IA172362014

One of the reasons given by the judge for dismissing the appeal was that the appellant and the sponsor had not, "for whatever reason", attended the hearing to be questioned about their case, and, in particular, the change of work status of the sponsor from employed to self-employed. The appellant clearly knew the date of the hearing and had not, "on the evidence before me", submitted any evidence as to her inability to attend the hearing.

The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the UT raising three grounds. The only one which is pertinent is the second one, which was that the judge had unjustly proceeded with the hearing when there was a valid medical excuse for the appellant and the sponsor not attending, and the appellant had made a written request to the Tribunal for an adjournment of the hearing on medical grounds, which was backed up by a medical certificate.

UT Judge McWilliam granted permission to appeal on ground 2 as it appeared to her that the documents referred to by the appellant had been faxed to Taylor House on 16 March 2015, "and arguably should have been before the judge".

Judge Youngerwood acted reasonably in proceeding with the hearing of the appeal in the absence of the appellant and the sponsor, as on the evidence before him there was no satisfactory excuse for their non-attendance.

However, unknown to him, the appellant had the day before faxed to Taylor House a written request for an adjournment on medical grounds and a medical certificate. It is open to debate whether the evidence she provided was sufficiently cogent to justify an adjournment being granted. But the fact remains that, through no fault of hers or the judge, there was procedural unfairness. She was deprived of a fair hearing on the issue of whether an adjournment should be granted, and the judge draw an adverse inference from her apparent failure to explain why she and the sponsor had not attended.