As such, the Applicant submits that it makes no difference whether he is an active member in any opposition group. It is sufficient that he is an ethnic Oromo national and there is an abundance of evidence that establishes a risk for any Oromo national in Ethiopia.
[42] Moreover, the Applicant submits that section 97 of the Act does not use the terms “specific risk” or “personalized risk.” Rather, section 97 simply requires that the risk not be one that is experienced generally within the country. Since the Applicant belongs to a subgroup that is more at risk than the general population, he satisfies the definition of risk under section 97. Indeed, based on Justice Dawson’s analysis in Surajnarain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1165, the Applicant contends that he is included under section 97 because he is experiencing fear based on his ethnicity. According to Justice Dawson, the threat need not be personalized. Rather, it can be a risk that is faced by an individual and which may be shared by others who are similarly situated. Since the Applicant in this instance is Oromo and his fear is based on his ethnicity, this fear falls under the scope of the Surajnarain analysis.
Conclusions
[43] The Applicant concludes that numerous errors were made by the Officer in this case. For instance, she did not understand the full extent of how the persecution experienced by the Oromos has worsened based on the documentary evidence provided by the Applicant. What is more, the Officer relied on five-year-old evidence to determine that some Oromos experience persecution while others do not. As such, the Officer mistakenly based her analysis on the Applicant’s particular profile instead of his membership in the Oromo Community. The Officer also erred in determining that the evidence relied on by the Applicant regarding the conditions he faced in Ethiopia revealed conditions faced by the general population as opposed to just the Oromo ethnic community. Finally, the Officer erred in not finding that Oromo ethnics are persons similarly situated to the Applicant.
[44] The Applicant suggests that these numerous errors ought to result in the quashing of the Decision and that the matter be sent back for reconsideration.
The Respondents
The Decision
[45] The Respondents submit that the Officer provided a thorough and well-reasoned assessment, and gave careful consideration to the Applicant’s submissions regarding his life being at risk if he is returned to Ethiopia due to his political opinion and as an Oromo suspected of supporting the OLF. The Decision reflects a careful and detailed analysis of the Applicant’s submissions and evidence.
Evidentiary Issues
[46] The Respondents submit that the Officer was correct in not giving consideration to documents submitted by the Applicant that pre-dated the RPD decision. No explanation was given as to why such evidence could not have been presented to the RPD. The PRRA process is not intended to be an appeal of an RPD decision so that the only new evidence for consideration is new, additional or different risks that could not have been considered by the RPD.
[47] The onus is upon the Applicant to provide the Officer with new evidence supporting the PRRA application rather than the same evidence that was before the RPD, and to demonstrate how this new evidence meets the requirements set out in section 113 of the Act: Kaybaki v. Canada (Solicitor General of Canada), 2004 FC 32 at paragraph 11.
[48] The Respondents also say that the Officer correctly distinguished between supporters of the OLF who have come to the attention of the authorities and those who have not, and determined that the Applicant’s life would not be at risk if returned to Ethiopia. Moreover, the Officer refers to the United Kingdom Home Office Operational Guidance Note which supports her finding that the Applicant does not have a profile that would make him a target.
[49] The Respondents contend that it was reasonable of the Officer to consider and apply the Guidance Note which concluded that individuals did not face danger upon their return to Ethiopia simply because of their Oromo ethnicity, or on the basis of a low-scale level of involvement with the OLF. Such a finding was also made in the recent case of Mohamed v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 315 at paragraph 25: “the thrust of the objective documentary evidence is that the Ethiopian government targets OLF members and sympathizers, not all 35 million people of Oromo ethnicity.” Moreover, the Officer found that there was no evidence to suggest that the Applicant was being sought by the authorities because of his political involvement, and that there was no new material evidence in the PRRA application to suggest a change in country conditions since the decision made by RPD.
[50] The Respondents also submit that the Officer did not commit an error by referring only to a portion of the (Response to Information Request (RIR) in her reasons. While the paragraphs not relied on by the Officer may lend some support to the submissions made by the Applicant, this information is prefaced in the report by the statement that “evidence of surveillance by government officials of demonstrations against Ethiopia in Europe and North America could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.” As such, the Respondents suggest that it was reasonable for the Officer to reach the conclusion she did. Not having mentioned the entirety of the RIR in her reasons is not fatal to her Decision. This is especially true because there was nothing in the unmentioned portions of the RIR to establish that the Applicant’s presence at the demonstration attracted the attention of the Ethiopian authorities, or that the Officer erred in concluding that the Applicant faced less than a mere possibility of persecution if returned to Ethiopia.
[51] Simply because this evidence was not mentioned outright by the Officer in her reasons does not mean that it was not considered. An officer is allowed to reject evidence if it does not establish that the country conditions as of the date of the PRRA application are materially different from those that existed at the time of the RPD assessment. The Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Officer failed to consider this evidence, or made an error in omitting discussion of those portions of the RIR that refer to Ethiopian spy agents posted at embassies, and the existence of the “Strategic Plan.”
[52] In addition, the Respondents submit that Justice O’Keefe’s ruling on this matter in the context of the stay motion is not determinative of the issue. The onus is now on the Applicant to convince the Court that the Decision was incorrect or was not reasonable, which is a higher standard than simply demonstrating that his issue is not frivolous or vexatious.
Letter from Friend
[53] The Respondents submit that the Officer did not err by failing to mention the letter written by the Applicant’s friend, Bahiru Duguma, in her Decision. In his PRRA application, the Applicant described this letter as “a letter from my friend…indicating that he has stopped visiting Ethiopia since 2003 because of his fear of being an Oromo.”
