Reference re Firearms Act (Can.)

Reference re Firearms Act (Can.)
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2000-06-15
Neutral citation
2000 SCC 31
Report
[2000] 1 SCR 783
Case number
26933
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; L'Heureux-Dubé, Claire; Gonthier, Charles Doherty; Iacobucci, Frank; Major, John C.; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; Arbour, Louise; LeBel, Louis
On appeal from
Alberta
Subjects
Constitutional law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 26933
Decision Content
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783
IN THE MATTER OF Section 27(1) of the Judicature Act,
R.S.A. 1980, chapter J-1
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Reference by the
Lieutenant Governor in Council to the Court of Appeal
of Alberta for hearing and consideration of the questions
set out in Order in Council 461/96 respecting the Firearms
Act, S.C. 1995, chapter 39
The Attorney General for Alberta Appellant
v.
The Attorney General of Canada Respondent
and
The Attorney General for Ontario, the Attorney General of Nova Scotia,
the Attorney General for New Brunswick, the Attorney General of Manitoba,
the Attorney General for Saskatchewan,
the Government of the Northwest Territories,
the Minister of Justice for the Government of the Yukon Territory,
the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations,
the Coalition of Responsible Firearm Owners and Sportsmen (CORFOS),
the Law-Abiding Unregistered Firearms Association (LUFA),
the Shooting Federation of Canada,
the Association pour la santé publique du Québec inc.,
the Alberta Council of Women’s Shelters, CAVEAT,
the Fondation des victimes du 6 décembre contre la violence,
the Canadian Association for Adolescent Health,
the Canadian Pediatric Society, the Coalition for Gun Control,
the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police,
the Corporation of the City of Toronto,
the City of Montreal and the City of Winnipeg Interveners
Indexed as: Reference re Firearms Act (Can.)
Neutral citation: 2000 SCC 31.
File No.: 26933.
2000: February 21, 22; 2000: June 15.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and L’Heureux‑Dubé, Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for alberta
Constitutional law -- Division of powers -- Criminal law power -- Firearms -- Licensing and registration of ordinary firearms -- Whether licensing and registration provisions of Firearms Act intra vires Parliament -- Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(27) -- Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 .
In 1995, Parliament amended the Criminal Code by enacting the Firearms Act . The amendments require the holders of all firearms to obtain licences and register their guns. Alberta referred constitutional questions to the Court of Appeal to determine whether the licensing and registration provisions of the Firearms Act , as they relate to ordinary firearms, are intra vires Parliament. The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that the Act is a valid exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power. Alberta appealed to this Court.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed. The impugned provisions of the Firearms Act are constitutional.
The Firearms Act constitutes a valid exercise of Parliament’s jurisdiction over criminal law. The Act in “pith and substance” is directed to enhancing public safety by controlling access to firearms. Its purpose is to deter the misuse of firearms, control those given access to guns, and control specific types of weapons. It is aimed at a number of “mischiefs”, including the illegal trade in guns, both within Canada and across the border with the United States, and the link between guns and violent crime, suicide, and accidental deaths. The purpose of the Firearms Act conforms with the historical public safety focus of all gun control laws. The changes introduced by the Act represent a limited expansion of the pre-existing gun control legislation. The effects of the Act also suggest that its essence is the promotion of public safety. The criteria for acquiring a licence are concerned with safety. Criminal record checks and background investigations are designed to keep guns out of the hands of those incapable of using them safely. Safety courses ensure that gun owners are qualified.
The Firearms Act possesses all three criteria required for a criminal law. Gun control has traditionally been considered valid criminal law because guns are dangerous and pose a risk to public safety. The regulation of guns as dangerous products is a valid purpose within the criminal law power. That purpose is connected to prohibitions backed by penalties.
