IA266762014

I have carefully considered Judge Levin�s determination and remind myself that it is not my role to consider arguments intended to emasculate it. However I have also carefully considered whether there might be relevant considerations arising after it but I find that the evidence clearly points to both the appellant�s and the sponsor�s extremely poor credibility in this and other matters to which I will later refer. I regard Judge Levin�s assessment of the matters before the appeal hearing as wholly correct and soundly reasoned. I find that this was a marriage of convenience.

Only then did Judge Wilson turn his attention to what was on any view a significant development that had arisen after Judge Levin had made his findings; namely, the birth of the sponsor�s twins, in respect of whom it was accepted the appellant was the father.

I can find no grounds whatsoever for concluding that the birth of the appellant�s and the sponsor�s children was a relevant consideration to the issue of the propriety of the marriage, or that this event in any way undermines the respondent�s repeated conclusion and Judge Levin�s finding that this was a marriage of convenience.

The core of the Secretary of State�s written response to the Notice of Appeal is to be found in the statement that is contained in paragraph 3: �It is far from inconceivable that a party to a marriage of convenience, with all that that implies, would be prepared to give birth to a child to support an application�. It is argued, at paragraph 5, that �it was clearly open to the judge to find that he was not persuaded by the DNA evidence as overtaking the previous findings�.

At the hearing, Mr Diwnycz adopted the arguments in the respondent�s written response. He also drew attention to what he argued were matters of concern arising from the DNA report, wherein the author concluded that the appellant was the father of the sponsor�s children.