[54] The Applicant failed to show how this evidence related to his PRRA application. Much of the content of this letter, including the reference to mutual friends of the writer and the Applicant, and the potential treatment of the Applicant, is referred to in other documents that the Officer considered expressly in her reasons. The Respondents submit that simply because the Officer did not make specific reference to this letter does not mean that the letter was not considered. What is more, the letter does not contain any new evidence of a significant change in Ethiopia’s country conditions since the RPD decision that would suggest any additional personalized risk for the Applicant upon his return to Ethiopia.
The Applicant’s Spouse
[55] The Respondents submit that the Officer did not err by not referring to the evidence regarding the Applicant’s spouse and her departure from Ethiopia. The Applicant now suggests that his wife feared persecution as a result of being an ethnic Oromo and because of her suspected involvement with the OLF. However, the Applicant’s affidavit contains no mention of his wife having suspected involvement with the OLF.
[56] There was nothing in the Applicant’s wife’s departure from Ethiopia that contradicts the Officer’s conclusion that this evidence “did not support the applicant’s assertion that he has a personalized risk in Ethiopia based on his membership in the OLF.” As such, the Officer committed no error in not making reference to the Applicant’s spouse, since relevant evidence is only ignored where it is squarely at odds with a tribunal’s finding of fact, or where it is of such weight in support of the Applicant’s position that it requires a separate assessment: Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 494 at paragraphs 19, 20, 24. This was clearly not the case with this Decision.
Letters of Low Probative Value
[57] The Officer committed no error in giving low probative value to the letter from the Chairman of AFRO-O and the November 8, 2008 report from the OLF. The Officer has specialized expertise in the weighing of evidence, and the Respondents submit that it is not the role of the Court to reweigh the evidence that was before the Officer. Indeed, the Federal Court has held that “Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Officers are specialized administrative tribunals with decision-making responsibilities, and that significant deference is owed to their decision and, in particular, their decisions regarding the weight to be given to evidence presented before them”: De Mota v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 386 at paragraph 15.
[58] The Officer’s reasons make it clear that she considered the contents of the letter signed by the Chairman and the Board of Directors of AFRO-O. The Officer notes that this letter suggests that the Applicant would be in danger upon returning to Ethiopia, but she also finds that it is unclear what contact this organization had with the Applicant prior to making its assessment. Moreover, the Officer did not dismiss this letter; she gave it a low probative value after finding that the author did not indicate what understanding he had of the Applicant’s personal situation. The Respondents submit that the Officer’s analysis of the document was thorough and that her conclusion to afford it low probative value was reasonable.
[59] As for the November 8, 2008 report, the Respondents submit that it was reasonable for the Officer to afford this document little weight because of her concern about its authenticity: Dzey. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 167 at paragraph 25, Hossain v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No 160 at paragraph 4. While the Officer referred to this report in her Decision, she determined that it merited little weight, and provided a detailed explanation as to why: (1) the document was unsigned; (2) it was not on official letterhead; (3) it contained a misspelling of Oromo; and (4) it was silent as to its source of information. Based on this evidence, it was clearly reasonable for the Officer to attribute little weight to this document, and the Respondents submit that there is little basis for the Court to intervene with the Decision on this basis.
Hearing is Unnecessary
[60] The Respondents submit that, pursuant to section 167 of the Act, an officer has no obligation to interview an applicant when credibility is not at issue. The credibility of the Applicant was not the determining issue of the Decision. Hence, a hearing was not required. In this case, the Applicant was found not to be in need of protection since he did not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate additional personalized risks upon his return to Ethiopia that had not already been contemplated by the RPD. This was not a determination of credibility.
[61] In the case of Ferguson v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1067, the Court held that a PRRA applicant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he/she would be subject to the risk of persecution, danger of torture, risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual punishment upon return to his/her home state. The determination of whether an applicant’s evidence has reached this threshold depends on the weight ascribed to the evidence. In considering credibility, as compared to a sufficiency of evidence, the Court in Ferguson determined that the assessment of credibility is completely different from the assessment of weight to be assigned to evidence. As such, the Respondents submit that the Officer made no finding of credibility regarding the November 8, 2008 Report; the Officer simply gave reasons as to why she afforded little weight to this document. Since the Officer made no finding of credibility regarding this report, she did not breach the duty of fairness in failing to provide the Applicant with an interview or a hearing. This case is distinguishable from the case of Liban cited by the Applicant. In this instance, the Officer made no findings concerning the Applicant’s credibility in making her Decision. While the Officer referred to credibility findings made by the RPD, a mere reference to credibility findings does not mean that the Applicant is entitled to a hearing.
No Error in Applying the Act
[62] The Respondents submit that the Decision was reasonable and refers to Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1385 at paragraph 29:
Sections 96 and 97 require the risk to be personalized in that they require the risk to apply to the specific person making the claim. This is particularly apparent in the context of section 97 which utilizes the word “personally.” In the context of section 96, evidence of similarly situated individuals can contribute to a finding that a claimant’s fear of persecution is “well-founded.”
[63] While the Applicant asserts that all ethnic Oromos are targeted in Ethiopia, the determination made by the RPD was that the documentary evidence supported a finding that some Oromos support the government, while others do not. The Officer reviewed the evidence submitted by the Applicant and found no new material evidence to demonstrate any further risks since the RPD decision. Rather, the Officer found that the Applicant had failed to provide any objective evidence to demonstrate that his profile in Ethiopia is similar to those in the country who experience a risk of harm. The documents provided related to conditions experienced by the general population or described specific conditions faced by people who were not similarly situated to the Applicant. The Officer also determined that the evidence did not support a finding that the Applicant was being sought by Ethiopian authorities because of his political activities, and did not support the Applicant’s claim of a personalized risk.
Summary
[64] In conclusion, the Respondents submit that PRRA officers have extensive experience with assessing country conditions and deference should be given to the determinations made by the Officer in this case. I