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Zia Nabi and Daniel Clarke (instructed by The Community Law Partnership) for the Claimants Andrew Arden QC, Andrew Dymond and Riccardo Calzavara (instructed by Legal and Democratic Services, Birmingham City Council) for the Defendant Hearing dates: 7-11 December 2015, and 25 January 2016 ____________________
So, in allocating its own housing stock under Part VI, an authority has to take account of, and give reasonable preference, to homeless people for which it is responsible.
These dual duties (a duty to make inquiries, and a duty to provide interim accommodation whilst doing so), based upon the criterion of the authority having "reason to believe" that the applicant may be, amongst other things, homeless, have featured in all subsequent statutory provisions for housing the homeless. They lie at the heart of these claims.
i) By virtue of section 176, accommodation shall only be regarded as available for a person's occupation if it is available for occupation by him and any other person who normally resides with him as a member of his family.
ii) By virtue of section 177(1), it is expressly not reasonable for a person to continue to occupy accommodation "if it is probable that this will lead to domestic violence or other violence against him" or another person in identified categories.
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