B e f o r e :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING ____________________
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Martin Henley (instructed by AM International Solicitors) for the Applicant The Respondent did not attend Hearing dates: 25th February 2026 ____________________
HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Sweeting:
Introduction
This is the Applicant's renewed application for permission to appeal, against the order of District Judge McGarva sitting at Westminster Magistrates' Court. The District Judge delivered his judgment on 28 March 2025 and ordered the Applicant's extradition in respect of two offences. He ordered the Applicant's discharge on a further two offences, having found that the dual criminality requirement was not satisfied. An extradition order was sealed on 11 April 2025. Permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Turner J.
Background
The request for surrender arises from an accusation Arrest Warrant issued by Judge Roman Narodowski of the District Court in Bydgoszcz on 31 October 2018, and certified by the National Crime Agency ("NCA") on 4 December 2024. The Applicant was arrested in the United Kingdom on 11 December 2024 and appeared the following day at Westminster Magistrates' Court.
The warrant alleged four offences:
Further information confirmed that offences 1 and 2 were committed wholly in Germany.
The District Judge decided that offences 1 and 2 were not extradition offences within section 64 Extradition Act 2003 because the conduct occurred outside Poland, and the Judicial Authority had not demonstrated extra-territoriality under section 64(4). He therefore discharged the Applicant on those counts under section 10(3). By contrast, offences 3 and 4 involved conduct in Poland and satisfied section 64(3).
The Applicant's personal circumstances before the District Judge were that he had been detained in Poland from April 2015 to April 2016, then released on preventative measures including police supervision, financial surety, a prohibition on leaving Poland and notification requirements, all explained to him and acknowledged by signature. He left Poland and came to the UK in 2016, where he has worked continuously, paid tax, and has no UK convictions.
The District Judge treated fugitivity as a significant factor. He was sure that the Applicant had intentionally placed himself beyond the reach of the Polish court in breach of conditions. The Applicant accepted that he was a fugitive.
A further feature of the case was delay. The period between issue of the warrant and NCA certification was some six years. Evidence from the NCA indicated that the UK's departure from the EU resulted in the loss of access to the SIRENE system and EU records, and that a UK connection for the Applicant was not identified until December 2024, whereupon the warrant was executed.
The material part of the statement from the NCA said:
The District Judge accepted this evidence as a partial explanation for delay.
Having discharged the applicant on offences 1 and 2, the District Judge assessed Article 8 and section 21A exclusively by reference to offences 3 and 4. He weighed the constant and weighty public interest in extradition and the impact of fugitivity against the personal circumstances relied upon by the Applicant, including delay, his work history, family support in Coventry, and time already served in custody (about 16 months across Poland and the UK). He concluded that the public interest remained compelling and that extradition was compatible with Article 8 and proportionate under section 21A.
Procedural history of the appeal
The appeal was lodged on 16 April 2025; perfected grounds were filed on 1 May 2025 and the Respondent's notice on 14 May 2025. Turner J refused permission on 17 December 2025; a renewal application was filed on 23 December 2025 and came before me on 25 February 2026.
Renewed grounds
The renewed application advances a single ground, that the District Judge (and Turner J on the papers) erred in the Article 8/section 21A analysis by failing to treat the six-year certification delay as culpable delay weighing materially against extradition. It is said that there was no proper evidential basis to attribute any part of the delay to the Applicant's fugitivity, because, on the Applicant's case, the Respondent (and/or UK authorities) must be taken to have known of the Applicant's presence in the UK from the date of the English translation of the warrant, which appears to have been undertaken on 10 November 2018, yet offered no explanation for the time taken to certify, to 4 December 2024.
Mr Henley, who also appeared in front of the District Judge, accepted candidly that he had not spotted the date of the English translation at the time of the extradition hearing although the document was in the bundle before the court. He submitted that it had been open to the Respondent to give a proper explanation of the reason for delay, but it had not done so.
In argument, reliance was placed by Mr Henley on Pabian v Poland [2024] EWHC 2431 (Admin) , for the proposition that even in fugitive cases, unexplained delay must be weighed against extradition.
