R. v. Cuerrier

R. v. Cuerrier
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1998-09-03
Report
[1998] 2 SCR 371
Case number
25738
Judges
L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; Cory, Peter deCarteret; McLachlin, Beverley; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil
On appeal from
British Columbia
Subjects
Criminal law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 25738
Decision Content
R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant
v.
Henry Gerard Cuerrier Respondent
and
The Attorney General for Ontario,
the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association,
the Canadian AIDS Society, Persons with AIDS
Society of British Columbia and
Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Cuerrier
File No.: 25738.
1998: March 27; 1998: September 3.
Present: L’Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Criminal law ‑‑ Aggravated assault ‑‑ Consent ‑‑ Fraud ‑‑ Non‑disclosure of HIV status ‑‑ Accused having unprotected sexual relations knowing he was HIV‑positive ‑‑ Whether non‑disclosure of HIV status can constitute fraud vitiating partner’s consent to sexual intercourse ‑‑ Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 265(3) (c), 268 .
The accused was charged with two counts of aggravated assault pursuant to s. 268 of the Criminal Code . Even though he had been explicitly instructed, by a public health nurse, to inform all prospective sexual partners that he was HIV‑positive and to use condoms every time he engaged in sexual intercourse, the accused had unprotected sexual relations with the two complainants without informing them he was HIV‑positive. Both complainants had consented to unprotected sexual intercourse with the accused, but they testified at trial that if they had known that he was HIV‑positive they would never have engaged in unprotected intercourse with him. At the time of trial, neither complainant had tested positive for the virus. The trial judge entered a directed verdict acquitting the accused. The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.
Held: The appeal should be allowed and a new trial ordered.
Per Cory, Major, Bastarache and Binnie JJ.: To prove the offence of aggravated assault, the Crown must establish (1) that the accused’s acts “endanger[ed] the life of the complainant” (s. 268(1)) and (2) that he intentionally applied force without the consent of the complainant (s. 265(1)(a)). The first requirement is satisfied in this case by the significant risk to the lives of the complainants occasioned by the act of unprotected intercourse. It is unnecessary to establish that the complainants were in fact infected with the virus. With respect to the second requirement, it is no longer necessary, when examining whether consent in assault or sexual assault cases was vitiated by fraud under s. 265(3) (c), to consider whether the fraud is related to “the nature and quality of the act”. The repeal in 1983 of statutory language imposing this requirement and its replacement by a reference simply to “fraud” indicates that Parliament’s intention was to provide a more flexible concept of fraud in assault and sexual assault cases. To that end, principles which have historically been applied in relation to fraud in criminal law can be used with appropriate modifications.
In the context of the wording of s. 265, an accused’s failure to disclose that he is HIV‑positive is a type of fraud which may vitiate consent to sexual intercourse. The essential elements of fraud in commercial criminal law are dishonesty, which can include non‑disclosure of important facts, and deprivation or risk of deprivation. The dishonest action or behaviour must be related to the obtaining of consent to engage in sexual intercourse -- in this case unprotected intercourse. The accused’s actions must be assessed objectively to determine whether a reasonable person would find them to be dishonest. The dishonest act consists of either deliberate deceit respecting HIV status or non‑disclosure of that status. Without disclosure of HIV status there cannot be a true consent. The consent cannot simply be to have sexual intercourse. Rather, it must be consent to have intercourse with a partner who is HIV‑positive. The extent of the duty to disclose will increase with the risks attendant upon the act of intercourse. The failure to disclose HIV‑positive status can lead to a devastating illness with fatal consequences and, in those circumstances, there exists a positive duty to disclose. The nature and extent of the duty to disclose, if any, will always have to be considered in the context of the particular facts presented. To establish that the dishonesty results in deprivation, which may consist of actual harm or simply a risk of harm, the Crown needs to prove that the dishonest act had the effect of exposing the person consenting to a significant risk of serious bodily harm. The risk of contracting AIDS as a result of engaging in unprotected intercourse meets that test. Further, in situations such as this, the Crown is still required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant would have refused to engage in unprotected sex with the accused if she had been advised that he was HIV‑positive. Therefore, a complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse can properly be found to be vitiated by fraud under s. 265 if the accused’s failure to disclose his HIV‑positive status is dishonest and results in deprivation by putting the complainant at a significant risk of suffering serious bodily harm.