The Firearms Act is not essentially regulatory legislation. The Act’s complexity does not necessarily detract from its criminal nature. Nor does the law give either the chief firearms officer or the Registrar undue discretion. The offences are clearly defined in the Act. The chief firearms officer and the Registrar are explicitly subject to the supervision of the courts. Further, the law’s prohibitions and penalties are not regulatory in nature. They are not confined to ensuring compliance with a scheme, but independently serve the purpose of public safety. Parliament’s intention was not to regulate property, but to ensure that only those who prove themselves qualified to hold a licence are permitted to possess firearms of any sort. Finally, Parliament may use indirect means to further the end of public safety.
The 1995 gun control scheme is distinguishable from existing provincial property regulation schemes. The Act addresses the aspects of gun control which relate to the dangerous nature of firearms and the need to reduce misuse. While ordinary guns are often used for lawful purposes, they are also used for crime and suicide, and cause accidental death and injury. Their control accordingly falls within the criminal law power.
The registration provisions cannot be severed from the rest of the Act. The licensing provisions require everyone who possesses a gun to be licensed; the registration provisions require all guns to be registered. These portions of the Firearms Act are both tightly linked to Parliament’s goal of promoting safety by reducing the misuse of any and all firearms. Both portions are integral and necessary to the operation of the scheme.
The Firearms Act does not trench on provincial powers such that upholding it as criminal law will upset the balance of federalism. The provinces have not established that the effects of the Act on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights are more than incidental. First, the mere fact that guns are property does not suffice to show that a gun control law is in pith and substance a provincial matter. Second, the Act does not significantly hinder the ability of the provinces to regulate the property and civil rights aspects of guns. Third, assuming (without deciding) that the provincial legislatures have the jurisdiction to enact a law in relation to the property aspects of firearms, the double aspect doctrine permits Parliament to address the safety aspects of ordinary firearms. Fourth, the Firearms Act does not precipitate the federal government’s entry into a new field since gun control has been the subject of federal law since Confederation. There is no colourable intrusion into provincial jurisdiction.
The problems associated with the misuse of firearms are firmly grounded in morality. However, even if gun control did not involve morality, it could still fall under the federal criminal law power. Parliament can use the criminal law to prohibit activities which have little relation to public morality.
The apprehensions of northern, rural and aboriginal Canadians that this law does not address their particular needs do not go to the question of Parliament’s jurisdiction to enact the law. The cost of the program and the efficacy of the law, or lack thereof, are equally irrelevant to Parliament’s ability to enact it under the division of powers analysis. Within its constitutional sphere, Parliament is the judge of whether a measure is likely to achieve its intended purpose.
Cases Cited
Applied: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; referred to: Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, 2000 SCC 21; Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862; Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373; Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1939] A.C. 117; Texada Mines Ltd. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1960] S.C.R. 713; R. v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443; McGuigan v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 284; Attorney General of Canada v. Pattison (1981), 30 A.R. 83; Martinoff v. Dawson (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 482; R. v. Northcott, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 38; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662; General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641; Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1; Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 501; R. v. Cosman’s Furniture (1972) Ltd. (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 312; Scowby v. Glendinning, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 226; Westendorp v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43; R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940; R. v. Felawka, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 199; R. v. Wetmore, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 284; Boggs v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 49; Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; R. v. Furtney, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 89; Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616; Lord’s Day Alliance of Canada v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1959] S.C.R. 497; Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 504; Validity of Section 92(4) of the Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.), [1958] S.C.R. 608; Provincial Secretary of Prince Edward Island v. Egan, [1941] S.C.R. 396; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; Consortium Developments (Clearwater) Ltd. v. Sarnia (City), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 3; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85; Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1937] A.C. 368; R. v. Chiasson (1982), 66 C.C.C. (2d) 195, aff’d [1984] 1 S.C.R. 266; Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1931] A.C. 310.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 16 (4th Supp.).
Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 91(27) , 92(13) .
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, ss. 2 “firearm” [ad. 1995, c. 39, s. 138], 84, 85 [repl. idem, s. 139 ], 86 [idem], 87 [idem], 91 [idem].
Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, ss. 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 58 , 60 , 61 , 64 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 74 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93 , 94 , 112 , 115 .
Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-27 .
Authors Cited
Beatty, David M. Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.
Beatty, David M. “Gun Control and Judicial Anarchy” (1999), 10 Constitutional Forum 45.
Canada. Department of Justice. The Government’s Action Plan on Firearms Control. Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Goverment Services Canada, 1994.
Canada. Department of Justice. The Impact of the Availability of Firearms on Violent Crime, Suicide, and Accidental Death: A Review of the Literature with Special Reference to the Canadian Situation. Working Document by Thomas Gabor. Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1994.
Canada. House of Commons Debates, vol. 133, No. 154, 1st Sess., 35th Parl., February 16, 1995, pp. 9706-7.
Canada. Senate. Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Proceeding of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. Issue No. 61. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1995.
Davies, Elaine M. “The 1995 Firearms Act : Canada’s Public Relations Response to the Myth of Violence” (2000), 6 Appeal 44.
Friedland, Martin L. A Century of Criminal Justice: Perspectives on the Development of Canadian Law. Toronto: Carswell, 1984.
Gibson, Dale. “The Firearms Reference in the Alberta Court of Appeal” (1999), 37 Alta. L. Rev. 1071.
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992 (updated 1997).
Hutchinson, Allan C., and David Schneiderman. “Smoking Guns: The Federal Government Confronts The Tobacco and Gun Lobbies” (1995), 7 Constitutional Forum 16.
Lederman, William R. Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas: Essays on the Constitutional History, Public Law and Federal System of Canada. Toronto: Butterworths, 1981.
MacLellan, Russell. “Canada’s firearms proposals” (1995), 37 Can. J. Crim. 163.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal (1998), 219 A.R. 201, 179 W.A.C. 201, 65 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 164 D.L.R. (4th) 513, 19 C.R. (5th) 63, 128 C.C.C. (3d) 225, [1999] 2 W.W.R. 579, [1998] A.J. No. 1028 (QL), upholding the constitutionality of the licensing and registration provisions of the Firearms Act . Appeal dismissed.
Roderick A. McLennan, Q.C., Thomas W. R. Ross and Neal A. McLennan, for the appellant.
Graham R. Garton, Q.C., and Sheilah Martin, Q.C., for the respondent.
Robert E. Charney and Edward J. Maksimowski, for the intervener the Attorney General for Ontario.
Louise Walsh Poirier and Reinhold Endres, Q.C., for the intervener the Attorney General of Nova Scotia.
Gabriel Bourgeois, for the intervener the Attorney General for New Brunswick.
Kenneth J. Tyler, for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba.
Graeme G. Mitchell, Q.C., and Thomson Irvine, for the intervener the Attorney General for Saskatchewan.
Scott Duke, for the intervener the Government of the Northwest Territories.
William Craik and Lee Kirkpatrick, for the Minister of Justice for the Government of the Yukon Territory.
Delia Opekokew, Darren W. Winegarden, Albert C. Peeling and John D. Parsons, for the intervener the Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations.
Dallas K. Miller, Q.C., for the intervener the Coalition of Responsible Firearm Owners and Sportsmen.
David R. Holman, for the intervener the Law-Abiding Unregistered Firearms Association.
Brian A. Crane, Q.C., and Paul Shaw, for the intervener the Shooting Federation of Canada.
Paul Larochelle, Q.C., and Michèle Thivierge, for the intervener the Association pour la santé publique du Québec inc.
Alexander D. Pringle, Q.C., and June Ross, for the intervener the Alberta Council of Women’s Shelters.
Peter A. Downard, Paul F. Monahan and Rochelle S. Fox, for the interveners CAVEAT, the Fondation des victimes du 6 décembre contre la violence, the Canadian Association for Adolescent Health and the Canadian Pediatric Society.
