IA074172013

The appellant is a 42 year old citizen of the People�s Republic of China. She entered the United Kingdom on 9 February 2007 as the spouse of Mark Crowther, a British citizen. She was granted leave to enter until 31 January 2009. Leave was extended until 25 March 2011 and again to 21 July 2013. A son, now 5 was born to them. We are told and have no reason to doubt that in fact at the date on which her leave to remain had been extended, 25 March 2011, as the spouse of her husband they had in fact separated. He had gone to Manchester, taking their son with him.

On 10 November 2011 an application form countersigned by Mr Crowther and signed by her applied for indefinite leave for her to remain as his spouse. In section 11 of the form both of them declared that they were living together as husband and wife and intended to do so permanently. The declaration was false as both knew. By then he had gone to live in Malaga with another woman. He had in fact already told the Home Office in February 2011 that he was divorcing the appellant. He had lived in Spain with their son since June 2011.

This appeal for which permission has been granted by Judge King is founded on the unusual circumstances of the appellant. She asserts that the decision of the Secretary of State of 22 February 2013 breaches her right to respect for family and private life, both for herself and her son and so infringes Article 8 ECHR.

Unsurprisingly, in the light of the facts which we have recited, the relationship between Mr Crowther and her and between her and her son have given rise to proceedings in the Family Court. Judge Manuell was provided with copies of the orders of the Family Court but, as we understand it, nothing else.

On 23 April 2013, that is to say two months and one day after the Secretary of State�s decision letter against which the appellant�s appeal to the Tribunal was brought, the following order was made by consent. It was ordered that the husband would make available to the appellant their son for visiting contact in circumstances in which contact could be observed by the guardian. Various consequential orders were made so that when the matter came back before the court, as it did on 5 July before Mr Justice Keehan, a definitive interim order could be made.