Now, in the first place, that is a question of fact, and it is a question of fact for the Dean of Guild to decide. In the second lace, I cannot see how this street can be held to be anything but a side street for this very simple reason, that of all streets which can be called side streets, a street which is a cul de sac must essentially be a side street. It cannot possibly be anything else. It leads nowhere, and no access can be got to the city except at one end. These are my views upon this matter of fact. I see no ground for holding that the Dean of Guild has gone wrong. It would be desirable that these Acts of Parliament should be put into some more intelligible shape than they are at present.
Lord Kyllachy —I see no escape from the construction which the Dean of Guild has put upon these enactments. The intention of the clause specially in question may be open to doubt, but as to its construction I think there can be no doubt, and therefore, though with some regret, I am bound to concur.
Lord Stormonth Darling —I concur. It is very desirable that statutes which impose restraints on the rights of property should be worded as clearly as possible. The municipal statutes applicable to this case are not by any means models of clearness, and it may be that the intention of the framers has not been adequately given effect to, but with that we have nothing to do. The Dean of Guild has held that this is a side street, and, once that appears, there seems to me to be an end of the case.
Lord Low —I am of the same opinion. I think it is very likely that what was intended when this clause was framed was a provision of the nature figured by Mr Guthrie. But in order that such a meaning may be gathered from the clause, it is evident that a great number of important words have to be read into the clause which are not there, and of course this is quite an inadmissible way of dealing with an Act of Parliament. As the clause stands .it exactly meets the present case, because you have a side street and a house being built in a side street, and the clause says in the most distinct terms that in such a case the building shall not be higher than one and a half times the width of the street without the consent of the magistrates. The words exactly apply to this case, and I have no doubt that the Dean of Guild was perfectly right in applying them literally and allowing the lining.
The Court adhered.
Counsel for Petitioner (Respondent)— Solicitor-General ( Clyde, K.C.)— W. J. Robertson. Agents— Davidson & Syme, W.S.
Counsel for Respondents (Appellants)— Guthrie, K.C.— J. A. Welsh. Agent— Thomas Hunter, W.S.