Remoteness of damage

A defendant in negligence is liable only for damage of a kind that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach, not damage that was merely a direct consequence (The Wagon Mound (No 1) [1961] AC 388). This foreseeability test operates as a limiting principle after duty, breach and factual causation are established. Courts distinguish sharply between the kind of damage (which must be foreseeable) and its extent or precise manner (which need not be). The classification of 'kind' is deliberately broad: physical injury is generally one kind; property damage another. Once a foreseeable kind of harm occurs, the defendant takes the victim as found, including all pre-existing vulnerabilities (the egg-shell skull rule: Smith v Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405). The rationale is to balance corrective justice with the need for fair boundaries of responsibility—defendants should answer for risks they create but not for every remote consequence.

_The Wagon Mound (No 1)_ [1961] AC 388: Overruled the direct consequence test from Re Polemis, establishing that only reasonably foreseeable kinds of damage are recoverable. This transformed remoteness from a causal to a normative inquiry.

_Hughes v Lord Advocate_ [1963] AC 837: Injury by explosion was not too remote where burns were foreseeable—both were injury by fire/heat. This established that courts classify harm broadly by general type, not precise mechanism.

_Smith v Leech Brain & Co Ltd_ [1962] 2 QB 405: A foreseeable burn triggered latent cancer; defendants liable for death. Confirms the thin-skull rule survived Wagon Mound—once the kind of harm is foreseeable, defendants bear risk of unusual extent.

_Jolley v Sutton LBC_ [2000] UKHL 31: Children injured while jacking up abandoned boat; injury while playing on/around boat was foreseeable even if precise activity wasn't. Shows courts' generous approach to classifying kinds of harm.

_Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd_ [2008] UKHL 13: Suicide following tort-induced depression didn't break causal chain where mental illness deprived victim of autonomy. Intervening acts don't sever liability if they're the very harm risked.

Courts apply a three-step analysis. First, identify the actual damage suffered and classify it by kind (physical injury, property damage, economic loss, psychiatric harm). Second, ask whether damage of that general kind was reasonably foreseeable to the reasonable person at the time of breach—not whether this precise injury or mechanism was foreseeable. Third, consider whether any intervening act broke the chain (only if unforeseeable and truly voluntary).

Key triggers include: unusual causal mechanisms (Hughes—explosion not fire); pre-existing vulnerabilities (Smith—cancer susceptibility); complex chains involving third parties (Corr—suicide); and novel activities by claimants (Jolley—jacking up boat). Courts consistently classify physical injuries as one broad kind, rarely subdividing. The extent of damage within a foreseeable kind is always recoverable (egg-shell skull rule), including impecuniosity (Lagden v O'Connor). Foreseeability is judged objectively at breach date, using knowledge then available (Doughty).

Confusing remoteness with factual causation: These are separate stages—establish but-for causation first, then ask if damage is too remote. Never write 'unforeseeable so no causation'.

Misapplying egg-shell skull: The rule applies only within a foreseeable kind of harm. Unforeseeable types of harm remain irrecoverable.

Over-narrow classification: Fire and explosion are the same kind (Hughes, Vacwell). Don't distinguish mechanisms within a general type.

Ignoring intervening acts: Always consider novus actus where third parties/claimant acts intervene—foreseeable interventions don't break the chain.