An approach to the concept of fraud in s. 265(3)(c) of the Code that includes any deceit inducing consent to contact would bring within the sexual assault provisions of the Code behaviour which lacks the reprehensible character of criminal acts and would trivialize the criminal process by leading to a proliferation of petty prosecutions instituted without judicial guidelines or directions. Some limitations to the concept of fraud in that section are necessary. The fraud required to vitiate consent for sexual assault must carry with it the risk of serious harm. This standard is sufficient to encompass not only the risk of HIV infection but also other sexually transmitted diseases which constitute a significant risk of serious harm. However, the standard is not so broad as to trivialize a serious offence.
Where public health endeavours fail to provide adequate protection to individuals like the complainants, the criminal law can be effective. The criminal law has a role to play both in deterring those infected with HIV from putting the lives of others at risk and in protecting the public from irresponsible individuals who refuse to comply with public health orders to abstain from high‑risk activities.
Per L’Heureux‑Dubé J.: Parliament’s intention in passing the 1983 amendments to the Criminal Code concerning sexual offences was both to include them within the general scheme of assault, and to modernize and sensitize the law’s approach to them. These factors, as well as the specific redrafting of the consent provision support the conclusion that the intention of these amendments was to move away from the traditional approach to fraud as it relates to consent in sexual assault cases. The objectives of the 1983 assault scheme are to protect people’s physical integrity from unwanted physical contact, and to protect people’s personal autonomy to decide under what conditions they will consent to be touched. Section 265(3) ensures that when consent is obtained, that consent is a true reflection of a person’s autonomous will.
Fraud occurs therefore, when the dishonest act in question induced another to consent to the ensuing physical act, whether or not that act was particularly risky and dangerous. The focus of the inquiry into whether fraud vitiated consent so as to make certain physical contact non‑consensual should be on whether the nature and execution of the deceit deprived the complainant of the ability to exercise his or her will in relation to his or her physical integrity with respect to the activity in question. There must be a causal connection between the fraud and the submission to the act. Where fraud is in issue, the impugned act is considered a non‑consensual application of force if the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in a manner designed to induce the complainant to submit to a specific activity, and that absent the dishonesty, the complainant would not have submitted to the particular activity. The dishonesty of the submission‑inducing act would be assessed based on the objective standard of the reasonable person. The Crown must also prove that the accused knew, or was aware, that his or her dishonest actions would induce the complainant to submit to the particular activity.
This interpretation of fraud as it relates to consent has the effect of maximizing the individual’s right to determine with whom, and under what conditions, he or she will consent to physical contact with another. This approach is also respectful of the legislative context because it can be applied with equal consistency to all of the assault offences to which the fraud provision relates. An interpretation of fraud that focuses only on the sexual assault context, and which limits it to those situations where a “significant risk of serious bodily harm” is evident, is unjustifiably restrictive. The Criminal Code contains no such differences between sexual assault and other assaults, and to maintain such distinctions would be contrary to the intention of the 1983 amendments.
