B e f o r e :

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING ____________________

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George Hepburne Scott (instructed by Raj Law Solicitors) for the Applicant The Respondent did not attend Hearing dates: 25th February 2026 ____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Mr Justice Sweeting:

Introduction

This is a renewed application for permission to appeal following a refusal on paper on 15 December 2025.

The application arises from the judgment and order of District Judge Tempia dated 25 April 2025, ordering the extradition of Mr Andrzej Domin ("the Applicant") to Poland pursuant to a Part 1 European Arrest Warrant ("the EAW").

The EAW was issued on 9 May 2024 by the Regional Court in Bialystok and certified by the NCA on 3 August 2024. It relates to two convictions:

There was also one accusation matter in respect of non-payment of child maintenance between 13 August and 6 December 2014. The District Judge concluded that this was not capable of being an extradition offence and discharged the Applicant in relation to that part of the warrant.

The Applicant was arrested on 27 August 2024, did not consent to extradition, and has remained in custody since.

The Extradition Hearing

The District Judge found that:

The District Judge rejected his challenges under section 20 and held that extradition was proportionate under Article 8 ECHR.

The Applicant now seeks permission to appeal on two grounds.

Ground 1: Section 20

The Applicant contends the District Judge was wrong to conclude that he was "deliberately absent" from the proceedings in either conviction.

As far as Conviction 1 is concerned the District Judge concluded that:

On behalf of the Applicant, Mr Hepburne Scott submitted that whilst Box D(3)(a) of the EAW states that the Applicant was "summoned in person", Box D(4) does not specify how or where, so giving rise to uncertainty and, it was asserted, failing to meet the burden on the Respondent to prove deliberate absence to the criminal standard.

He argued the District Judge improperly relied on the Applicant's evidence that he knew of the conviction when he came to the UK in August 2013, because the sentence became final only on 20 June 2013, and was not operative when he arrived in this country.

In relation to Conviction 2 The District Judge found:

Mr Hepburne Scott submitted that it was not enough that the summons was "considered served" according to the EAW. Although Box D(4) is completed, the reasons given, reliance on information from the Applicant's mother, and the assumption that he had left the country, do not, he argued meet the requirements of section 20; a simple failure to attend cannot amount to a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of the right to be present, applying Bertino v Italy [2024] UKSC 9 . The Applicant denied knowingly waiving his rights, asserting he was unaware of proceedings and had attempted to resolve matters.

The Respondent did not attend the renewal hearing but relied on the submissions accompanying the Respondent's Notice. In those written submissions it contended that the District Judge was entitled to find deliberate absence for both convictions and that none of the Applicant's points were reasonably arguable.

The EAW, in respect of Conviction 1, clearly records that the Applicant was personally summoned and informed of the consequences of non-attendance whilst his own evidence confirmed he knew of the conviction and sentence when he came to the UK. The District Judge was therefore entitled to find that he knowingly avoided the process.

In relation to Conviction 2, it was submitted that the Applicant actively participated by reaching an agreement with the prosecutor for conviction without trial. The judgment and appeal instructions were sent to the address he provided. He failed to notify the court of a new address, despite a legal obligation to do so, and in those circumstances his conduct met the test for knowing and intelligent waiver under Bertino .

Ground 2: Article 8

The District Judge conducted a balancing exercise setting factors in favour of extradition against those which militated against it. She found:

The Applicant argues that the District Judge erred in finding extradition proportionate, contending that he has served most or all of the 8-month sentence while on remand, and that extradition would cause disproportionate hardship to him and his partner, who is said to be emotionally dependent on him.

In addition, it was said that the District Judge did not give adequate weight to delay, his rehabilitation and the impact on his established life in the UK.

The Respondent submits that the proportionality finding was orthodox and fully consistent with Norris v Government of the USA (No 2) [2010] 2 AC 487 ; H(H) v Italy Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa [2013] 1 AC 338 ; and Polish Judicial Authorities v Celinski [2016] 1 WLR 551 . The District Judge considered the evidence, applied the correct legal principles, and conducted the proper balancing exercise. In particular she was entitled to give substantial weight to:

The District Judge took account expressly of:

The Respondent argues the Applicant's renewal grounds merely restate factors already considered and do not demonstrate that the District Judge's assessment was arguably wrong, irrational, or based on any error of law.

The Respondent invited the Court to refuse permission to appeal, submitting that neither ground is reasonably arguable and that the District Judge made no error in her findings on section 20 or Article 8.

