Omissions and public authorities

English tort law imposes no general duty to rescue or protect another from harm, even where intervention would be easy and threatened harm severe. This foundational rule reflects choices about autonomy and the limits of civil liability. Yet the law recognises five exceptions where affirmative duties arise: (1) assumption of responsibility, (2) creation of danger, (3) control over source of harm, (4) detrimental reliance, and (5) statutory powers/duties. Public authorities present distinct difficulties—resource allocation, policy discretion, and defensive administration concerns have led courts to restrict liability systematically. The Caparo framework applies with particular stringency to omissions: even where an exception exists, proximity and 'fair, just and reasonable' requirements often defeat claims. The Human Rights Act 1998 creates a parallel track, imposing positive obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR where common law negligence would fail.

Smith v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] AC 241: No general duty to prevent third parties causing harm; Lord Goff articulated the canonical exceptions (assumption of responsibility, creation of danger, control). Foundation case for all omissions analysis.

Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923: Statutory power alone does not create common law duty; highway authority's discretionary decision whether to remove sight obstruction was non-justiciable. High-water mark of judicial reluctance to impose duties on authorities exercising powers.

Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2: Police owe no duty to individual victims when responding to emergency calls absent special circumstances; 999 call promising help insufficient to establish assumption of responsibility. Policy concerns (defensive policing, resource allocation) preclude general duty.

Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4: Positive acts creating foreseeable risk generate duty on ordinary Donoghue principles; public authorities not immune when they act rather than omit. Corrective to over-broad reading of Michael—established duty categories apply by analogy.

CN v Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC 25: Local authorities exercising child protection functions owe no common law duty to individual children; statutory functions directed at children generally, not creating individual actionable relationships. Imposing duty would cut across statutory scheme and create indeterminate liability.

First classify: is this truly an omission or does it involve positive conduct? Pure failure to act requires an exception to ground liability; negligent performance of a task undertaken is misfeasance, analysed under ordinary Caparo principles. For omissions, identify which exception (if any) applies: Did D voluntarily assume care? Did D's prior conduct create the danger? Does D control the harm source? Did C detrimentally rely? Is there a statutory context? Then apply Caparo: foreseeability usually satisfied, but proximity and fairness often defeat claims, especially against public bodies. For public authorities, distinguish policy decisions (generally non-justiciable) from operational implementation (potentially actionable), though Gorringe warns this affects breach not duty. Consider HRA: Articles 2/3 require 'real and immediate risk' known to authority plus failure to take reasonable measures—different test, different remedies.

Conflating acts with omissions: Conducting inspection badly differs from not inspecting—former is misfeasance with ordinary Caparo analysis. Over-relying on policy/operational: This distinction affects breach, not duty existence (Gorringe). Ignoring Robinson: Public bodies acting positively owe ordinary duties—no blanket immunity. Missing HRA track: Serious harm involving public authority requires both common law and Convention analysis. Misreading assumption of responsibility: Legal conclusion not factual inquiry—999 call insufficient (Michael), custody sufficient (Reeves).