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For the appellant: Mr S Whitwell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer For the respondent: Ms S Ferguson, Counsel, instructed by Freemans Solicitor
                            We shall refer to the parties as they stood before the First-tier Tribunal. Thus, Secretary
                            The respondent seeks to challenge the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Aldridge ("the judge"), promulgated on 11 August 2021 following a hybrid hearing on 29 July 2021. By that decision, the judge allowed the appellant's appeal against the respondent's decision, dated 31 July 2019, revoking his refugee status, which had been granted on 31 December 2012.
                            The appellant is a citizen of Iran, born 1984. He came to the United Kingdom in late 2012 and claimed asylum shortly thereafter. He was granted refugee status some three weeks later.
                            The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal under section 82(1)(c) of the 2002 Act, relying on the sole ground of appeal available to him under section 84(3).
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1.
We
shall
refer
to
the
parties
as
they
stood
before
the
First-tier
Tribunal.
Thus,
Secretary
of State is once again "the respondent" and MRBM is "the appellant".
2.
The respondent seeks to challenge the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Aldridge ("the judge"), promulgated on 11 August 2021 following a hybrid hearing on 29 July 2021. By that decision, the judge allowed the appellant's appeal against the respondent's
decision,
dated
31
July
2019,
revoking
his
refugee
status,
which
had
been granted on 31 December
2012.
3.
The appellant is a citizen of Iran, born 1984. He came to the United Kingdom in late 2012
and
claimed
asylum
shortly
thereafter.
He
was
granted
refugee
status
some
three weeks
later.
4.
In
April
2018,
the
appellant
was
convicted
of
possession
with
intent
to
supply
Class
A drugs, for which he received sentences of 33 and 10 months' imprisonment, to run concurrently. As result of this, the respondent initiated revocation action. Relevant notification
letters
were
issued,
cumulating
in
the
revocation
decision.
The
respondent also excluded him from humanitarian protection and relied on a certificate issued under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ("the 2002 Act"). It was accepted that a return to Iran would violate Article 3
ECHR.
5.
The
appellant
appealed
to
the
First-tier
Tribunal
under
section
82(1)(c)
of
the
2002
Act, relying on the sole ground of appeal available to him under section
84(3).
6.
That
appeal
was
first
heard
by
the
First-tier
Tribunal
in
February
2020.
It
was
allowed, but the decision set aside by the Upper Tribunal in April of that year and the appeal remitted with a single preserved finding, namely that the appellant's 2018 conviction related to a "particularly serious crime" for the purposes of section 72 of the 2002
Act.
7.
Following the remittal, in December 2020 the appellant was convicted of driving with excess alcohol. He was fined and disqualified from driving for 12
months.
The judge's decision
8.
The
judge
correctly
identified
the
core
issue
in
the
appeal
as
being
a
need
to
determine whether
the
appellant
represented
a
danger
to
the
community
of
the
United
Kingdom, pursuant to the second limb of the rebuttable presumption under section 72(2) of the 2002 Act (the first limb - whether the appellant had been convicted of a "particularly serious
crime"
-
was
no
longer
live,
given
the
preserved
finding
from
the
2020
First-
tier
Tribunal
decision).
He
directed
himself
to
EN
(Serbia)[2009]
EWCA
Civ
630,
[2010] 2 WLR 182 as being the appropriate
authority.
9.
We
will
consider
the
judge's
findings
and
reasons
in
greater
detail
later
in
our
decision. For present purposes, we summarise his decision as follows. Having considered a number of factors (including courses undertaken whilst in prison, the prospect of employment, and the new relationship), the judge found that it was unlikely that the appellant would again engage in drugs-related criminality and on that basis the appellant did not represent a danger to the community: [32], [34], and [35]. He addressed the drink-driving conviction. On an assessment of the circumstances surrounding that offence, the judge concluded that its occurrence did not go to demonstrate a danger to the community. The appellant had rebutted the second limb of the statutory presumption and the appeal was
allowed.
10.
We note in passing that the judge also purported to conclude that the appellant was not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. However, as the appellant
was still a refugee, he was not also entitled to humanitarian protection
and so this particular aspect of the judge's decision was, in effect, superfluous. Nothing turns on this.
The procedural issue: background
11.
What followed after the promulgation of the judge's decision created an
unusual
procedural situation, with which the Upper Tribunal has had to grapple.