Per Gonthier and McLachlin JJ.: Since the 1888 decision in Clarence, the law has been settled: fraud does not vitiate consent to assault unless the mistake goes to the nature of the act or the identity of the partner. Fraud as to collateral aspects of a consensual encounter, like the possibility of contracting serious venereal disease, does not vitiate consent. In amending the Criminal Code in 1983 and adopting a new definition of fraud for assault, including sexual assault, Parliament did not intend to remove the common law limitations. An intent to broaden the crime of assault radically cannot be inferred from Parliament’s removal of the words “nature and quality of the act”. Rather, Parliament must be supposed to have expected that the courts would continue to read the Code provisions on sexual assault against the background of the common law, unless it used language clearly indicating that it was altering the common law. There is nothing in s. 265 to indicate such an intention. This conclusion is supported by s. 45(2) of the Interpretation Act , which provides that an amending enactment shall not be deemed to involve a declaration of a change in the existing law. It is also supported by the rule of construction that where, as here, a criminal statute is ambiguous, the interpretation that favours the accused is preferred. As well, the jurisprudence, without exception, supports the view that Parliament intended to retain the common law definition of fraud for assault. Section 265(3) must, therefore, continue to be read in light of the common law.
It is an established rule that courts will effect changes to the common law only where those changes are incremental developments of existing principle and where the consequences of the change are contained and predictable. Here, the broad changes proposed to the common law concept of fraud for assault do not fall within this test. Both the application of the commercial concept of fraud, limited by an ad hoc qualifier that there must be a “significant risk of serious bodily harm”, and the application of an unqualified view of fraud which includes any deceit inducing consent to contact amount to abandoning the common law rule and substituting new principles in its place. Not only are the proposed extensions of the law sweeping, they are unprecedented. Moreover, the theoretical difficulties with both proposals are matched by the practical problems they would introduce. Parliament is better equipped than the courts to foresee the complex ramifications of such sweeping change and make the necessary value choices.
It is open, however, for courts to make incremental changes by extending the common law concepts of nature of the act and identity, provided the ramifications of the changes are not overly complex. It is the proper role of the courts to update the common law from time to time to bring it into harmony with the changing needs of society. This applies to the common law concept of fraud in relation to assault. In this case, the current state of the law does not reflect the values of Canadian society. It is unrealistic to think that consent given to sex on the basis that one’s partner is HIV‑free stands unaffected by blatant deception on that matter. Where a person represents that he or she is disease‑free, and consent is given on that basis, deception on that matter goes to the very nature of the sexual act. To say that such a person commits fraud vitiating consent, thereby rendering the contact an assault, seems right and logical. A return to the pre‑Clarence view of the common law that deception as to venereal disease may vitiate consent would catch the conduct here at issue, without permitting people to be convicted of assault for other inducements, and would draw a clear line between criminal and non‑criminal conduct. This proposed extension of the law is relatively narrow, catching only deceit as to venereal disease where it is established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was a high risk of infection and that the defendant knew or ought to have known that the fraud actually induced consent to unprotected sex. This limited change will not have far‑reaching, unforeseeable or undesirable ramifications. The common law should thus be changed to permit deceit as to sexually transmitted disease that induces consent to be treated as fraud vitiating consent under s. 265 of the Criminal Code .
Cases Cited
By Cory J.
Not followed: R. v. Clarence (1888), 22 Q.B.D. 23; R. v. Ssenyonga (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 257; R. v. Petrozzi (1987), 35 C.C.C. (3d) 528; considered: State v. Lankford, 102 A. 63 (1917); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal.Rptr. 273 (1984); R. v. Bennett (1866), 4 F. & F. 1105, 176 E.R. 925; R. v. Sinclair (1867), 13 Cox C.C. 28; referred to: R. v. Thornton, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 445; R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714; Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226; Bolduc v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 677; R. v. Maurantonio, [1968] 1 O.R. 145; In re London and Globe Finance Corp., [1903] 1 Ch. 728; Scott v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1975] A.C. 819; R. v. Olan, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1175; R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5; R. v. Brasso Datsun (Calgary) Ltd. (1977), 39 C.R.N.S. 1; R. v. Zlatic, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29; R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 R.C.S. 1013.
By L’Heureux‑Dubé J.
Referred to: R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714; R. v. Burden (1981), 25 C.R. (3d) 283; R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5; R. v. Hinchey, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128.
