IA101412014

The appellant is a national of Pakistani born on 21 November 1987. He appeals to the Upper Tribunal against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Robison dated 26 August 2015 refusing his appeal against the decision of the respondent cancelling his leave on the ground that either false representations were employed or material facts were not disclosed for the purposes of obtaining a visa/entry clearance, or there had been a change of circumstances since it had been granted pursuant to paragraph 321A of the Immigration Rules.

Permission to appeal was initially refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Garratt on 18 December 2015 but subsequently granted by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Mahmood on 27 January 2016. He was of the view that it was arguable that the Judge misdirected himself at paragraph 15 of his decision whereby he concluded that no proof of income into the appellant's bank account did not actually mean that the appellant did not work at Mamma Mia and placing too much importance on the fact that the appellant had a national insurance number when initially the appellant did have permission to work.

At the hearing, Mr Bajwa adopted his grounds of appeal and emphasised that there was a letter from the employment that the appellant had not worked. Mr Walker relied on the Rule 24 response and said that the Judge considered the evidence of the HMRC which the judge had to consider. He said that the appellant told the officers at Heathrow airport that his national insurance had been stolen.

This appeal was dismissed under paragraph 321 (1A) of the Immigration Rules. The complaint made against the Judge is that he did not consider the letter from Mamma Mia, which stated that they have never employed the appellant. The judge did not consider his explanation that his national insurance number had been stolen implying that somebody else was working with his national insurance number at mamma Mia. The appellant relied on the letter from this company stating that the appellant has not worked for them.

The respondent also provided HMRC records to show that the appellant had worked. The judge was entitled to rely on the evidence provided by the respondent who had proved in the balance of probabilities that the appellant had worked in the United Kingdom.