Jill Copeland, for the interveners the Coalition for Gun Control, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the Corporation of the City of Toronto, the City of Montreal and the City of Winnipeg.
The following is the judgment delivered by
The Court --
I. Introduction
1 In 1995, Parliament amended the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 , by enacting the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 , commonly referred to as the gun control law, to require the holders of all firearms to obtain licences and register their guns. In 1996, the Province of Alberta challenged Parliament’s power to pass the gun control law by a reference to the Alberta Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal by a 3:2 majority upheld Parliament’s power to pass the law. The Province of Alberta now appeals that decision to this Court.
2 The issue before this Court is not whether gun control is good or bad, whether the law is fair or unfair to gun owners, or whether it will be effective or ineffective in reducing the harm caused by the misuse of firearms. The only issue is whether or not Parliament has the constitutional authority to enact the law.
3 The answer to this question lies in the Canadian Constitution. The Constitution assigns some matters to Parliament and others to the provincial legislatures: Constitution Act, 1867 . The federal government asserts that the gun control law falls under its criminal law power, s. 91(27) , and under its general power to legislate for the “Peace, Order and good Government” of Canada. Alberta, on the other hand, says the law falls under its power over property and civil rights, s. 92(13) . All agree that to resolve this dispute, the Court must first determine what the gun control law is really about – its “pith and substance” – and then ask which head or heads of power it most naturally falls within.
4 We conclude that the gun control law comes within Parliament’s jurisdiction over criminal law. The law in “pith and substance” is directed to enhancing public safety by controlling access to firearms through prohibitions and penalties. This brings it under the federal criminal law power. While the law has regulatory aspects, they are secondary to its primary criminal law purpose. The intrusion of the law into the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights is not so excessive as to upset the balance of federalism.
II. Reference Questions
5 The formal questions put to the Alberta Court of Appeal by the Alberta government in 1996 are attached in Appendix A. Simply put, the issue before us is whether or not the licensing and registration provisions in the Firearms Act , as they relate to ordinary firearms, were validly enacted by Parliament. The impugned provisions of the Act are attached in Appendix B.
III. Legislation
6 For many years, the Criminal Code has restricted access to firearms, mainly automatic weapons and handguns, by classifying some as prohibited and some as restricted. The Firearms Act amendments extended this regulation to all firearms, including rifles and shotguns. As a result, s. 84 of the Criminal Code now controls three classes of firearms: (1) prohibited firearms (generally automatic weapons); (2) restricted firearms (generally handguns); and (3) all other firearms (generally rifles and shotguns). The third class of guns is variously referred to as “ordinary firearms”, “long guns”, and “unrestricted firearms”. We will refer to this class as “ordinary firearms”.
7 The reference questions focus on the validity of the licensing and registration provisions for ordinary firearms introduced by the Firearms Act . The licensing sections of the Act provide that a person must be licensed in order to possess a firearm. Eligibility for a licence reflects safety interests. An applicant with a criminal record involving drug offences or violence, or a history of mental illness, may be denied a licence. An applicant who seeks to acquire a firearm must pass a safety course which requires a basic understanding of firearm safety and the legal responsibilities of firearm ownership. The chief firearms officer, who issues licences, may conduct a background check on the applicant in order to determine eligibility, and may attach conditions to a licence. Once issued, a licence is valid for five years, but it may be revoked for contravention of its conditions or for certain criminal convictions. A licence refusal or revocation may be appealed to a court.
8 The registration provisions of the Act are more limited. A firearm cannot be registered unless the applicant is licensed to possess that type of firearm. Registration is generally done by reference to the serial number on the firearm. A registration certificate is valid as long as its holder owns the weapon. If ownership of a registered weapon is transferred, the new owner must register the weapon. In order to give gun owners time to register their weapons, people who owned ordinary firearms as of January 1, 1998 are deemed to hold registration certificates that are valid until January 1, 2003. Possession of an unregistered firearm of any type is an offence. All licences and registration certificates, along with imported, exported, lost and stolen guns, are recorded in the Canadian Firearms Registry, which is operated by a federal appointee.
