IA044172015

The problem for the appellant is that the judge clearly states that he considered every document which was placed before him. Neither in her grounds of appeal nor in submissions made by counsel for the appellant before me is it said that a specific piece of evidence has been ignored. In reality counsel for the appellant sought to plead this case of new, arguing that inadequate weight had been given to the history behind the appellant's application.

Although the decision is brief, a fair impartial reading of the decision clearly demonstrates that the judge made findings in fact that the appellant is a 33-year-old student who entered the UK in February 2007, and that she appealed against the respondent's decision to remove her from the UK arguing that she has established private life in terms of article 8 ECHR. At [3] the judge clearly and correctly sets out the decision which the appellant appeals against. At [11] the judge succinctly sets out the appellant's claim. At [13] the judge summarises the appellant's grounds of appeal.

Between [14] and [15] the judge correctly sets out why the appellant cannot fulfil the requirements of the immigration rules. It is not suggested that the appellant can fulfil the requirements of the immigration rules.

In reality the appellants challenge drives at [18] to [20] of the decision. It is true that at [20] the judge makes reference to " any family life the appellant may be found to have ". That is clearly an error, but it is not a material error of law because it is abundantly clear from an holistic reading of the decision that the appellant's appealed concerned her right to respect for private life, and it was the appellant's article 8 private life that the judge considered. One wrong word has been used, but the context makes it clear that the focus in this case never shifted from article 8 private life.

[17] to [18] are brief. The question for me is whether or not that brevity amounts to superficiality.

Findings of fact can only be made on the basis of evidence produced. The documents placed before me, together with the submissions made, indicate that no reliable evidence of the component parts of private life within the meaning of article 8 ECHR was played before the judge. The judge looked for reasons to consider the appellant's article 8 ECHR rights out-with the immigration rules and could not find them because that evidence was not placed before him.

In SS (Congo) and Others [2015] EWCA Civ 387 Lord Justice Richards said (at paragraph 33) " In our judgment, even though a test of exceptionality does not apply in every case falling within the scope of Appendix FM, it is accurate to say that the general position outside the sorts of special contexts referred to above is that compelling circumstances would need to be identified to support a claim for grant of LTR outside the new Rules in Appendix FM. In our view, that is a formulation which is not as strict as a test of exceptionality or a requirement of "very compelling reasons" (as referred to in MF (Nigeria) in the context of the Rules applicable to foreign criminals), but which gives appropriate weight to the focused consideration of public interest factors as finds expression in the Secretary of State's formulation of the new Rules in Appendix FM. It also reflects the formulation in Nagre at para. [29], which has been tested and has survived scrutiny in this court: see, e.g., Haleemudeen at [44], per Beatson LJ".

In Shizad (sufficiency of reasons: set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) the Tribunal held that (i) Although there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions on the central issue on which an appeal is determined, those reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the judge; (ii) Although a decision may contain an error of law where the requirements to give adequate reasons are not met, the Upper Tribunal would not normally set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal where there has been no misdirection of law, the fact-finding process cannot be criticised and the relevant Country Guidance has been taken into account, unless the conclusions the judge draws from the primary data were not reasonably open to him or her.

It is not an arguable error of law for a Judge to give too little weight or too much weight to a factor, unless irrationality is alleged. Nor is it an error of law for a Judge to fail to deal with every factual issue under argument. Disagreement with a Judge's factual conclusions, his appraisal of the evidence or assessment of credibility, or his evaluation of risk does not give rise to an error of law. I find that the Judge's decision, when read as a whole, sets out findings that were sustainable and sufficiently detailed and based on cogent reasoning.

I therefore find that no errors of law have been established and that the Judge's determination should stand.

The appeal is dismissed.