By McLachlin J.
Applied: R. v. Bennett (1866), 4 F. & F. 1105, 176 E.R. 925; R. v. Sinclair (1867), 13 Cox C.C. 28; not followed: R. v. Clarence (1888), 22 Q.B.D. 23; referred to: R. v. McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686; R. v. Deruelle, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 663; Marcotte v. Deputy Attorney General for Canada, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108; R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714; R. v. Petrozzi (1987), 35 C.C.C. (3d) 528; R. v. Ssenyonga (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 257; Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750; R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654; R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925; Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210; Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Maurantonio, [1968] 1 O.R. 145; R. v. Dee (1884), 14 L.R. Ir. 468; R. v. Flattery (1877), 2 Q.B.D. 410; Hegarty v. Shine (1878), 14 Cox C.C. 145; R. v. Case (1850), 1 Den. 580, 169 E.R. 381; R. v. Linekar, [1995] 3 All E.R. 69; R. v. Mercer (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 41.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C‑34, ss. 143 [rep. 1980‑81‑82‑83, c. 125, s. 6], 149 [am. 1972, c. 13, s. 70; rep. 1980‑81‑82‑83, c. 125, s. 8], 244 [rep. & sub. 1974‑75‑76, c. 93, s. 21].
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 221 , 265 , 268 , 273.2 (b) [en. 1992, c. 38, s. 1], 274 to 278 [formerly R.S.C. 1970, c. C‑34, ss. 246.4 to 246.8].
Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, ss. 259, 266.
Interpretation Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I‑21, s. 45(2) .
Authors Cited
Boyle, Christine. “The Judicial Construction of Sexual Assault Offences”. In Julian V. Roberts and Renate M. Mohr, eds., Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, 136.
Boyle, Christine L. M. Sexual Assault. Toronto: Carswell, 1984.
Canada. Health Canada. Laboratory Centre for Disease Control. Bureau of HIV/AIDS and STD Update Series. “AIDS and HIV in Canada”, in HIV/AIDS Epi Update, November 1997.
Canada. Health Canada. Laboratory Centre for Disease Control. Bureau of HIV/AIDS and STD Update Series. “Oral Contraceptive and Condom Use”, in STD Epi Update, November 1997.
Dwyer, John M. “Legislating AIDS Away: The Limited Role of Legal Persuasion in Minimizing the Spread of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus” (1993), 9 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 167.
Elliot, Richard. Criminal Law and HIV/AIDS: Final Report. Montreal: Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network and Canadian AIDS Society, March 1997.
Great Britain. Law Commission. Consultation Paper No. 134. Criminal Law: Consent and Offences against the Person. London: H.M.S.O., 1994.
Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol. 11(1), 4th ed. reissue. London: Butterworths, 1990.
Holland, Winifred H. “HIV/AIDS and the Criminal Law” (1994), 36 Crim. L.Q. 279.
Kenney, Stephen V. “Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons from History and a Model for the Future” (1992), 8 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 245.
McGinnis, Janice Dickin. “Law and the Leprosies of Lust: Regulating Syphilis and AIDS” (1990), 22 Ottawa L. Rev. 49.
Mewett, Alan W., and Morris Manning. Criminal Law, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1985.
Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law, 3rd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1994.
Smith, John Cyril, and Brian Hogan. Criminal Law, 4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1978.
Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames. A History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 2. London: MacMillan & Co., 1883.
Tierney, Thomas W. “Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of HIV: An International Analysis” (1992), 15 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 475.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Center for Health Statistics. Vital and Health Statistics: Fertility, Family Planning, and Women’s Health -- New Data From the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth, Series 23: Data From the National Survey of Family Growth, No. 19. Hyattsville, Maryland: DHHS Publication, May 1997.
