RP000062019

In the case of the Ivory Coast Operational Guidance Note, much of the contents are supported by references to key documents and the FCO Country Profile and other background material. Such background material must be evaluated in the normal way. Insofar as its contents are a statement of policy, it should be regarded as the Secretary of State's submission. It should not be regarded as country information in the normal sense but as the caseworker's own assessment of that material. As such, it is to be assessed on its merits but should not be treated as if it were an expert report or having greater authority solely by reason of its coming from the UK Border Agency.

The names of the reports issued by the Country Information and Policy Unit of the Home Office since 2010 have changed by the distinction between the two basic kinds of reports identified by the Upper Tribunal in MD is still relevant. A CPIN is, in essence, the same as a COIS report; it is not an OGN (Operational Guidance Note). It is not correct, as Mr Mohzam submitted, that the CPIN on Vietnam which the judge gave evidential weight should be treated in the same way as an OGN. On the contrary, the CPIN (as the MD acknowledges) cites sources of evidence in the same way as the appellant's expert report. The point made by the judge was that the sources cited by the CPIN were more recent than those cited in the expert report. That was a fact obvious on the face of the papers; there was no need for the judge to bring it to the attention of the appellant's representative. The appellant chose to rely on evidence which she would have been aware pre-dated that advanced by the respondent. The judge did not treat her unfairly by putting more weight on the more recent material. Mr Mohzam also submitted that many of the sources cited in the CPIN dated from the same period (2019) in which the expert report had been written. However, as Mr Tan, who appeared for the Secretary of State, pointed out the sources cited by the expert report dated from an even earlier period. In my opinion, the judge was fully entitled to attach more weight to the CPIN than the expert report for the reasons clearly given in his decision.

The grounds also complain that the judge failed to state why he believed that the appellant no longer owes money to those in Vietnam who might seek to harm her. This challenge is also without merit. Contrary to what is asserted in the grounds, the judge has given full reasons for his finding at [50]. Inter alia , he noted the absence of any attempts by creditors to chase money owed since 2016; other than a brief mention in her solicitor's representations in 2016, 'there is no other evidence of any visits nor any chasing of debt.' The appellant's daughters had remained in Vietnam until 2011 and one daughter had returned there on a visit with her partner. It was plainly open to the judge to find that the appellant would not be pursued for any debt from 15 years ago. The Tribunal's decision on the matter of the revocation of the appellant's refugee status is sound in law and I do not intend to disturb it.

The appellant asserts that the judge failed to consider properly the expert medical evidence concerning, in particular, the appellant's mental health. This ground is without merit. The judge made cogent and clear findings that, whilst the appellant's mg condition may deteriorate if she does not receive treatment, she would be able to access such treatment as she requires in Vietnam. The judge's analysis is careful, thorough and even-handed; the ground amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with a finding which was manifestly available to the judge on the evidence.

Considered as a whole, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is sound in law, its findings based firmly and rationally on a careful assessment of the evidence before it. For the reasons I have given, the grounds fail to establish that the judge erred in law such that I should interfere with the judge's conclusions. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.