12.
Unhappy with the result, the respondent made an in-time application for permission to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. That application was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Moon on 6 October
2021.
13.
The respondent then made an in-time renewed application for permission to appeal directly to the Upper Tribunal. It was then that the difficulties began. It remains unclear as to precisely what took place, but it appears as though the in-time renewed application
was
accompanied
by
either
the
grounds
of
appeal
relating
to
the
challenge brought by the respondent to the 2020 First-tier Tribunal decision only, or both those grounds and the grounds challenging the judge's decision. Whilst we have not been able to uncover any definitive evidence of which scenario applied, we do have a copy on
file
of
the
IAUT-1
form,
dated
12
November
2021,
which
includes
the
latest
grounds of appeal at section
F.
14.
When the file came up for a decision on permission, an Upper Tribunal Judge erroneously considered the 2020 grounds of appeal and granted permission to the respondent by a decision dated 18 January 2022. Whilst that Judge correctly acknowledged that the decision under appeal was that of Judge Aldridge, the
reasons for the grant of permission clearly related to the previous challenge made against the 2020 First-tier Tribunal decision.
15.
Following the grant of permission, the respondent provided a skeleton argument, dated 30 March 2022. In this, the error relating to the grant of permission was acknowledged and it was submitted that the respondent was in fact relying on the latest grounds of
appeal.
16.
In
his
original
rule
24
response,
the
appellant
indicated
that
he
had
no
objection
to
the respondent relying on the correct grounds of appeal, and the merits of those grounds were addressed in some
detail.
17.
The error of law hearing was then listed before a panel, comprising Hill J (sitting as a judge of the Upper Tribunal) and Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor, on 18 May 2022. For reasons which need not be set out here, that hearing was adjourned. A detailed
Directions
Notice
was
sent
out
to
the
parties
on
25
May
2022.
In
this,
the
panel articulated its provisional view that the difficulty caused by the grant of permission on an apparently erroneous basis could best be dealt with by having a "rolled-up" hearing
at
which
the
issue
of
permission
would
be
considered
and,
if
permission
were granted, a consideration of the merits of the respondent's challenge to the judge's decision. It was also stated that, as the respondent's renewed application for permission
was
made
to
the
Upper
Tribunal
in-time,
an
extension
of
time
did
not
seem necessary. Finally, the panel stated its provisional view that the respondent's correct grounds of appeal appeared to be
arguable.
18.
The appellant then provided an amended rule 24 response. This stated that the appellant did in fact take objection to the respondent been able to rely on her latest grounds of appeal. It was also asserted that there was no valid application for permission to appeal before the Upper Tribunal and it was therefore not right to say that any application had been made
in-time.
19.
A new hearing was listed. Unfortunately, due to an administrative issue on the respondent's part, the relevant Senior Own Office Presenting Officer had not been allocated the cases and once again the hearing had to be
adjourned.
20.
The hearing on 12 September 2022 was effective. At the outset, we asked the representatives whether they had any specific objections to the course of action proposed in the Directions Notice of 25 May 2022. Mr Whitwell was content with it. Ms Ferguson did not raise any specific points on the
day.
The procedural issue: our approach
21.
As the procedural issue in this case appears to be highly unusual, we deem it appropriate to set out our approach in some
detail.
22.
Some
of
the
ground
contemplated
by
the
original
constitution
of
the
panel
in
this
case has now been covered by the decision in
SA (Non-compliance with rule 21(4)) Bangladesh[2022]
UKUT
00132
(IAC).
Paragraph
1
of
the
judicial
headnote
states
that:
"1. An in-time application [for permission to appeal] which does not comply with rule 21(4) in one or more ways is nevertheless a valid application which must be decided
by
the
Upper
Tribunal.
If
it
had
been
intended
otherwise,
the
UT
Rules
could easily have said
so."
23.
Rule 21(4) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 ("the Rules") sets out
the
various
requirements
of
an
application
for
permission
to
appeal.
Rule
21(4)(e
) refers
to
the
need
to
provide
the
grounds
on
which
the
party
seeking
permission
relies.
24.
Rule
7(1)
of
the
Rules
provides
that
an
irregularity
resulting
from
the
failure
to
comply with any requirement of the Rules does not of itself render void the proceedings or "any step taken in the
proceedings."
25.