The Judge considered Pabian in his judgment saying:
In Pabian , Chamberlain J analysed the development of the law in relation to Article 8 and delay and distilled the principles that emerged from the case law. That exercise was undertaken principally because of the respondent's submission in Pabian that there had been a step change in the law as a result of the decision in RT v Poland. As Chamberlain J demonstrated, the position is more nuanced. He said [51]:
In summarising his conclusions on Article 8, the District Judge said:
The Respondent's position, as set out in the Respondent's Notice, is that the District Judge directed himself impeccably, set out factors for and against extradition, and reached the only sustainable conclusion on the evidence. The Applicant's fugitivity was conceded and weighs heavily. The NCA material provided a coherent explanation for aspects of the delay post-Brexit, and there was no evidential basis to assert that the authorities knew where the Applicant was prior to December 2024. In any event, the Respondent submits that, as the District Judge concluded, even taking delay fully into account, the balance under Article 8 and section 21A still favoured surrender on offences 3 and 4.
The legal framework
An appeal lies to this court only with permission. The threshold is whether the proposed grounds are properly arguable with a real prospect of success (or otherwise raise a compelling reason). In extradition appeals, this court will only intervene if the judge erred in law, took into account an irrelevant consideration, failed to take into account a relevant consideration, or reached a conclusion not open to him on the material.
Where Article 8 is in play, the court performs a structured balancing exercise. There is no formal test of exceptionality, but successful challenges are likely to be rare given the constant and weighty public interest in honouring extradition obligations; particular weight is placed on fugitivity. The proportionality cross-check under section 21A of the 2003 Act examines seriousness, likely penalty, and the availability of less coercive measures. These principles are well-established and were expressly applied by the District Judge.
Discussion
The Applicant's case rests on the proposition that the authorities must be taken to have known he was in the UK from November 2018 by reason of an English translation of the warrant, such that the subsequent delay to December 2024 was unexplained and should have carried decisive weight in his favour. As far as the authorities in this country are concerned, that submission is not borne out by the material. The District Judge referred to the NCA evidence explaining the post-Brexit loss of access to EU databases (including SIRENE), the creation of an Interpol case in September 2024, and the first identification of a UK link in December 2024, whereupon the warrant was promptly executed. Any delay by the Respondent could be attributed to fugitivity, in part at least. The full weight of the submission that knowledge of the Applicant's whereabouts after he had fled could be inferred rests on the date of the English translation of the warrant. For my part I would be reluctant to draw such an inference on that basis alone but even if it would be correct to do so delay was not ignored in the balancing exercise.
The District Judge took delay into account and expressly recognised that not all of it could safely be attributed to fugitivity; he accepted that some was systemic and related to the UK's changed access to EU systems. He then factored delay into the Article 8 balance. That was a lawful and orthodox approach.
Even if it were arguable that further criticism could be levelled at the explanation for delay, the Applicant must still show that, had the District Judge approached delay differently, the outcome would realistically have been different. On the facts found, the Applicant was a fugitive who had left Poland in breach of conditions imposed after a year's detention, was aware of ongoing proceedings, and had deliberately placed himself beyond reach. He had close family support but no dependants or caring responsibilities in the UK. The criminal conduct remaining in issue, importing almost a kilogram of cannabis into Poland with others, was serious. Those were weighty countervailing factors.
The Applicant accepted fugitivity before the District Judge. The Judge's finding to the criminal standard was properly reasoned: the preventative measures (including a prohibition on leaving Poland and notification obligations) were explained and acknowledged in writing; the Applicant nonetheless left Poland and failed to notify a change of address. That finding was plainly open to the Judge.
The District Judge approached Article 8 and section 21A in a structured way: he identified and weighed the public interest (including the specific weight of fugitivity and the undesirability of the UK being seen as a safe haven), considered the seriousness of the conduct (importation close to category 3 harm on the Sentencing Council framework), acknowledged the Applicant's positive private life factors and the delay, and evaluated the time already spent in custody (approximately 16-months across both jurisdictions). He concluded that extradition remained proportionate. That reasoning discloses no error of law and cannot be said to be outside the range of reasonable assessments based on the evidence.
In refusing permission Turner J observed:
The Applicant's renewed ground, at its highest, invites this court to re-weigh factors which were already squarely before and conscientiously addressed by the District Judge. That is not a proper basis for granting permission. The mere possibility that another judge might have given somewhat greater weight to delay does not render the decision arguably wrong. On the District Judge's findings, the powerful public interest in honouring extradition requests, amplified by fugitivity and seriousness, remained determinative notwithstanding delay and the Applicant's successful life in the United Kingdom.
Conclusion
The renewed application fails to identify any arguable legal error in the District Judge's approach to delay, Article 8, or section 21A. Nor does it disclose any other basis on which the appeal would have a real prospect of success. The renewed application for permission to appeal is therefore refused.
END