IV. Reasons of the Alberta Court of Appeal
9 The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the 1995 gun control law by a 3:2 majority: (1998), 65 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1. The court wrote four judgments.
A. Majority
10 Fraser C.J.A., in a comprehensive judgment, began by noting that guns may be regulated by both the federal and provincial governments for different purposes, and that the effectiveness of the law is irrelevant to its constitutional characterization. She found that Parliament’s purpose in enacting the law was to enhance public safety. While guns preserve lives and serve as useful tools, they also wound and kill. The latter aspect of guns – their inherent dangerousness – is the focus of the impugned provisions of the Act. Parliament’s aim was to reduce the misuse of guns in crime, including domestic violence, as well as to reduce suicides and accidents caused by the misuse of firearms. The licensing provisions, which require applicants to pass a safety course and undergo a criminal record check and background investigation, support this purpose. The registration system, by seeking to reduce smuggling, theft and illegal sales, also addresses misuse. The licensing and registration provisions are inextricably intertwined. While the provisions entail the regulation of property rights, this regulation is the means of the law, not its end. On this basis, Fraser C.J.A. concluded that the Act is in pith and substance designed to protect public safety from the misuse of firearms.
11 Fraser C.J.A. went on to the second step in the analysis: considering whether or not that pith and substance could be allocated to one of Parliament’s heads of power under the Constitution Act, 1867 . She held that the legislation falls under the criminal law power, s. 91(27) , under either its “prevention” aspect or its “prohibition, penalty, and purpose” aspect. The law does not represent a “colourable” or improper intrusion into provincial jurisdiction.
12 Berger and Hetherington JJ.A. wrote separate opinions agreeing with the Chief Justice. Hetherington J.A. held that any firearm, used improperly, is dangerous to human life and health. As a result, Parliament’s purpose, in seeking to prevent crime and promote public safety by discouraging possession, is a valid criminal law purpose. The potential inefficacy of the law, highlighted by Alberta and the other provincial governments, is irrelevant unless it shows that Parliament had a different purpose – a colourable motive. Colourability has not been shown because the law genuinely attempts to improve firearms storage, reduce trafficking, and aid in tracking guns generally. While the law may affect property and civil rights, that does not prevent Parliament from enacting it. Hetherington J.A. concluded that the Firearms Act contains prohibitions accompanied by penal sanctions, enacted for criminal public purposes, and therefore it is a valid law under the test propounded by La Forest J. of this Court in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, and R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213.
13 Berger J.A. likewise noted that all guns are capable of causing death if misused. He held that Parliament’s purpose in enacting the legislation was to ensure that firearms are only possessed by those qualified to use them. The licensing provisions identify those who are qualified. The registration system ensures that only qualified people can acquire firearms. As a prohibition backed by a penalty, for a public purpose, the law is a valid exercise of Parliament’s criminal law power. The regulatory aspects of the law are merely the means to an end.
B. Minority
14 Conrad J.A. dissented, Irving J.A. concurring. Conrad J.A. broadly defined the purpose of the law as regulating all aspects of the possession and use of firearms. While firearms and safety are subjects of both federal and provincial concern, the criminal law power represents a “carve-out” from provincial jurisdiction. The regulation of ownership rather than use and the complexity of the regulations demonstrate that this legislation cannot be classified as valid criminal law. The Criminal Code generally prohibits acts, rather than regulating ownership. Possession itself is not dangerous; it is only misuse that is dangerous, and the law goes far beyond prohibiting misuse. This led Conrad J.A. to conclude that the Firearms Act represents a colourable intrusion into the provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, and is invalid as an exercise of Parliament’s jurisdiction over criminal law or its peace, order and good government power. While she would have struck down the legislation entirely, she held that if the licensing scheme were deemed valid, the registration scheme could be severed from the licensing scheme.