Watt, David. The New Offences Against the Person: The Provisions of Bill C‑127. Toronto: Butterworths, 1984.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (1996), 83 B.C.A.C. 295, 136 W.A.C. 295, 141 D.L.R. (4th) 503, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 261, 3 C.R. (5th) 330, [1996] B.C.J. No. 2229 (QL), dismissing the Crown’s appeal from the accused’s acquittal on two charges of aggravated assault (1995), 26 W.C.B. (2d) 378. Appeal allowed and new trial ordered.
William F. Ehrcke, Q.C., for the appellant.
Douglas J. Stewart and Todd A. McKendrick, for the respondent.
Renee M. Pomerance, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario.
John G. Dives and Harbans K. Dhillon, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
Marlys Edwardh and Richard Elliott, for the interveners Canadian AIDS Society, Persons with AIDS Society of British Columbia and Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network.
The following are the reasons delivered by
1 L’Heureux-Dubé J. -- This appeal must determine whether the accused’s misrepresentation as to his HIV-positive status can nullify the complainants’ apparent consent to sexual intercourse so as to bring the sexual activity in question within the scope of the Criminal Code offence of aggravated assault. I have read the different reasons of my colleagues, Justices Cory and McLachlin, and although I agree with the result that they both reach, I disagree with the respective routes that they take to reach that result. In particular, I disagree with McLachlin J.’s conclusion that Parliament did not intend to move away from the strict common law approach to the vitiation of consent by fraud in the assault context. Likewise, although I share Cory J.’s conclusion that Parliament did intend such a change, I cannot agree with the new test that he articulates to determine the additional circumstances in which fraud will vitiate consent.
2 The central issue in this appeal is the interpretation to be given to the word “fraud” as it appears in s. 265(3) (c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 . As “fraud” is not defined in the assault scheme in the Criminal Code , it is left to the courts to interpret its meaning as it relates to consent to the application of force. Consistent with established principles of statutory interpretation, the interpretation of “fraud” in s. 265(3) (c) must give effect to the intention of Parliament, and it must be informed by an appreciation of the context of the Criminal Code , its purposes, and the particular objectives of the assault scheme to which the fraud provision relates.
3 Contrary to McLachlin J.’s interpretation of legislative intent, I agree with Cory J.’s conclusion that the 1983 amendment to the Criminal Code , in which the rape and indecent assault provisions were reconstituted as the offence of sexual assault, and the words “false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act” were removed, evidences Parliament’s intention to move away from the unreasonably strict common law approach to the vitiation of consent by fraud.
4 In further support of Cory J.’s conclusion, it is important also to appreciate the more general objectives of the 1983 amendments. Public pressure, based on dissatisfaction with the offences of indecent assault and rape, and the legal treatment of these issues, led to the 1983 amendments: C. Boyle, Sexual Assault (1984), at pp. 27-29. The amendments were not restricted to merely reclassifying indecent assault and rape as sexual assault, as McLachlin J. implies, but were aimed much more broadly at modernizing and sensitizing the law’s approach to sexual offences, which are predominantly perpetrated by men against women. Included in the amendments was a provision abrogating the evidentiary rules relating to the doctrine of recent complaint in sexual assault cases (s. 275), a provision stating that corroboration of a complainant’s testimony is no longer required in such cases in order to secure a conviction (s. 274), provisions restricting the evidentiary uses of a complainant’s sexual history (s. 276) and sexual reputation (s. 277), and a provision repealing the marital exemption to sexual assault (s. 278).
5 The substantial overhaul that Parliament undertook with the 1983 amendments implies that it was dissatisfied with the traditional approach to sexual offences. This approach had been informed by the common law, as well as previous statutory codifications. In this context of discontent with the law’s historical treatment of victims of sexual offences, and in light of the removal of the words “false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act”, it is clear that Parliament intended to move away from the traditional approach to fraud as it relates to consent in sexual assault offences.
