Court of Appeal (Civil Division) ยท Lord Denning MR, Lawton LJ and Scarman LJ
Facts
Froom was driving his car when Butcher, driving negligently, collided with him. Butcher admitted responsibility for the accident. Froom was not wearing the seat belt that was fitted to his car, though it was not then a legal requirement to wear one. He suffered head injuries and chest injuries and a broken finger. The evidence was that a belt would have prevented or reduced the head injuries, but that the chest injuries and the broken finger would probably have occurred anyway.
History
The trial judge had held that the claimant's failure to wear a seat belt did not amount to contributory negligence. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal.
Issue
Whether a driver who fails to wear a seat belt, which is available but not legally required, is guilty of contributory negligence; and, if so, what reduction in damages is appropriate.
Held
Appeal allowed. Failing to wear a seat belt was contributory negligence, although not compulsory at the time, and the claimant's damages were reduced by 20 per cent, because the head injuries would have been prevented by the belt but the others would not.
Ratio
- A person who fails to wear an available seat belt and suffers more serious injury than he would have done had he worn one is guilty of contributory negligence, even if wearing a belt is not a legal requirement, because a reasonable person would have worn it.
- The damages should be reduced by a share that reflects the difference the belt would have made: about 25 per cent if the injury would have been prevented altogether, about 15 per cent if it would have been much less severe, and no reduction if wearing the belt would have made no difference.
The judgments
Lord Denning MR (lead)
Held that the failure to wear a seat belt does not cause the accident but it can cause the harm to be greater, and contributory negligence concerns fault which contributed to the damage, not only to the accident. A prudent driver would have worn a belt, and the proof of what difference it would have made is a matter of evidence. He set out the scale of reductions to be applied, as guidance for the lower courts.
Key reasoning
- Contributory negligence under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 requires fault on the claimant's part which contributed to the damage, and not necessarily to the accident, so failure to wear a belt falls within the Act when it increased the injuries.
- The fact that there was no legal duty to wear a belt did not prevent the claimant from being at fault, since the standard is that of a reasonable and prudent person who knows the risk of a collision.
- The reduction is a matter of what is just and equitable, and given the difficulty of exact proof in each case, an approximate scale is the appropriate approach.
Obiter
- Comments that a driver who fails to wear a belt out of a genuine and reasonable belief that it was dangerous, or because he was exempt for medical reasons, might be treated differently, and that a passenger who fails to wear a belt might also be at fault.
Where it fits in the module
In Tort (FHS), on Contributory negligence, Froom v Butcher is the standard example of the apportionment under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 for failing to guard against harm. It is read with Jones v Livox Quarries Ltd [1952] 2 QB 608, Capps v Miller [1989] 1 WLR 839, Gough v Thorne [1966] 1 WLR 1387 and Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5. Candidates consider how courts decide what reduction is just and equitable, the relation between causation and fault in apportionment, whether a tariff of reductions is an appropriate method, and the later compulsory wearing rules of the 1980s.
Criticisms
- A fixed scale of reductions treats the share of responsibility as depending on the physical effect of the belt, and so it ignores the claimant's blameworthiness, though the Act speaks of responsibility.
- The court set a rule of general application in a way that resembles legislation, though the statute demands an assessment of what is just and equitable on the facts of each case.
- Treating a person as at fault for not taking a precaution that the law did not then require, and that many drivers did not take, imposes a standard of care ahead of ordinary behaviour and so is open to doubt.
- The approach shifts part of the cost of the defendant's negligence to the claimant, though the defendant's breach alone caused the accident, which may seem unfair to injured people.
Written with AI (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code writer)) on 1 November 2026, reviewed for errors by a second model (claude-sonnet-5.5 (Claude Code checker)). Read the case itself at [1976] QB 286. Spotted an error? Tell us.