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Upon the truster's death in 1810, the trustees entered into possession of the property, and continued to manage it till 1824, when they conveyed it to Mary Hood, the only child of the truster. The conveyance by the trustees narrated the trust-deed of Thomas Hood, with the destinations, and the prohibitory, irritant and resolutive clauses, and disponed the property to Mary Hood and her heirs; whom failing, the heirs of provision specified in the trust-deed, under the burdens, restrictions and provisions therein contained. Upon this conveyance Mary Hood was infeft.
By the destination in Thomas Hood's settlement, the heritable property thereby conveyed descended to the defender, as Mary Hood's heir-at-law. Mary Hood had no power to alter the destination appointed by her father, so as to defeat the defender's right as his mother's heir-at-law.
The destination in Thomas Hood's settlement was not validly altered, or the right of the defender to the whole property defeated, by the postnuptial contract founded on, in respect that deed was wholly gratuitous, and contained no special disposition of the property in question, or express alteration of the destination.
Lord Corehouse, Ordinary. Act. Dean of Fac. (Hope,) D. Macneill. John M'Cracken, Agent. Alt. Keay, G. Bell. William Stewart, Agent. S. Clerk.
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