The rule of law
Dicey's formal conception, Raz's refinements, and the clash between legal certainty and substantive justice.
Overview
The rule of law stands alongside parliamentary sovereignty as a foundational principle of the United Kingdom constitution. It denotes, in its most basic sense, the idea that law — not arbitrary power — governs society. Yet that seemingly uncontroversial statement masks profound disagreement about the principle's content, scope, and justiciability. Does the rule of law require merely that rules be clear, prospective, and publicly promulgated? Or does it impose substantive constraints on what rules Parliament may enact — protecting, for instance, fundamental rights or access to justice?
This note traces the competing conceptions of the rule of law from Dicey's Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) through to Lord Bingham's modern synthesis and beyond. We examine the formal or 'thin' theory associated with Joseph Raz, the substantive or 'thick' theory articulated by Ronald Dworkin and endorsed (in modified form) by Tom Bingham, and the common law constitutionalism advanced by Trevor Allan and Sir John Laws. The tension between these theories has profound practical consequences: it determines whether courts may disapply or interpret legislation to vindicate rule-of-law values, and whether emergency powers, ouster clauses, or retrospective taxation can survive judicial scrutiny.
After completing Week 2 on parliamentary sovereignty, you will already appreciate that any robust rule-of-law principle may collide with legislative supremacy. This week explores precisely that collision. We consider landmark judgments — Entick v Carrington, M v Home Office, Pierson, Anisminic, Privacy International, Miller (No 1), Unison — in which courts have invoked the rule of law to control executive discretion, protect access to justice, and occasionally hint at limits on Parliament itself. We also examine key statutory interventions: the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (which placed both rule of law and judicial independence on a statutory footing) and the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (which codified civil service impartiality).
Academic debate remains intense. Scholars such as Paul Craig, Trevor Allan, Jeffrey Jowell, and Sir Stephen Sedley defend varying degrees of substantive content; Richard Ekins and John Finnis warn that thick conceptions undermine democracy and legal certainty. For Mods candidates, mastery of these positions — and the ability to deploy them in argument — is essential. The note concludes with a full worked essay, five graded practice questions, and a guide to common exam traps.
This note assumes familiarity with parliamentary sovereignty and the dualist sources of UK constitutional law covered in Weeks 1 and 2.
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