IA003802020

Mr Diwncyz submitted in response that the judge had clearly given full consideration to the CPIN report and had had full regard to the best interests of the appellant's daughter. As to the grounds challenging the judge's findings on internal relocation, the references made by Mr Mupara in the CPIN report related more to families in poverty and to uneducated women, whereas the appellant was well-educated and would have access to her own resources through employment without being reliant upon her family for support. The case of SA (Divorced woman- illegitimate child) Bangladesh CG [2011] UKUT 254 referred to the availability of state shelters, but the appellant was unlikely to need to access one in any event as she had family support. Internal relocation would not be unduly harsh and the judge's decision adequately addressed the matter.

In response, Mr Mupara again referred to the CPIN report and submitted that the judge had failed to give it proper consideration when assessing how the appellant, as a single woman with no male support, would be able to relocate to another part of the country.

There was, quite properly, no challenge to the judge's finding that the appellant would be at no risk from her husband in another part of the country, as set out at [23] of his decision. The challenge that was made in the grounds, and expanded upon before me by Mr Mupara, was to the judge's findings on whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh for the appellant, as a single woman with a daughter and with no male support. In my view there is no merit in that challenge.

Although Mr Mupara's submissions were presented on the basis of an inadequacy of proper consideration of the background evidence and a failure to take account of material matters, his submissions were, in my view, nothing more than an attempt to re-argue the appellant's case and a disagreement with the judge's decision. The judge plainly took full account of the CPIN report, referring to it at various points in his decision and indeed at some point making findings in favour of the appellant on the basis of that report (see [23]). Mr Mupara relied in particular on paragraph 2.4.3 of the CPIN report as evidence of the appellant's inability to find employment owing to discrimination against women in Bangladesh, but the judge was not required specifically to quote that section when it was otherwise clear from his observations at [26] that he had full regard to the difficulties faced by single women in Bangladesh. The judge took full account of the appellant's circumstances and was perfectly entitled to consider that, as an educated woman who had previously been in employment in Bangladesh, she would be able to find work on return. The judge gave particular consideration to the fact that the appellant was in a different position to previously as she was separated from her husband and had to look after her daughter and was entitled to conclude that that would not prevent her from being in employment as her mother could assist her with child care. The points raised by Mr Mupara in challenging the judge's findings at [26], in relation to the ability of the appellant's mother to assist her, were not entirely clear and I do not agree with him that the judge was not entitled to conclude as he did. The fact that the appellant's mother was poor and that she was also a woman were matters considered by the judge who was entitled to find that she would nevertheless be able to provide support to the appellant other than by financial means.

As for the submissions made by Mr Mupara about the judge's failure to take account of paragraph 2.4.5 of the CPIN report relating to forced marriages for children, I find no merit in such an argument. As Mr Mupara admitted in response to my enquiry, that was not a matter raised before the judge and I do not accept that it was a 'Robinson obvious' point that ought to have been considered. There was no basis for the judge to have considered the question of the appellant's daughter being forced into a marriage just because the CPIN made a generalised reference to such marriages taking place, when it was not raised by the appellant at any point in her evidence or in the submissions before him. The judge did, however, give consideration to the best interests of the appellant's daughter at [28] and therefore plainly turned his mind to the matter.

It seems to me, therefore, that the judge's decision took account of all relevant matters and included a full consideration of the evidence. I agree with Mr Diwncyz that although the judge's decision was concise, it was a properly researched and comprehensive one. The decision was based upon a proper consideration of the country background materials and with full regard being given to the appellant's family and other circumstances.

For all of these reasons I find no merit in the grounds. Judge Sharma's decision was one which was fully and properly open to him on the evidence before him and was supported by clear and cogent reasoning. I do not find any errors of law in his decision requiring it to be set aside and I accordingly uphold his decision.

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve an error on a point of law. I do not set aside the decision. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.