While jurisprudence is not a case-law subject, certain landmark decisions illuminate or challenge Hart's theory.
R v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273
This case—involving the killing and eating of a cabin boy by shipwrecked sailors—is often cited in jurisprudence for its explicit rejection of a necessity defence and its affirmation of law's moral independence. Lord Coleridge CJ refused to allow moral intuitions about survival to override the prohibition on murder, illustrating the separation thesis: law may diverge from morality or utilitarian calculation.
Riggs v. Palmer (1889) 115 NY 506 (New York Court of Appeals)
Dworkin's favourite case. Elmer Palmer murdered his grandfather to inherit under the will. The court denied inheritance, invoking the principle that 'no one shall profit from his own wrong', despite no explicit statutory bar. Dworkin argues this shows that legal reasoning appeals to principles, not just rules, and that Hart's rule of recognition cannot capture this. Hart's response: the judge exercised discretion within the open texture of the statute.
Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147
The House of Lords held that a statutory 'ouster clause' ('determination by the Commission shall not be called in question in any court') did not preclude judicial review of jurisdictional errors. This case illustrates the UK rule of recognition's implicit criteria: even explicit statutory language may be overridden or interpreted restrictively in light of rule-of-law principles. Hart's theory accommodates this if the rule of recognition incorporates such principles.
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645
After Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in 1965, the Privy Council faced the question whether Rhodesian courts were bound by post-UDI legislation from the illegal Smith regime. The Privy Council held that legality depended on continued allegiance to the Crown. This case raises Hartian questions: has the rule of recognition in Rhodesia changed? If officials accept UDI law, has a new legal system come into being? Hart discusses revolutions and secessions as moments when the rule of recognition shifts, identifiable only ex post by officials' convergent practice.
R (Privacy International) v. Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22
The Supreme Court divided on whether Parliament can oust judicial review entirely. The majority held that an ouster clause would need to use exceptionally clear language. Lord Carnwath and Lord Lloyd-Jones dissented, arguing that parliamentary sovereignty permits absolute ouster. This case probes the content of the UK rule of recognition: does it include rule-of-law constraints that Parliament cannot override, or is parliamentary sovereignty unlimited?
Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217 (Supreme Court of Canada)
The Court held that unilateral secession would be unconstitutional but that, following a clear referendum result, there would be a constitutional duty to negotiate. This case illustrates Hart's account of legal systems' emergence and dissolution: the question is whether a new rule of recognition comes to be accepted by officials and citizens.
German Post-War Cases: Gustav Radbruch's Formula
Post-1945 German courts grappled with Nazi-era informants prosecuted for denunciations that were 'legal' under Nazi law. Some courts, influenced by Gustav Radbruch, held that extremely unjust 'laws' were not law at all. Hart criticised this as conceptual confusion: it is clearer to say that Nazi laws were valid but immoral, and that post-war officials justifiably refused to enforce them. Fuller countered that Nazi law lacked the internal morality of law (generality, clarity, consistency) and thus failed as law.
This historical debate remains central to jurisprudence and appears frequently in essays and exams.