In the present case, we are satisfied that he respondent's renewed application for permission to appeal was made in-time. The grant of permission states this to have been the case, the date of the IAUT-1 form, 12 November 2021, is, as far as we can
see, consistent with the relevant timeframe, and there is no other no other countervailing evidence brought to our attention which suggests that it was in fact
late.
26.
Thus, the requirement that an in-time application had been made, as set out in
SA, is satisfied.
27.
Turning
to
rule
21(4)(e
),
we
have
already
highlighted
the
fact
that
we
cannot
be
certain as to whether only the 2020 grounds of appeal were provided with the application, or whether the latest grounds of appeal were also provided. On balance are prepared to accept that both sets of grounds were provided (it would follow from this that the respondent significantly contributed to the difficulties which subsequently arose). In reality, it makes no material difference. The application for permission was made
in- time and any deficiencies in terms of the grounds provided did not render that application
void.
28.
It
follows
that
there
was
a
valid
application
requiring
a
decision
by
the
Upper
Tribunal.
29.
The permission decision made was plainly erroneous in that it related to the 2020 grounds of appeal (whether or not the latest grounds of appeal were also before that Judge). That fact does not, in our judgment, render void the respondent's application. Our view on this is supported by what is said in
SA, in combination with rule 7(1) of the
Rules.
30.
There then arises the issue of the appropriate manner in which to deal with the erroneous basis of the grant of permission. In the Directions Notice of 25 May 2022, it was stated that treating the latest grounds of appeal as an amendment to the 2020 grounds
might
not
be
the
best
approach:
see
paragraph
7.
However,
on
reflection,
this may
not
in
fact
be
objectionable.
Rule
5
of
the
Rules
permits
for
documents
(including grounds
of
appeal)
to
be
amended.
It
could
permissibly
be
said
that
the
latest
grounds were an amendment (albeit, wholesale) of the grounds which were considered by the Upper Tribunal Judge to grant of
permission.
31.
Alternatively, it may be that the decision granting permission is set aside. This would not be by virtue of the Rules (the power under rule 43 relates only to decisions which dispose of proceedings - a grant of permission would not fall into that category), but the "supplementary powers" under section 25 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement
Act
2007,
in
particular
sub-section
(2)(c),
which
gives
the
Upper
Tribunal the same powers as the High Court in relation to "all other matters incidental to the Upper Tribunal's functions." Section 25 of the 2007 Act has been given a broad interpretation:
Singh[2019] EWCA Civ 1014, [2019] Imm AR
1275.
32.
On
balance,
we
take
the
view
that
the
former
approach
is
the
better
of
the
two,
but
see merit in the second as well. Ultimately, whichever is adopted makes no difference in the present
case.
33.
What is of crucial importance is to ensure fairness to the parties. On the respondent's side, she provided grounds which should have been considered on their merits at the time
of
the
renewed
application,
but
were
not,
or
at
least
she
had
applied
to
amend
the erroneous grounds. On the appellant's side, the respondent has been granted permission
to
appeal
on
an
erroneous
basis,
placing
the
judge's
favourable
decision
at potential risk of being set
aside.
34.
With
the
above
in
mind,
the
appropriate
means
of
resolving
the
situation
is
to
consider the issue of permission afresh at an oral hearing. This provided the parties with an opportunity to argue their respective cases prior to the Upper Tribunal formally considering whether the judge in fact made errors of
law.
The procedural issue: decision on permission to appeal
35.
We
informed
the
representatives
that
we
would
hear
their
submissions
on
the
issue
of permission and the merits together. We would then consider whether permission should be granted and then, if necessary, go on to deal with the determination of whether the judge's decision contained errors of
law.
36.
The
respondent's
'correct'
grounds
of
appeal
can
be
summarised
as
follows.
The
judge erred in law by "failing to give adequate rational reasons for his findings." There was a reliance on evidence which pre-dated the drink driving conviction. That conviction "is
indicative"
that
the
appellant
represented
a
danger
to
the
community
of
the
United Kingdom.
The
judge
had
given
"very
little
weight"
to
the
drink-driving
conviction
and had seemed to "make excuses" for the appellant's behaviour. Paragraph 14 and the grounds asserts
that:
"... for the judge to rely on alcohol awareness course taken in prison, only for the appellant to be convicted of drink-driving after his release from prison, as showing that this appellant is not a danger to the UK community is irrational."
