Fourthly, each of the Claimant's communications is prefaced by a strap line that it is subject to his applications variously to appeal or to apply for relief in respect of any matter to the Registrar, from the Registrar, to the President from the Registrar, and so on. It must be noted that no such right is granted to any party in the EAT and each application and Notice of Appeal is treated on its merits. The Claimant is wholly indiscriminate in the authority which he cites in support of each application. For example, he does not set out why his treatment on 15 accessions (Egg) and 38 occasions (Ajilon) by the four judicial levels has violated Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the European Convention, prohibiting torture, unlawful restraints on his liberty and private life, or the unincorporated Article 13. He has not indicated why the CPR or procedural rules in the House of Lords affect judgments in the Employment Tribunal or the EAT. Nevertheless, in the bombardment of the Employment Tribunal and the EAT, these matters are constantly recycled.
I take the view that it is not my duty to deal with every single one of the 43 measures or failures to take measures identified by the Claimant in the Tribunals below. Affirmed by the approach of Rix LJ, I will first decide the appeal against the striking out of his claim by the Reading Tribunal on 17 January 2007. Lest I am wrong about that, and so that the Claimant may preserve his rights under Rule 3, I will deal analytically with the earlier and later matters.
The legal provisions
Section 21 of the Employment Tribunals Act allows an appeal to the EAT against a judgment order decision or any proceedings of an Employment Tribunal. It is apt to include failures to act. Unless an error of law is identified, the EAT is deprived of jurisdiction. The practice in the EAT is for an appeal to be sifted by a judge and if it discloses no reasonable prospect of success or is an abuse of the process of the EAT or is likely to disrupt the proceedings, an opinion is issued under Rule 3(7) of the EAT Rules. The Claimant is offered the opportunity to amend his Notice of Appeal by submitting a fresh one under Rule 3(8) or to apply to a judge under Rule 3(10) where an oral hearing will occur.
Wide powers are given to an Employment Tribunal, usually acting through a Chairman, to strike out misconceived cases or cases with no reasonable prospect of success. At the EAT, wide powers of case management are provided by the overriding objective in the EAT Rules and Practice Direction paragraphs 1.4 and 9.1.
The Egg appeals
The substantive issue before the EAT in the Egg Notice of Appeal is whether or not the stay should be lifted. A stay was imposed on the Claimant's cases on 14 July 2005 pending appeal to the EAT. Despite at least eight further applications by the Claimant to the Employment Tribunal, this decision has remained in place. It has been refreshed by reference to the Claimant's continued appeals, or, more accurately, applications for permission to appeal, up to and including the House of Lords. Nevertheless, the original decision remains. It was felt inappropriate for the Employment Tribunal to consider the Claimant's discrimination and dismissal claims while aspects of his complaint were the subject of treatment, on the Claimant's application, by respectively the EAT, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.
The Claimant acknowledges that the nine measures against which he appeals include six which are out of time, and which I have dismissed. The remaining three appear to be simply a reiteration of the same judgment. I decided by an Order on 27 March 2007 that these appeals appeared to be academic, once the House of Lords decided on 13 March 2007 that his petition was inadmissible. For myself, I do not understand why it took so long for this to be decided since by statute the Claimant had no right. But the House of Lords was seised of this matter up to that date. Thereafter the Claimant exhausted all his domestic remedies. This is apparent from the fact that he has told the EAT that he is "appealing" to the European Court of Human Rights. His ability to seek to re-open this matter before the Court of Appeal is the subject of discretion and, it seems to me, does not affect the Employment Tribunal's judgment that his case should be stayed until exhaustion of his appeals, which has occurred on the dismissal of his petition as inadmissible by the House of Lords on 13 March 2007.
In any event he is facing in two directions. By seeking under the CPR to reopen a final decision against his case at the Court of Appeal, I do not know whether he wishes the stay to be lifted or to be restored consistent with his earlier applications. By directing that there should be a case management discussion (listed for 26 June 2007 but vacated to await this Judgment) the Employment Tribunal in Nottingham has shown that there is no longer a stay. I decided on 27 March 2007, both by letter and by Order, that the Claimant should indicate any live issue which he seeks to pursue, and if not then his case would be struck out in accordance with Rule 26 for failing to comply with EAT orders. It is open to the EAT to strike out under Rule 26, for failure to comply with EAT directions, an appeal by a Claimant who does not attend at the EAT: see Sedley LJ in Bertolin v Thornbury Estates Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 25 . Permission to appeal against my exercise of rule 26 in that case was not interfered with. This case will therefore be struck-out under Rule 26 for failure to comply with my directions. The Claimant was given every opportunity to attend but dismissively decided he would not. He has failed to comply by showing why there is any live issue in relation to his appeal. I see no reason why I should not carry out that Order and this Notice of Appeal is struck out.
