Trespass to the person

Trespass to the person comprises three intentional torts protecting bodily integrity and liberty through direct interference: assault (apprehension of imminent unlawful contact), battery (unlawful contact), and false imprisonment (unlawful restraint of liberty). All are actionable per se without proof of damage. The Wilkinson v Downton rule, refined in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32, creates separate liability for intentional infliction of harm outside orthodox trespass, requiring: (i) conduct directed at the claimant, (ii) intent to cause severe distress or psychiatric injury, (iii) actual causation of such distress. This framework protects personal autonomy against intentional interference while distinguishing trespass (requiring intention per Letang v Cooper) from negligence.

R v Ireland [1998] AC 147: Silent telephone calls causing apprehension of imminent harm constitute assault; words alone may suffice. Modernised assault doctrine for contemporary harassment.

Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232: Trespass requires intention; negligent injury falls under negligence tort. Fundamental separation of intentional from negligent harms.

Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1: Medical treatment of incapacitated patients in best interests not battery; hostility not required. Established necessity framework now codified in Mental Capacity Act 2005.

Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32: Substantially narrowed Wilkinson v Downton rule to require conduct directed at claimant with intent to cause severe distress. Balances freedom of expression with protection from intentional harm.

Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742: False imprisonment requires total restraint; ability to escape defeats claim. Defines boundaries of liberty interference.

Courts analyse each tort systematically. Battery: establish (i) direct contact, (ii) intentional act, (iii) absence of consent/lawful justification. Trivial everyday contact excluded. Assault: prove (i) intentional act, (ii) reasonable apprehension, (iii) of imminent unlawful contact. Words/silence suffice if creating apprehension. False imprisonment: show (i) total restraint of liberty, (ii) intentional act, (iii) no lawful authority. Awareness not required (Murray). Wilkinson v Downton: demonstrate (i) targeted conduct, (ii) intent for severe distress, (iii) actual severe harm. Defences examined: consent (can be withdrawn), lawful authority (PACE 1984 arrests), self-defence (reasonable force), necessity (limited medical contexts).

Five critical errors: (1) Requiring hostility for battery—Re F establishes hostility unnecessary. (2) Applying pre-Rhodes broad Wilkinson v Downton test—must use narrowed 2015 requirements. (3) Requiring awareness for false imprisonment—Murray confirms awareness unnecessary. (4) Conflating trespass with negligence—Letang v Cooper mandates intention for trespass. (5) Ignoring Protection from Harassment Act 1997—provides alternative statutory route often preferable to Wilkinson v Downton.