37.
At the hearing, Mr Whitwell confirmed that the respondent's case was predicated
on
both
a
reasons
and
a
rationality
challenge,
in
reliance
on
the
grounds
of
appeal
and
her skeleton argument. In short, the judge had failed to consider the whole range of relevant factors. In respect of the reasoning, it was insufficient to support the conclusion that the appellant's overall conduct did not make him a danger to the community. The absence of aggravating factors relating to the drink-driving offence did not amount to the presence of mitigating factors.
38.
The
alleged
errors
were,
it
was
submitted,
both
arguable
and,
as
a
matter
of
substance, made out.
39.
Ms
Ferguson
submitted
that
the
judge
had
clearly
had
regard
to
both
offences
and
had formed a holistic view on the question of whether the appellant represented a danger to
the
community.
The
assessment
and
conclusions
were
not
arguably
or
substantively irrational. She confirmed that she was not contending that each and every offence committed by an individual had to cross the "particularly serious crime" threshold. However, every case is fact-specific and the judge had conducted such an exercise here. Questions of weight were a matter for the
judge.
40.
At
the
end
of
the
hearing,
we
informed
the
parties
of
our
decision
that
permission
was granted. The reasons and rationality challenges were both arguable, albeit that the latter only just crossed that
threshold.
41.
We reserved our decision on the question of whether the judge had materially erred in
law.
The substantive issue: conclusions on error of law
42.
Before turning to our analysis of this case we remind ourselves of the need to show appropriate restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, having regard to numerous exhortations to this effect emanating from the Court of Appeal in recent years: see, for example,
Lowe[2021] EWCA Civ 62, at paragraphs 29-31,
AA (Nigeria)[2020] EWCA Civ 1296; [2020] 4 WLR 145, at paragraph 41, and
UT (Sri Lanka)[2019] EWCA Civ 1095, paragraph 19 of which states as
follows:
"19. I start with two preliminary observations about the nature of, and approach to, an
appeal
to
the
UT.
First,
the
right
of
appeal
to
the
UT
is
"on
any
point
of
law
arising from a decision made by the [FTT] other than an excluded decision": Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 ("the 2007 Act"), section 11(1) and (2). If the UT finds an error of law, the UT may set aside the decision of the FTT and remake the decision: section 12(1) and (2) of the 2007 Act. If there is no error of law in the FTT's decision,
the
decision
will
stand.
Secondly,
although
"error
of
law"
is
widely
defined, it is not the case that the UT is entitled to remake the decision of the FTT simply because
it
does
not
agree
with
it,
or
because
it
thinks
it
can
produce
a
better
one.
Thus, the reasons given for considering there to be an error of law really matter. Baroness Hale put it in this way in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department at [30]:
"Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently."
43.
Following
from
this,
we
bear
in
mind
the
uncontroversial
propositions
that
the
judge's decision
must
be
read
sensibly
and
holistically
and
that
we
are
neither
requiring
every aspect of the evidence to have been addressed, nor that there be reasons for
reasons.
44.
We have considered with care the written and oral arguments put forward by both parties.
45.
It is common ground that the judge identified the core issue in the appeal and the relevant judicial guidance on section 72 of the 2002 Act in the form of
EN (Serbia). It was
incumbent
on
the
judge
to
conduct
a
holistic
assessment
of
the
appellant's
conduct and whether, on the evidence provided, he represented a danger to the community
of the United Kingdom. That danger had to be "real". A real risk of the repetition of a particularly
serious
crime
would
be
likely
to
demonstrate
a
danger,
although
no
causal connection is required as a matter of
law.
46.
The respondent's challenge is focused on the judge's approach to the drink-driving conviction and the assessment of this when considering the ultimate question of whether the appellant represented a danger to the community. Whilst not therefore specifically a live issue, for the sake of completeness we state our conclusion that the judge did not err in respect of his assessment of the index offence, namely the drugs conviction from 2018, and whether there was a real risk of the appellant engaging in similar
conduct
in
the
future.