V. Analysis
15 The issue before us is whether the licensing and registration provisions of the Firearms Act constitute a valid federal enactment pursuant to Parliament’s jurisdiction over criminal law or its peace, order and good government power. In order to answer this question, we must engage in the division of powers analysis used so often by this Court, and most recently summarized in Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, 2000 SCC 21; see also Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273, R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, and R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463. There are two stages to this analysis. The first step is to determine the “pith and substance” or essential character of the law. The second step is to classify that essential character by reference to the heads of power under the Constitution Act, 1867 in order to determine whether the law comes within the jurisdiction of the enacting government. If it does, then the law is valid.
A. Characterization: What Is the Pith and Substance of the Law?
16 The first task is to determine the “pith and substance” of the legislation. To use the wording of ss. 91 and 92 , what is the “matter” of the law? What is its true meaning or essential character, its core? To determine the pith and substance, two aspects of the law must be examined: the purpose of the enacting body, and the legal effect of the law.
17 A law’s purpose is often stated in the legislation, but it may also be ascertained by reference to extrinsic material such as Hansard and government publications: see Morgentaler, supra, at pp. 483-84. While such extrinsic material was at one time inadmissible to facilitate the determination of Parliament’s purpose, it is now well accepted that the legislative history, Parliamentary debates, and similar material may be quite properly considered as long as it is relevant and reliable and is not assigned undue weight: see Global Securities, supra, at para. 25; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 35; and Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, at para. 14. Purpose may also be ascertained by considering the “mischief” of the legislation -- the problem which Parliament sought to remedy: see Morgentaler, supra, at pp. 483-84.
18 Determining the legal effects of a law involves considering how the law will operate and how it will affect Canadians. The Attorney General of Alberta states that the law will not actually achieve its purpose. Where the legislative scheme is relevant to a criminal law purpose, he says, it will be ineffective (e.g., criminals will not register their guns); where it is effective it will not advance the fight against crime (e.g., burdening rural farmers with pointless red tape). These are concerns that were properly directed to and considered by Parliament. Within its constitutional sphere, Parliament is the judge of whether a measure is likely to achieve its intended purposes; efficaciousness is not relevant to the Court’s division of powers analysis: Morgentaler, supra, at pp. 487-88, and Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373. Rather, the inquiry is directed to how the law sets out to achieve its purpose in order to better understand its “total meaning”: W. R. Lederman, Continuing Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas (1981), at pp. 239-40. In some cases, the effects of the law may suggest a purpose other than that which is stated in the law: see Morgentaler, supra, at pp. 482-83; Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1939] A.C. 117 (P.C.) (Alberta Bank Taxation Reference); and Texada Mines Ltd. v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1960] S.C.R. 713; see generally P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed.), at pp. 15-14 to 15-16. In other words, a law may say that it intends to do one thing and actually do something else. Where the effects of the law diverge substantially from the stated aim, it is sometimes said to be “colourable”.
19 Against this background, we turn to the purpose of the Firearms Act . Section 4 states that the purpose of the Act is “to provide . . . for the issuance of licences, registration certificates and authorizations under which persons may possess firearms” and “to authorize . . . the manufacture of” and “transfer of” ordinary firearms. This is the language of property regulation. However, this regulatory language is directly tied to a purpose cast in the language of the criminal law. The licensing, registration and authorization provisions delineate the means by which people can own and transfer ordinary firearms “in circumstances that would otherwise constitute [a criminal] offence”. Those who challenge the legislation point to the first part of the section and its regulatory focus. Those who seek to uphold the law point to the second part of the section and its criminal focus.
