Defamation

Defamation protects reputation against false statements, but since 2013 requires proof of serious harm (s 1 Defamation Act 2013). A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant's reputation; for trading corporations, this means serious financial loss (s 1(2)). The rationale is to filter out trivial claims and protect freedom of expression while maintaining remedies for genuine reputational damage. The distinction between libel (permanent form, actionable per se) and slander (transient form, requiring special damage with limited exceptions) persists, but all claims must first satisfy the serious-harm threshold established in Lachaux v Independent Print [2019] UKSC 27.

Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2019] UKSC 27: Serious harm requires actual evidence or probability of harm, not mere inference from inherently defamatory words. This substantially raised the bar for defamation claims by requiring factual proof of reputational damage.

Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127: Created responsible-journalism privilege with ten non-exhaustive factors for public-interest reporting. Though replaced by s 4 Defamation Act 2013, the factors remain influential background to the statutory defence.

Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17: Social media posts must be interpreted in context, considering the casual nature of the medium and what an ordinary reasonable reader would understand. Essential for online defamation analysis.

Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe [2006] UKHL 44: Clarified that responsible journalism requires the journalist acted responsibly in publishing on a matter of public interest. Now superseded by s 4 but demonstrates the pre-2013 approach.

Courts apply a sequential analysis: (1) Is the statement defamatory at common law (tendency to lower reputation)? (2) Does it meet the s 1 serious-harm threshold with evidence of actual/likely harm? (3) For corporations, is there serious financial loss? (4) Consider defences: truth (s 2 - substantial truth suffices), honest opinion (s 3 - statement of opinion with indicated basis), public interest (s 4 - reasonable belief publication was in public interest), or privilege. The meaning of statements, particularly online, is assessed objectively from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader in context (Stocker). Website operators have specific immunity under s 5 for unidentified third-party content. The single-publication rule (s 8) means limitation runs from first publication, not re-publications.

Students repeatedly cite pre-2013 law without recognising the fundamental changes introduced by the Defamation Act 2013. They forget the serious-harm threshold is now mandatory - no claim succeeds without satisfying s 1. Many apply the old Reynolds privilege factors directly instead of the s 4 statutory public-interest defence. The libel/slander distinction causes confusion: libel remains actionable per se but slander generally requires special damage (with narrow exceptions for criminal accusations, unfitness for trade, and certain disease imputations). Students miss the s 8 single-publication rule's impact on limitation periods for online content.