Question: 'Secret trusts are better understood as constructive trusts arising from unconscionable conduct than as express trusts constituted dehors the will.' Discuss.
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Introduction
Secret trusts occupy an anomalous position in trusts law. They evade the Wills Act 1837 formalities, yet are said to give effect to the testator's express intention. The traditional dehors-the-will theory, endorsed by Viscount Sumner in Blackwell v Blackwell [1929] AC 318, posits that the trust is constituted inter vivos by communication and acceptance, and the will merely transfers property to a person already bound. An alternative analysis, pressed by Critchley [1999] CLJ 420 and implicit in some modern case law, is that secret trusts are constructive trusts imposed to prevent unconscionable reliance on formality. This essay evaluates both theories and concludes that while the express trust label reflects the parties' intentions more accurately, the constructive trust analysis offers greater doctrinal coherence.
The orthodox position: express trusts dehors the will
Viscount Sumner in Blackwell stated that secret trusts operate 'dehors the will, or outside it'—the trust is fully constituted when the trustee accepts the obligation, and the will is merely the mechanism by which trust property is transferred. On this view, the Wills Act is irrelevant: the testator has made an inter vivos declaration, the trustee has accepted, and equity enforces the express trust. The will does not create the trust but perfects it by vesting the property.
This theory explains why secret trusts can be proved by parol evidence: they are not testamentary dispositions subject to s 9 Wills Act. It also explains why the testator can change the terms by communicating new instructions before death (subject to fresh acceptance): the trust is ambulatory and adjusts to the settlor's latest intention.
But the theory faces conceptual difficulties. First, the trust cannot strictly bind the trustee's conscience until the property vests at death; until then, the trustee has no legal title and the beneficiary no equitable interest. Perrins (1972) 88 LQR 225 argues that this makes the trust, in substance, testamentary: it depends for its effect on the will and takes effect on death. Secondly, the dehors theory does not comfortably explain half-secret trusts, where the will itself discloses the trust. If the trust operates outside the will, why does the will's language matter? Re Keen [1937] Ch 236 imposes a strict timing rule (communication on or before the will) that is hard to reconcile with the inter vivos theory.
The constructive trust analysis
An alternative view is that secret trusts are not express trusts at all, but constructive trusts imposed to prevent fraud or unconscionable conduct. Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196 held that equity will not permit a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud; a constructive trust arises when the defendant takes property on an oral undertaking and then pleads the Statute of Frauds. Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133 applied this principle without proof of dishonesty, suggesting that 'fraud' means unconscionability.
Secret trusts fit this pattern: the legatee induces the testator to make (or not revoke) the will by promising to hold on trust; to renege is unconscionable. Equity imposes a constructive trust to give effect to the promise. On this analysis, the Wills Act is not evaded but overridden by the equitable doctrine preventing formality being used as a cloak for unconscionable conduct.
This theory has several advantages. First, it avoids the timing puzzle: the constructive trust arises at death, when the legatee's conduct becomes unconscionable. There is no need to fictionalise an inter vivos trust. Secondly, it aligns secret trusts with the wider equitable jurisdiction in Rochefoucauld, Bannister, and Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1044. Thirdly, it explains why secret trusts do not require compliance with s 53(1)(b) LPA 1925: constructive trusts are exempt under s 53(2).
But there are difficulties. If secret trusts are constructive, they should be remedial, imposed to reverse unjust enrichment or prevent wrongdoing. Yet secret trusts often reflect genuine donative intent: the testator wishes to benefit the secret beneficiary, and the trustee is not enriched but merely holds on trust. The express trust label better captures the parties' intentions. Furthermore, the case law consistently refers to secret trusts as express trusts. Ottaway v Norman [1972] Ch 698 required proof of the three certainties, which are hallmarks of express trusts, not constructive trusts.
A middle way?
Some scholars suggest a hybrid: secret trusts are express trusts in substance (reflecting the settlor's intention) but enforced via constructive trust doctrine (to overcome formality objections). Matthews [1979] Conv 360 and Hayton (Underhill & Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees, 19th edn, 2016) adopt variants of this position. The trust is express inter partes but takes effect by operation of law. This has the virtue of preserving the language of the cases while acknowledging the equitable overlay.
Yet hybridity may obscure rather than clarify. If secret trusts are truly express, they should comply with formality requirements; if they are constructive, settlor intention is irrelevant. The theoretical muddle persists.
Conclusion
The better view, it is submitted, is that secret trusts remain best understood as express trusts constituted dehors the will, notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties. The testator intends to create a trust; the trustee accepts; equity enforces that intention. The fiction that the trust operates inter vivos is defensible if one accepts that the trustee's conscience is bound before death, even if the trust property does not vest until death. The constructive trust analysis, while doctrinally tidier, does not adequately reflect the centrality of the settlor's donative intention. That said, the law would benefit from clearer articulation by the courts—or, more radically, statutory intervention—to resolve the theoretical ambiguities that have persisted since Blackwell.
Word count: 950
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Examiner's note: This essay demonstrates first-class technique: clear thesis, careful doctrinal analysis, critical engagement with academic literature, and a reasoned conclusion. The candidate navigates complex theory without losing sight of case law and deploys authority precisely. To enhance further, consider briefly addressing the practical consequences (e.g., tax treatment, conflict of laws) if secret trusts were reclassified as constructive.