20 The statements of the Honourable Allan Rock, Minister of Justice at the time, in his second-reading speech in the House of Commons, reveal that the federal government’s purpose in proposing the law was to promote public safety. He stated: “The government suggests that the object of the regulation of firearms should be the preservation of the safe, civilized and peaceful nature of Canada” (House of Commons Debates, vol. 133, No. 154, 1st Sess., 35th Parl., February 16, 1995, at p. 9706 (emphasis added)). Mr. Rock went on to describe the contents of the bill in more detail (at p. 9707):
First, tough measures to deal with the criminal misuse of firearms; second, specific penalties to punish those who would smuggle illegal firearms; and third, measures overall to provide a context in which the legitimate use of firearms can be carried on in a manner consistent with public safety. [Emphasis added.]
(See also the judgment of Fraser C.J.A., at paras. 169-72.)
Later, the Minister referred to the problems of suicide, accidental shootings, and the use of guns in domestic violence, and detailed some of the shooting tragedies that had spurred public calls for gun control. Russell MacLellan, the Parliamentary Secretary of Justice at the time, underscored the government’s concerns, noting that the Act pursues “three fundamental policies: the deterrence of the misuse of firearms, general controls on persons given access to firearms, and controls placed on specific types of firearms” (“Canada’s firearms proposals” (1995), 37 Can. J. Crim. 163, at p. 163).
21 Another way to determine the purpose of legislation is to look at the problems it is intended to address – the so-called “mischief” approach. The Firearms Act is aimed at a number of evils or “mischiefs”. One is the illegal trade in guns, both within Canada and across the border with the United States: see The Government’s Action Plan on Firearms Control, tabled in the House of Commons in 1994. Another is the link between guns and violent crime, suicide, and accidental deaths. In a paper commissioned by the Department of Justice in 1994, The Impact of the Availability of Firearms on Violent Crime, Suicide, and Accidental Death: A Review of the Literature with Special Reference to the Canadian Situation, Thomas Gabor found that all three causes of death may increase in jurisdictions where there are the fewest restrictions on guns. Whether or not one accepts Gabor’s conclusions, his study indicates the problem which Parliament sought to address by enacting the legislation: the problem of the misuse of firearms and the threat it poses to public safety.
22 Finally, there is a strong argument that the purpose of this legislation conforms with the historical public safety focus of all gun control laws. This reference challenges the licensing and registration provisions of the Act only as they relate to ordinary firearms. Alberta does not question the licensing and registration of restricted and prohibited weapons. It freely admits that the restrictions on those categories of weapons are constitutional. Indeed, Alberta would have difficulty alleging otherwise, as numerous courts have upheld the validity of different aspects of the federal gun control legislation that existed prior to the enactment of this Act: see R. v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443; McGuigan v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 284; and Attorney General of Canada v. Pattison (1981), 30 A.R. 83 (C.A.).
23 More specifically, before the introduction of the Firearms Act , the registration of all restricted weapons was upheld by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Martinoff v. Dawson (1990), 57 C.C.C. (3d) 482. Furthermore, the Criminal Code required anyone seeking to obtain any kind of firearm to apply for a firearms acquisition certificate. This requirement was upheld in R. v. Northcott, [1980] 5 W.W.R. 38 (B.C. Prov. Ct.). These cases upheld the previous gun control legislation on the basis that Parliament’s purpose was to promote public safety. The Firearms Act extends that legislation in two respects: (1) it requires all guns to be registered, not just restricted and prohibited firearms; and (2) eventually all gun owners will be required to be licensed, not just those who wish to acquire a firearm. These changes represent a continuation of Parliament’s focus on safety concerns, and constitute a limited expansion of the pre-existing legislation. Given the general acceptance of the gun control legislation that has existed for the past hundred years, the constitutional validity of which has always been predicated on Parliament’s concern for public safety, it is difficult to now impute a different purpose to Parliament. This supports the view that the law in pith and substance is about public safety.