6 The specific redrafting of the consent provision that occurred in 1983 lends further support to the conclusion that Parliament intended that a modified approach be taken to the issue of fraud and consent. Immediately prior to 1983, the general assault provision (R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 244) read as follows:
244. A person commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another person or with consent, where it is obtained by fraud, he applies force intentionally to the person of the other, directly or indirectly;
The rape provision (s. 143) read as follows:
143. A male person commits rape when he has sexual intercourse with a female person who is not his wife,
(a) without her consent, or
(b) with her consent if the consent
(i) is extorted by threats or fear of bodily harm,
(ii) is obtained by personating her husband, or
(iii) is obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act.
The indecent assault provision (s. 149) read as follows:
149. (1) Every one who indecently assaults a female person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
(2) An accused who is charged with an offence under subsection (1) may be convicted if the evidence establishes that the accused did anything to the female person with her consent that, but for her consent, would have been an indecent assault, if her consent was obtained by false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act.
The new general assault provision, which applies to all of the assault offences, has integrated the different means of vitiating consent that were a part of the provisions that it replaced. It reads as follows:
265. (1) A person commits an assault when
(a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly;
. . .
(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist by reason of
(a) the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant;
(b) threats or fear of the application of force to the complainant or to a person other than the complainant;
(c) fraud; or
(d) the exercise of authority.
7 An examination of the content of s. 265(3) is particularly significant when compared to the provisions that it replaced. First, it is clear that Parliament intended to expand the circumstances in which consent would be vitiated. Henceforth in the Criminal Code ’s treatment of assault or sexual offences, both the exercise of authority (s. 265(3) (d)), and the application of force, or the threat thereof, to a person other than the complainant (s. 265(3) (a) and (b)), were to be considered consent-vitiating factors. Implying that Parliament’s intent was to permit a broader interpretation of the concept of “fraud” by enacting s. 265(3) (c) free of any qualifiers, is entirely consistent with the general thrust of s. 265(3) .
8 Second, some significance must be attributed to the new way in which the vitiation of consent is conceived by s. 265(3). The old provisions state that an offence has still been committed even where consent was obtained, if that consent was obtained in a particular manner: i.e. through false and fraudulent representations as to the nature and quality of the act. But s. 265(3) does not state simply that actions are unlawful if consent was obtained under vitiating circumstances. Instead, s. 265(3) says that “no consent is obtained where the complainant submits or does not resist” because of the presence of one of the enumerated factors. (Emphasis added.) In their treatise Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 789, A. W. Mewett and M. Manning suggest that this change is crucial and entails “a fundamental shift in the scope of operative fraud”, and is not just a perpetuation of the traditional approach to fraud in sexual assault contexts:
[W]e should no longer be concerned with whether there is consent and worry about whether it has been vitiated, but whether there has been submission or no resistance and worry about whether the reason for that submission or lack of resistance is fraud. This indicates that the inquiry under the new provisions is not, as it was under the old legislation, into whether there is any factor that negatives any consent to that act, but into whether there has been any submission or failure to resist by reason of any fraud. . . . [W]hat is relevant is not whether there has been any fraud going to the nature and quality of the act but whether there has been any fraud by reason of which the victim submitted or failed to resist, and surely those two things are very different. [Emphasis in original.]
9 McLachlin J. dismisses these substantial legislative developments as an “absence of evidence that Parliament discussed or considered the matter” (par. 51), and claims therefore that any modification of the existing common law beyond an incremental change amounts to unwarranted judicial interference with Parliament’s assigned role. On the contrary, there is ample evidence to justify the conclusion that Parliament changed the approach to be taken to fraud as it relates to consent in the assault context, thereby permitting the courts to perform their proper function of discerning Parliament’s intent in order to interpret this new legislative provision. While Cory J. accepts to a certain extent that Parliament intended to unburden the notion of fraud by removing the qualification that it must relate to the nature and quality of the act, he refuses to consider that the change was as significant and principled as, for example, Mewett and Manning suggest. Accordingly, it is with what Cory J. proposes to do with this newly liberated fraud provision, that I disagree. A further examination of the assault scheme as a whole and the objectives of the Criminal Code assault provisions will, in my view, demonstrate the reasons for taking a different approach to the interpretation of s. 265(3) (c).
