Cambridge BA: Land Law Paper

Arabella owns Greenacre, a large rural estate in Cambridgeshire. In 2005, she granted her neighbour Bernard a right of way over the north track of Greenacre 'for all purposes connected with the agricultural use of Whiteacre' by deed, which was duly registered. In 2010, Bernard began using the track to access a small pottery studio he had built on Whiteacre, selling ceramics to the public. Arabella complained but took no action. In 2018, Bernard sold Whiteacre to Clara, who converted the pottery studio into a popular wedding venue, using the north track daily for deliveries, wedding guests, and catering vehicles. Arabella now seeks to prevent Clara's use of the track entirely and has erected a gate across it. Clara claims (i) the easement has passed to her and she is entitled to use the track for all her commercial purposes, (ii) alternatively, she has acquired a prescriptive easement over the track, and (iii) that Arabella's erection of the gate constitutes an actionable interference. Arabella contends the easement never accommodated the dominant tenement for commercial purposes, that excessive use has extinguished it, and that she acted reasonably. Advise the parties, citing relevant authority.

Damian holds the registered freehold to Millhouse, a converted property divided into two self-contained flats. In 2015, he granted a ten-year lease of Flat A to Esme and a five-year lease of Flat B to Felix, both by written agreement only — neither lease was granted by deed. The leases stated that tenants would pay monthly rent, keep the premises in repair, and not sublet without Damian's written consent. In 2017, Esme sublet Flat A to George without seeking consent. In 2019, Damian sold Millhouse to Harriet, who was registered as proprietor. Harriet now seeks to (i) forfeit Esme's lease on grounds of unlawful subletting, (ii) recover arrears of rent from Felix, who has not paid for four months, and (iii) argue that Felix's lease is void for want of a deed and that he is merely a periodic tenant on different terms. Felix responds that he has a valid lease, that the original terms bind Harriet, and that Harriet cannot forfeit without following proper procedure. George claims he has an overriding interest binding on Harriet. Advise Harriet, Esme, Felix, and George, addressing the validity of each leasehold interest, the enforceability of covenants, and the availability of forfeiture.

In 1990, Ivan purchased Oaklands, a registered freehold house with a large garden, from Julian. The transfer deed contained a covenant by Ivan 'for himself, his heirs and assigns, not to erect any structure exceeding one storey in height on Oaklands.' Julian retained the neighbouring Elmwood. In 2000, Julian sold Elmwood to Katherine, who was registered as proprietor but was not expressly assigned the benefit of the covenant. In 2005, Ivan sold Oaklands to Lawrence, who was registered as proprietor. The restrictive covenant was noted on the charges register of Oaklands at the time of Lawrence's purchase. In 2022, Lawrence began building a two-storey extension on Oaklands. Katherine seeks an injunction restraining Lawrence. Lawrence argues (i) the burden of the covenant does not run with the land in law or equity against him, (ii) Katherine does not have the benefit of the covenant, and (iii) even if the covenant is enforceable, the court should award damages rather than an injunction because building is nearly complete. Advise the parties fully, addressing both the running of the burden and the benefit, and the question of remedy.

'The doctrine of proprietary estoppel provides a flexible but unprincipled route to the acquisition of property rights, undermining the certainty that land registration was designed to achieve.' Critically evaluate this statement with reference to case law and statute.

'The law of trusts of land, as reformed by the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, achieves a workable but imperfect balance between the interests of beneficiaries in occupation and the interests of creditors seeking to enforce charges against co-owned land.' Critically assess this claim, with particular reference to the exercise of the court's discretion under section 14 TOLATA 1996.