Introduction
The rule in Austerberry v Corporation of Oldham prevents the burden of positive covenants running with freehold land. This essay examines whether the rule is 'unprincipled' and a 'relic', considering doctrinal justifications, comparative perspectives, and reform proposals.
The rule and its rationales
Austerberry (1885) held that at common law, the burden of a covenant does not run with land. Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310 confirmed this applies equally to positive covenants, refusing to overrule Austerberry judicially. Lord Templeman cited separation of powers: courts should not create new proprietary interests; that is Parliament's role.
The rule rests on several rationales. First, freedom of alienation: land should not be unduly burdened by obligations imposed by remote predecessors. Second, privity of contract: only parties to a contract should be bound. Third, the numerus clausus of property rights: the law recognises a closed list of proprietary interests. Allowing positive covenants to run would create indefinite, potentially onerous obligations binding successors who never agreed to them.
These arguments have force. Unlimited power to impose positive obligations could render land unmarketable or create unfair burdens. Protection of purchasers is a legitimate policy.
Criticisms: unprincipled?
Critics argue the rule is unprincipled for several reasons.
First, the positive/restrictive distinction is formalistic. A covenant 'not to let premises fall into disrepair' is positive (Haywood v Brunswick PBS (1881)), but functionally similar to a restrictive covenant (e.g. 'not to alter'). Why should one bind successors and the other not? The distinction reflects form over substance.
Second, the rule is inconsistent with leasehold covenants. Under Spencer's Case and the LT(C)A 1995, positive covenants in leases bind successors if they touch and concern the land. There is privity of estate in landlord–tenant relationships, but modern long leases (e.g. 999 years) are functionally equivalent to freeholds. The doctrinal distinction seems arbitrary.
Third, the rule generates inefficient workarounds. Parties resort to chains of indemnity, estate rentcharges, or long leases to achieve what a simple positive covenant would accomplish. These devices are cumbersome, uncertain, and elevate form over commercial reality. As Professor Bright argues, the law frustrates legitimate expectations and increases transaction costs.
Fourth, comparative law undermines the rule's inevitability. Scotland, New Zealand, and several Australian states permit positive covenants to run, subject to registration. These jurisdictions have not experienced the parade of horribles predicted by defenders of Austerberry. This suggests the rule is not a necessary incident of freehold ownership.
Is it a relic?
'Relic' implies historical obsolescence. The rule emerged in the nineteenth century, reflecting Victorian concerns about feudal-style burdens and freedom of contract. At that time, covenants were less common, and developments less complex. Modern residential and commercial estates often depend on shared services (e.g. roads, drainage, landscaping). Positive covenants are essential to such schemes.
The failure of commonhold illustrates the problem. Commonhold was designed to permit positive obligations in freehold schemes, but it has barely been used. One reason is inertia and path dependence: leasehold structures, despite their drawbacks, are familiar. But this demonstrates the law's failure to adapt to modern needs.
The Law Commission's 1984 and 2011 reports both recommended abolishing the rule and introducing 'land obligations' enforceable against successors if registered. The 2011 report included a draft Bill. That Parliament has not enacted reform reflects political inertia, not principled disagreement.
Yet defenders of the rule argue it protects freedom of alienation. Positive covenants can impose indefinite costs on successors (e.g. perpetual maintenance obligations). Unlike restrictive covenants, they require expenditure, not mere abstention. This asymmetry justifies differential treatment.
Moreover, section 84 LPA 1925 permits discharge or modification of restrictive covenants but does not extend to positive obligations. This is deliberate: positive obligations are harder to value and compensate. Extending s 84 to positive covenants might be necessary if they were made to run, adding complexity.
Evaluation
The rule in Austerberry is both unprincipled and a relic, but not entirely without justification.
It is unprincipled insofar as it rests on a formalistic distinction (positive/restrictive) inconsistent with leasehold law and productive of inefficient workarounds. It frustrates legitimate commercial and residential arrangements.
It is a relic because it reflects nineteenth-century anxieties about burdening land, which are less salient today. Comparative evidence shows that reform is feasible.
But the rule is not wholly irrational. Positive covenants impose costs; allowing them to run without safeguards could unfairly burden successors. Reform should include registration requirements, modification mechanisms (extension of s 84), and protections for purchasers.
Conclusion
The rule in Austerberry is unprincipled in its formalism and inconsistency, and a relic in its failure to accommodate modern land use. Reform is overdue. The Law Commission's proposals offer a principled alternative. Judicial overruling is inappropriate (per Rhone), but legislative inaction is indefensible.