The
judge
took
proper
account
of
the
seriousness
of
that offence: [30]. He rightly considered the absence of employment as potentially disclosing a risk of falling back into the lifestyle which had resulted in the index offence. The same is true of the fact that the appellant had been in employment when he committed that offence and that there had been a financial motivation: [31]. It was open to the judge to take account of a variety of other factors including: courses undertaken in prison; the fact that since release there had been "no indication whatsoever" that the appellant had returned to his "previous ways"; that he had begun a new relationship and had married in 2020; and that he had recently obtained (but
not
yet
started)
what
was
described
as
"realistic"
employment:
[32],
[34],
and
[35]. The assessment as a whole was balanced and the conclusion was both rational and adequately
reasoned.
47.
Having said that, if we were to conclude that the judge erred in his approach to the drink-driving offence, the sustainable conclusions relating to the index offence could not save the decision as a
whole.
48.
We turn, then, to the drink-driving conviction of December 2020. There was no requirement for this to be classified as a "particularly serious crime" for the purposes of section 72 of the 2002 Act, and Ms Ferguson quite rightly did not seek to suggest otherwise.
In
our
judgment,
once
an
individual
has
been
convicted
of
such
a
crime,
the first limb of section 72 is engaged and any subsequent convictions (or for that matter, conduct
in
respect
of
which
no
convictions
have
been
accrued)
can
be
relevant
to
the
question of whether the individual represents a danger to the community, whether or
not they are "particularly serious".
49.
The judge plainly addressed his mind to the drink-driving offence, regarding it as being of "particular note" and properly recognising the "force" of the respondent's case against the appellant. The relevant passage within [30]
reads:
"... the appellant has committed a particularly serious offence and has now gone on to commit a further criminal offence. It is also correct to note that the offence relates to
the
abuse
of
alcohol
which
the
appellant
claims
to
have
benefited
from
counselling and
training
whilst
in
prison.
There
can
be
no
doubt
that
the
offence
of
drink-driving exists because of the danger that all drunk drivers represent to the
community."
50.
Reading
the
judge's
decision
sensibly
and
appreciating
that
he
was
appraised
of
all
the evidence
and
submissions
before
him,
we
are
satisfied
about
three
matters
arising
from this passage. First, the judge had in mind the specific argument relied on by the respondent
to
the
effect
that
the
second
offence,
when
viewed
together
with
the
index offence, was indicative of a propensity to offend, which in turn went to the question of whether the appellant represented a danger to the community. Second, he was cognisant of the reliance placed by the respondent at the hearing on the connection between the drink-driving offence and the alcohol awareness courses undertaken in prison
(the
same
submission
featured
in
paragraph
14
of
the
grounds
of
appeal).
Third, the judge recognised the serious implications of drink-driving in a general
sense.
51.
On the last point, we see no contradiction between the final sentence of [30] and the judge's ultimate conclusion that the appellant did not represent a danger to the community. It is tolerably clear that, in respect of the former, he was making a generalised statement which formed part of the overall context to the fact-specific assessment subsequently
undertaken.
52.
We
turn
to
what
the
judge
said
at
[33].
This
paragraph
has
caused
us
pause
for
thought. The judge's expression that the drink-driving offence caused him "dismay" adds nothing to his reasoning; it was in reality simply an observation. The judge then set out
a
number
of
factors
which,
on
his
assessment,
demonstrated
that,
notwithstanding the offence in question, the appellant did not represent a danger to the community. The factors included the minimum sentence imposed for the offence and the absence of any aggravating factors such as the standard of driving and its location. Whilst not expressly stated at that point in the decision, there appears to have been no dispute that the appellant had been only fractionally over the relevant alcohol limit when breathalysed by the police, who had in fact stopped to help him change a tyre on his car: [21]. The judge expressly stated that the offence was
"serious".
53.
We harboured a concern that the judge was potentially taking the absence of aggravating features and/or the existence of what might be described as mitigating features, as negating the seriousness of the drink-driving conviction and its relevance to the holistic assessment of the danger to the community issue. However, exercising the appropriate restraint identified earlier in our decision, and reading the judge's decision
sensibly
and
in
the
round,
we
have
ultimately
concluded
that
no
error
of
law
has been committed in this regard. As stated in the previous paragraph, the judge expressly recognised that the offence was indeed serious and he said much the same thing at the end of [30]. In our judgment, and not without some hesitation, we are satisfied that [33] represents a fact-sensitive approach, which is required in cases concerning section 72 of the 2002 Act. There is, we find, merit in Ms Ferguson's submission that a contrary conclusion (i.e. that the very fact of a drink-driving conviction, without more, must have led to a conclusion that the appellant did constitute a danger) would in effect negate the fact-specific nature of the assessment in cases such as the present. In short, we conclude that the judge was rationally entitled,
as
a
matter
of
law,
to
take
account
of
the
particular
circumstances
of
the
drink- driving
offence.