10 Section 265 of the Criminal Code describes the general elements that underlie all of the assault offences, including assault, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault. The essence of all forms of assault, as laid out in s. 265 , is the intentional, non-consensual application of force, or the threat thereof. “Force” can include any touching, no matter the degree of strength or power applied, and therefore is not only those physical acts designed to maim or cause injury. Where the application of force is consensual, there is no assault (except in limited circumstances such as those explained in R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714, which does not apply to this case). However, in certain situations, s. 265(3) operates to determine when, superficial appearances to the contrary, no consent has been obtained, thus precluding any defence of consent.
11 As can be seen from an examination of the underlying elements of assault, which form the basis of all of the assault provisions, the Criminal Code prohibition against the intentional and non-consensual application of force is very broadly constructed. Any unwanted touching by another, no matter how minimal the force that is applied, is criminal. The physical acts prohibited by the assault scheme include not only a punch in the face, or forced sexual intercourse at knife-point, but also placing one’s hand on the thigh of the person sitting adjacent on the bus: see R. v. Burden (1981), 25 C.R. (3d) 283 (B.C.C.A.). Clearly, the purpose of the assault scheme is much broader than just the protection of persons from serious physical harm. The assault scheme is aimed more generally at protecting people’s physical integrity.
12 Relatedly, the assault scheme is also about protecting and promoting people’s physical autonomy, by recognizing each individual’s power to consent, or to withhold consent, to any touching. The meaningfulness of the right to consent, and thus of the right to stipulate under which conditions a person wishes to be touched, is further protected by s. 265(3). In general, s. 265(3) lists factors that have the effect of making a person’s consent to the application of force meaningless. Where those factors are present, a true expression of a complainant’s autonomous will cannot be obtained. Parliament has recognized with s. 265(3), that in order to maximize the protection of physical integrity and personal autonomy, only consent obtained without negating the voluntary agency of the person being touched, is legally valid.
13 Given these objectives of the Criminal Code assault scheme, and the important protections inherent in the individual’s power to consent or deny consent, how should “fraud” be interpreted in relation to consent in s. 265(3) (c)? When interpreting s. 265(3) (c), it is important to keep in mind that it applies to consent to all forms of assault, not, for example, just sexual assault, or assault where there is potential or actual serious physical injury. The interpretation of the fraud provision, therefore, should be based on principles that are consistent across the different assault contexts. In this respect, I must expressly disagree with the approach taken by my colleague, Cory J. In my view, his interpretation of the fraud provision is inconsistent with such a principled approach to statutory interpretation.
14 Cory J. states that, apart from the traditional common law approach where the fraud relates to “the nature and quality of the act”, fraud will only vitiate consent in the sexual assault context where an accused’s objectively dishonest act has “the effect of exposing the person consenting to a significant risk of serious bodily harm” (para. 128 (emphasis added)). Notwithstanding the fact that the accused in this appeal has been charged with aggravated assault and not sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault, in my view, my colleague’s test has the effect of creating a different interpretation of “fraud” depending on the sexual nature of the particular offence with which an accused has been charged. In my view, my colleague’s interpretation has the effect of undoing what Parliament accomplished with its 1983 amendment of the Criminal Code : it re-introduces, in the sexual assault context, artificial limitations as to when fraud will negate consent to physical contact. With respect, I cannot accept the correctness of such limitations, nor support reverting, once again, to the singular and differential treatment of sexual assault.