24 The effects of the scheme – how it impacts on the legal rights of Canadians – also support the conclusion that the 1995 gun control law is in pith and substance a public safety measure. The criteria for acquiring a licence are concerned with safety rather than the regulation of property. Criminal record checks and background investigations are designed to keep guns out of the hands of those incapable of using them safely. Safety courses ensure that gun owners are qualified. What the law does not require also shows that the operation of the scheme is limited to ensuring safety. For instance, the Act does not regulate the legitimate commercial market for guns. It makes no attempt to set labour standards or the price of weapons. There is no attempt to protect or regulate industries or businesses associated with guns (see Pattison, supra, at para. 22). Unlike provincial property registries, the registry established under the Act is not concerned with prior interests, and unlike some provincial motor vehicle schemes, the Act does not address insurance. In short, the effects of the law suggest that its essence is the promotion of public safety through the reduction of the misuse of firearms, and negate the proposition that Parliament was in fact attempting to achieve a different goal such as the total regulation of firearms production, trade, and ownership. We therefore conclude that, viewed from its purpose and effects, the Firearms Act is in “pith and substance” directed to public safety.
B. Classification: Does Parliament Have Jurisdiction to Enact the Law?
25 Having assessed the pith and substance or matter of the law, the second step is to determine whether that matter comes within the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature. We must examine the heads of power under ss. 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and determine what the matter is “in relation to”. In this case, the question is whether the law falls under federal jurisdiction over criminal law or its peace, order and good government power; or under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. The presumption of constitutionality means that Alberta, as the party challenging the legislation, is required to show that the Act does not fall within the jurisdiction of Parliament: see Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 662.
26 The determination of which head of power a particular law falls under is not an exact science. In a federal system, each level of government can expect to have its jurisdiction affected by the other to a certain degree. As Dickson C.J. stated in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at p. 669, “overlap of legislation is to be expected and accommodated in a federal state”. Laws mainly in relation to the jurisdiction of one level of government may overflow into, or have “incidental effects” upon, the jurisdiction of the other level of government. It is a matter of balance and of federalism: no one level of government is isolated from the other, nor can it usurp the functions of the other.
27 As a general rule, legislation may be classified as criminal law if it possesses three prerequisites: a valid criminal law purpose backed by a prohibition and a penalty: RJR-MacDonald, supra; Hydro-Québec, supra; and Reference re Validity of Section 5(a) of the Dairy Industry Act, [1949] S.C.R. 1 (the “Margarine Reference”). The Attorney General of Canada argues that the 1995 gun control law meets these three requirements, and points to commentary on this legislation which supports its position: D. Gibson, “The Firearms Reference in the Alberta Court of Appeal” (1999), 37 Alta. L. Rev. 1071; D. M. Beatty, “Gun Control and Judicial Anarchy” (1999), 10 Constitutional Forum 45; A. C. Hutchinson and D. Schneiderman, “Smoking Guns: The Federal Government Confronts The Tobacco and Gun Lobbies” (1995), 7 Constitutional Forum 16; and Peter W. Hogg’s testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, October 26, 1995.
28 Before determining whether the three criminal law criteria are met by this legislation, some general observations on the criminal law power may be apposite. Criminal law, as this Court has stated in numerous cases, constitutes a broad area of federal jurisdiction: RJR-MacDonald, supra; Hydro-Québec, supra; and Margarine Reference, supra. The criminal law stands on its own as federal jurisdiction. Although it often overlaps with provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, it is not “carved out” from provincial jurisdiction, contrary to the view of Conrad J.A. It also includes the law of criminal procedure, which regulates many aspects of criminal law enforcement, such as arrest, search and seizure of evidence, the regulation of electronic surveillance and the forfeiture of stolen property.
29 Not only is the criminal law a “stand-alone” jurisdiction, it also finds its expression in a broad range of legislation. The Criminal Code is the quintessential federal enactment under its criminal jurisdiction, but it is not the only one. The Food and Drugs Act , the Hazardous Products Act , the Lord’s Day Act, and the Tobacco Products Control Act have all been held to be valid exercises of the criminal law power: see Standard Sausage Co. v. Lee, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 501 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Cosman’s Furniture (1972)