54.
The next issue to be considered is whether the judge's reliance on the drugs and alcohol awareness courses undertaken whilst the appellant was in prison was irrational, as argued in paragraph 14 of the grounds of appeal. Demonstrating irrationality is a difficult task. Here, the particular challenge put forward is that the judge was simply not entitled to rely on those courses "as showing that this appellant is
not
a
danger
to
the
UK
community".
We
reject
that
contention
for
two
reasons.
First, the judge was rationally entitled to take those courses into account as one factor amongst many. In particular, the judge saw them as relevant to any future danger relating
to
offending
behaviour
similar
to
that
evidenced
by
the
index
offence.
Second, and
following
from
the
first
reason,
the
judge
was
plainly
not
relying
on
those
courses as being decisive of his overall
assessment.
55.
Before the judge, the respondent undoubtedly had a strong argument that the committal of the drink-driving offence after the appellant had undertaken the
courses in
prison
was
indicative
of
him
being
a
danger
to
the
community.
Yet
it
cannot
be
said that
the
only
rational
outcome
was
for
the
judge
to
have
concluded
that
such
a
danger in fact existed as result of that offence. As both representatives have acknowledged, the assessment was fact-specific. We are satisfied that the judge was mindful of the significance of the offence and how it sat in relation to the index offence, the prison courses, and the serious nature of drink-driving in general. These matters are all expressly stated by the judge at various points in his decision. The respondent may disagree with the attribution of weight to some of the factors taken into account, but that was a matter for the judge, subject to any rationality challenge. Such a challenge does not succeed in the present
case.
56.
In many respects, the respondent's rationality challenge is intertwined with the reasons
challenge:
paragraph
11
of
the
grounds
of
appeal
contended
that
the
judge
had failed
to
give
"adequate
rational
reasons".
In
light
of
what
we
have
already
said
about a number of aspects of the grounds and additional submissions, we conclude that the judge did explain himself with sufficient clarity so as to permit the respondent to understand why the appeal was being allowed. He set out the competing arguments, together with the various factors being taken into account. Through his analysis, he gave what we consider to be adequate reasons as to why, taken as a whole, the evidence went to rebut the presumption under the second limb of section 72(2) of
the
2002 Act. Additional or better reasons could potentially have been given, but that of itself does not disclose any errors of law.
57.
The respondent has not meaningfully argued that the judge viewed the two offences in complete isolation. In any event, we see no indications in the judge's approach which would satisfy us that such an erroneous approach had been adopted. He was bound
to
separate
the
two
offences
out
for
the
purposes
of
analysis
within
the
decision, but that was nothing more than a matter of structure. The manner of the representatives' submissions before him and the way in which he considered the evidence points towards a holistic approach. This is supported further by the statement at the beginning of [36], which precedes the conclusion that the appellant did not represent a danger to the community; "In the circumstances of the evidence which is before
me..."
58.
The grounds of appeal, at paragraph 16, suggest that the judge was seeking to "make excuses"
for
the
drink-driving
conviction.
We
do
not
read
what
is
said
at
[33]
and
[34] as representing "excuses". Indeed, to assert that a judge would have acted in such a way amounts, in our view, to an accusation which is not made out
here.
59.
Having applied the appropriate level of restraint identified earlier in our decision,
we conclude that, whilst we might have reached a different conclusion at first instance, the judge's decision does not contain any errors of law. For us to have concluded otherwise would, in truth, have been to substitute our view of the case for his. That is not a proper basis on which to interfere with a decision of the First-tier
Tribunal.
Anonymity
60.
The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction, presumably because of the relevance of the Refugee Convention claim. We have considered for ourselves whether a direction should be made at this stage of proceedings. Having regard to the importance of open justice and the Guidance Note No.2 of 2022, we have concluded that a direction should be made. This is on the basis that the appellant is still a
refugee.
Notice of Decision
61.
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision
stands.
62.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is accordingly
dismissed.
Signed:
H
Norton-Taylor Date: 15 September
2022 Upper Tribunal Judge
Norton-Taylor
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