In doing so I have borne in mind my assessment of the strength of this appeal. Although not necessary for my Judgment, I will express my opinion under Rule 3(7). The Claimant has not responded saying why there is any live issue now. I am advised that the Employment Tribunal has listed a case management discussion of his case on 26 June 2007. It follows therefore that the Tribunal no longer regards the case as stayed by reason of any pending appeal. In any event, as a matter of construction, I would hold that the stay ceased to have effect automatically when the prescribed event took place on 13 March 2007. This application therefore is academic and an abuse of the process. Further, I consider that the appeal should not be entertained for it is simply an appeal against the repetition in writing of six earlier decisions, which appeals, the Claimant accepts, are out of time. That decision was not to take further steps in his case while there was an appeal on foot before, at his instance, the EAT, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords. In essence it is the same decision. There is no jurisdiction to hear this appeal out of time since the Claimant has withdrawn his appeals against the original decision and there is no merit in any contention that these are essentially new decisions.
I further hold that there is no reasonable prospect of success in overturning the case management decision of the Employment Tribunal to stay the hearing of his remaining tribunal claims pending appeals to the higher courts. This is an exercise in discretion and I see no error in principle. Indeed it was the correct decision.
Further, I would hold under Rule 3 that his simple response to not rely upon the first six measures against which he appealed but simply to rely on the last three does not constitute any reason under Rule 3(7) for the appeal to be continued further. Given the opinion I expressed on 27 March 2007, he has had an opportunity, effectively under Rule 3(10), at this hearing to put any matter before me which he wished. I have considered the matters which he has put, none of which contains any merit. This is indeed an academic appeal wholly without merit. In addition I consider that it would obstruct the disposal of proceedings in the Employment Tribunal for an appeal to be heard by the EAT at this stage. There is no reason for his money claims, misconceived and correctly held to be struck out by the Employment Tribunal, EAT, Court of Appeal and House of Lords, to hold up the hearing of his other claims. If I had not struck it out under Rule 26, I would have dismissed it under Rule 3(10) on each of the three separate grounds therein.
The Claims against Fujitsu and Ajilon
The first Notice of Appeal 1600/06
I do not consider it necessary for me now to deal with the earlier interim appeals since the claim has been struck out and I see no error in the Employment Tribunal Chairman's judgment for reasons which I give (paras 31-38 below). There being no live claim and no live appeal there is no jurisdiction to hear an interim appeal. The appeal is dismissed. But lest I am wrong about that I will give my opinion. It is independent of my decision on the third Notice of Appeal (below). The first appeal was the subject of an opinion by Burton J that it was 'hopeless'. The fresh appeal under the same number 1600/06, met with the same fate before His Honour Judge Peter Clark. That came before me under Rule 3(10) on 24 January 2007. In my opinion, this is a case which has no prospect of success and is an abuse of the process of the EAT.
It emerges out of a case management discussion on 28 July 2006 ('the Watford order') where certain claims were dealt with. It fed into a further case management discussion at Reading ('the Reading order'). This was necessary in order to define the issues in this complex case. Those issues were correctly set out for the orderly management of the case in accordance with the overriding objective. There is no error of law. In addition, now that the case has been struck out, as I will in due course show to have been correctly decided, it is an abuse of the process to continue with this matter. Rix LJ was of the same provisional view, and this case therefore fails all of the tests under Rule 3(7). No further action will be taken and the Notice of Appeal is effectively dismissed at this adjourned Rule 3(10) hearing of it.
The second Notice of Appeal 0096/07
This is an appeal against a series of interim measures taken by the Employment Tribunal at Reading. As a matter of analysis, and in order to deal expeditiously with these cases, I hold it to be principally an appeal against the judgment of the Employment Tribunal on 28 November 2006 to hold a pre-hearing review and setting out an agenda for it. In my judgment, this, and all of the associated measures taken in response to the correspondence with the Tribunal, constitute the vehicle for this appeal. It has not yet been sifted. It was my direction expressed at the hearing on 24 January 2007, to consider this matter with him at the adjourned hearing. He did not turn up.
As with the first Notice of Appeal, I do not consider it necessary for me now to deal with this second interim appeal since the claim has been correctly struck out, and the (third) Notice of Appeal from it has been determined under Rule3(7) below. There being no live claim and no live appeal there is no jurisdiction to hear an interim appeal. The appeal is dismissed.
Lest I am wrong I will deal with it in two ways but with the same result, each independent of my decision on the third Notice of Appeal (below). The Claimant was required to produce grounds on which the appeal was made and to indicate any live issue which he wished to pursue in this appeal following my Order and letter of 27 March 2007. He has failed to do so and failed to attend the hearing. Bertolin v Thornbury Estates Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 25 applies. I would strike it out under Rule 26.
Yet further, if I am wrong about both of those decisions, I would form an opinion under Rule 3(7), which is as follows. This case contains no basis for an appeal to the EAT with a reasonable prospect of success. Standing back from this, all that was being done, in response to the Claimant's constant electronic bombardment, was to set up a pre-hearing review. The matters were not set in stone. This was within the powers of case management of an Employment Tribunal. It was consistent with the overriding objective. In addition, Rix LJ considers that the approach of considering these matters holistically in the EAT is sensible. I would hold that since I have formed the opinion that the strike-out of the Claimant's case by the Employment Tribunal was correct, this interim appeal is an abuse of the process of the EAT. If the appeal had not been struck out, then, pursuant to Rule 3(7), I would rule that no further action be taken and the appeal effectively be dismissed. The claimant's rights under rules 3(8) and 3(10) therefore do not come into play.