Discussions and Conclusions

Section 20

Section 20 applies where the requested person has been convicted in the issuing state but did not attend the trial which resulted in the conviction. The Court must determine whether the person deliberately absented himself. If deliberate absence is established, the statutory bar does not arise, and extradition is not prohibited. The applicable principles were correctly set out by the District Judge in her judgment.

Conviction 1

The EAW states that on 27 May 2013, the Applicant was "summoned in person", informed of the date and place of the hearing, and notified that the proceedings might continue in his absence. The Applicant submits that, as Box D(4) does not specify how or where service occurred, the District Judge could not be satisfied of proper notification. However, Box D(4) says: "If you have ticked the box under points 3.1.b, 3.2 or 3.3 above, please provide information about how the relevant condition has been met". The relevant box under Box D(3) in respect of personal service is 3.1.a. Thus, there is no requirement to provide details where the warrant states that personal service was effected on the requested person. In any event the statement on the warrant is determinative. In Cretu v Romania [2016] EWHC 353 (Admin) at [34-35], the Divisional Court observed:

In Merticariu v Judecatoria Arad, Romania Supreme Court [2024] UKSC 10 the Supreme Court said [24]:

The warrant provides a clear and unambiguous statement that personal service occurred. Further, the Applicant's own evidence was that when he left Poland for the United Kingdom in August 2013, he knew of the conviction and the suspended sentence. The sentence became final on 20 June 2013, and there is no inconsistency between the date of finality and the Applicant's admitted knowledge when leaving Poland.

The District Judge found that the Applicant knew he was facing criminal proceedings, understood the consequences of non-attendance, and thereafter left Poland without maintaining contact or fulfilling his obligation to notify the court of any change of address. She concluded that he had knowingly and deliberately placed himself outside the legal process. Such a finding was properly available to her on the evidence.

Conviction 2

For Conviction 2, the summons was deemed served in accordance with Polish procedural law.

The Applicant argues that this cannot amount to a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of his right to be present, as required by Bertino v Italy [2024] UKSC 9 . In Bertino there had been no criminal proceedings of which the requested person could have been aware when he left Italy. The factual position here, on the District Judge's findings, is very different. It goes well beyond non-receipt of process or lack of knowledge of a hearing date. The warrant states:

The Applicant actively participated in the process, reached an agreement with the prosecutor to proceed without a trial and allowed service to take place at an address which remained the family home. The District Judge was entitled to find that he had deliberately then absented himself. This was a "knowing" waiver of his right to be present.

Conclusion on Section 20

For both convictions, the findings of deliberate absence were justified and open to the District Judge. The Applicant has not demonstrated that she was arguably wrong to reach the conclusion that the bar under section 20 was not made out.

Article 8 ECHR

The Court must consider whether extradition constitutes a disproportionate interference with the Applicant's private or family life. The principles summarised in Norris, HH , and Celinski apply. These include: the constant and weighty public interest in extradition; the requirement of a balanced, fact-sensitive assessment; and the respect ordinarily afforded to the first instance findings of fact.

Where the requested person is a fugitive, as here, very strong countervailing factors are required to defeat extradition.

The Applicant relies on:

The District Judge systematically addressed these matters. She acknowledged that part of the custodial term may have been served on remand but emphasised that the Applicant still has a 1 year 3-month sentence outstanding for a wounding offence. She accepted his partner's emotional dependence but noted that her evidence did not explain why the relationship would necessarily collapse; she is in employment and remains in their accommodation. The District Judge recognised the delay since the offending but balanced this against the seriousness of the conduct, which she described as "serious offences", and against the Applicant's status as a fugitive.

She concluded that the public interest in extradition outweighed the personal and private-life considerations relied upon.

Conclusion on Article 8

The District Judge's conclusion, that extradition would not be disproportionate and is compatible with the Applicant's Article 8 rights was plainly within the range of permissible judicial evaluations. The Article 8 ground is not reasonably arguable.

Overall Conclusion

The Applicant's grounds do not identify any reasonably arguable error of law, misdirection, or material factual mistake. They largely restate points already considered by the District Judge. The question for this Court is whether the District Judge was arguably wrong. There is no question which ought arguably to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong. Her approach complied with established authority. On the evidence, and given the finding of fugitivity, the balancing exercise could properly result only in the conclusion she reached. No irrationality or misapplication of principle is identifiable. It follows that I refuse the renewed application for permission.

END