15 As I have explained, the assault scheme is very broad in its objectives to protect people’s physical integrity from unwanted physical contact, and to protect people’s personal autonomy to decide under what conditions they will consent to be touched. Section 265(3) provides further protection to ensure that when consent is obtained, that consent is a true reflection of a person’s autonomous will. Where fraud is concerned, Cory J. would limit its consent-vitiating effects to the traditional common law approach, and to those assault contexts where there is a “significant risk of serious bodily harm”. But that which is integral to a principled interpretation of fraud is its causal effect on consent, and the objectives of the assault scheme. Accordingly, it is appropriate to define fraud in terms of its relationship to consent, as well as to any and all forms of assault, and not just in terms of the proximity and severity of the risks associated with the acts for which consent is being given.
16 In my view, considering the wording of s. 265(3)(c), as well as the objectives and context of the Criminal Code and the assault scheme, fraud is simply about whether the dishonest act in question induced another to consent to the ensuing physical act, whether or not that act was particularly risky and dangerous. The focus of the inquiry into whether fraud vitiated consent so as to make certain physical contact non-consensual should be on whether the nature and execution of the deceit deprived the complainant of the ability to exercise his or her will in relation to his or her physical integrity with respect to the activity in question. As Mewett and Manning, supra, explain at p. 789: “There must be a causal connection between the fraud and the submission” to the act. Where fraud is in issue, the Crown would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in a manner designed to induce the complainant to submit to a specific activity, and that absent the dishonesty, the complainant would not have submitted to the particular activity, thus considering the impugned act to be a non-consensual application of force. See C. Boyle, “The Judicial Construction of Sexual Assault Offences”, in J. V. Roberts and R. M. Mohr, eds., Confronting Sexual Assault: A Decade of Legal and Social Change (1994), 136, at p. 146; and Great Britain, Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 134, Criminal Law: Consent and Offences against the Person (1994), at pp. 51-52. The dishonesty of the submission-inducing act would be assessed based on the objective standard of the reasonable person. The Crown also would be required to prove that the accused knew, or was aware, that his or her dishonest actions would induce the complainant to submit to the particular activity. For a similar articulation of the elements of fraud, see R. v. Théroux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 5, at pp. 25-26.
17 In considering this case, the following facts would be sufficient to establish the objective dishonesty of the accused’s actions, and to infer that the accused knew that his actions induced the complainants’ submission to unprotected sex: the accused knew that he was HIV-positive, he was aware of the contagious and life-threatening nature of the disease, he was advised by public health nurses to always wear a condom and inform his partners of his HIV-positive status, he expressed fears that disclosure of his status to potential partners would end his sex-life, he lied about his HIV-positive status to one of the complainants, and he failed to disclose it to the other complainant in circumstances that called for its disclosure.
18 In my view, this interpretation of fraud as it relates to consent has the effect of maximizing the individual’s right to determine by whom, and under what conditions, he or she will consent to physical contact by another. This approach is also respectful of the legislative context because it can be applied with equal consistency to all of the assault offences to which the fraud provision relates.
19 An interpretation of fraud that focuses only on the sexual assault context, and which limits it only to those situations where a “significant risk of serious bodily harm” is evident, is unjustifiably restrictive. Such a particularization and limitation is nowhere present in the assault scheme, because Parliament removed any qualifications to the fraud provision as it relates to sexual assault. It must be noted that where sexual assault is concerned, those receiving the protection of the Criminal Code are overwhelmingly women. Limiting the definition of fraud in the sexual assault context in the way that Cory J. proposes is to potentially fall into the same trap as those people who believe that rape in the absence of physical “violence”, where the complainant just froze and did not fight back or was unconscious, is not a serious crime. The essence of the offence, as I have stated, is not the presence of physical violence or the potential for serious bodily harm, but the violation of the complainant’s physical dignity in a manner contrary to her autonomous will. That violation of physical dignity and personal autonomy is what justifies criminal sanction, and always has, irrespective of the risk or degree of bodily harm involved. Why should fraud be defined more broadly in the commercial context, which is designed to protect property interests, than it is for sexual assault, which is one of the worst violations of h