The third Notice of Appeal 0338/07
The appeal in this case is against the judgment to strike out the Claimant's claims made on 17 January 2007 at a hearing where the Respondents were represented, each by Counsel, and the Claimant failed to attend. I have power under Bertolin v Thornbury Estates Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 25 to strike this out as he failed to attend the Employment Tribunal and the EAT as well. But in fairness to him, I will instead deal with this on the merits under Rule 3(7), in accordance with the green light given by Rix LJ. The history of the matter is set out by the Employment Tribunal as follows:-
The Tribunal noted the approach of the Claimant to these proceedings in the following way:
The Chairman considered the arguments raised by the Respondents in support of their respective claims to strike out. In my judgment the Chairman was correct to hold that there was no reasonable prospect of success in either of the claims, for a number of reasons but principally because the Claimant had not been refused work and had been offered work which he had declined to turn up to do.
The Chairman considered that there was no prospect of success. She then decided separately whether to strike them out and held that she should, for the following reasons, including that there could be no fair trial, for she said this:
She reached the same conclusion by the entirely separate route of dealing with the unreasonable behaviour of the Claimant. She said this:
The Chairman correctly addressed the relevant issues before making the decision to strike out the claim. She has given full reasons for each strand of her decision and I see no error in them. Indeed in my judgment it was a correct decision to make.
As to the application by the two Respondents for costs, the Chairman's judgment was, with respect, entirely within her power. In the light of the bombardment of the ET and of the conduct by the Claimant including his failure to turn up to defend the strike-out applications, it cannot be said that the Chairman went outside her jurisdiction or exercised her discretion to award costs for a reason which was wrong in principle.
I would therefore form the opinion under Rule 3(7) that there is no reasonable prospect of success. I also consider that it is an abuse of the process of the EAT for this case to continue. Further, in my opinion continuation of this case will obstruct the proceedings of the EAT. That abuse and obstruction consists of the constant electronic bombardment, this time of the EAT, by the Claimant, causing a massive deployment by EAT staff in order to attend to his innumerable email. He has sent over 60, excluding many applications by fax relating to complaints about administration and judiciary. He was ordered to desist by the Employment Tribunal and he did not. I now order him to desist. It is contrary to the overriding objective of the EAT to ensure that justice is done to suffer him constantly to issue peremptory, dismissive, abusive and reiterative email to the EAT. He takes up precious time and resources in a jurisdiction where there is a long line of parties seeking to have their cases tried and appeals heard quickly. This is a relevant consideration: Andreou v Lord Chancellor's Department [2002] IRLR 728 at para 46 per Peter Gibson LJ. He will, of course, have an opportunity under Rule 3(8) and Rule 3(10) to consider again his Notice of Appeal.
The fourth Notice of Appeal 0410/07
This Notice of Appeal was lodged at the EAT on 15 March 2007. It appears to contest decisions by the Reading Employment Tribunal and the London Central Employment Tribunal on 15 and 16 February 2007 respectively. These have already been the subject of proceedings and should not be reiterated. It is an abuse of the process for these matters to be redone. The sole basis of the remaining grounds of appeal relate to what appeared to be new claims presented by the Claimant against Fujitsu and Ajilon. So far, all the Employment Tribunal has done is to identify that they may be out of time. In my opinion, under Rule 3(7), it is an abuse of the process of the EAT for any step to be taken on appeal in relation to these matters unless, and until, a finite judgment is given by the Employment Tribunal. There is no reasonable prospect of success in challenging a decision by an Employment Tribunal that it wishes to hear why a matter is said to be out of time. In my judgment this appeal should not be taken further. The Claimant has his rights under Rules 3(8) and 3(10).
General
I have dealt analytically with the five Notices of Appeal issued by the Claimant, four against Fujitsu and Ajilon, and one against Egg. With no help from the Claimant, I have identified 43 separate measures or failures, said by the Claimant to have taken place by the respective Tribunals. It is not consistent with the overriding objective, or with the holistic approach which I have taken, and has been upheld by Rix LJ, for me to descend into each of the 43 separate events. It is time now to deal robustly with this litigation and to close down as wholly unmeritorious those appeals which I have dealt with above, and those appeals which are subject to his rights under Rule 3(8) and Rule 3(10). His substantive claims of dismissal and discrimination, and his "piffling" expenses claim, in the Egg case are now live. It is in the interest of all concerned in that case that the Claimant focus on it now. Similarly and for the same reasons I refuse the Claimant's application already made for a review of my order on 30 May 2007 simply to reserve Judgment. Any typographical slips will be cured in the Order today. Apart from those specific steps required to be taken in accordance with the Practice Direction for the lodging of bundles, skeleton arguments and authorities, no correspondence will be undertaken by the EAT with the Claimant and none with the Employment Tribunals while the EAT is seised of these matters. All correspondence will be sent in hard copy form and case managers will not respond to e-mail.