M'CALLUM v The Rev JAMES GRANT (Court of Session)

In a suspension of this decree, the question in law was, whether a tenant in glebe lands can be ejected otherwise than by observance of the requisites of the statute 1555, c. 39, or the act of sederunt, 14th Dec. 1756?

The suspender maintained —That the provision of, the act 1572, c. 48, with regard to the removing of the occupiers of lands allotted to the minister of the parish as a glebe, applied solely to the case of the original designation of the glebe. The constructive application of the enactment to this case would indeed be equally fatal to the respondent's plea, for it directs that the parties be charged to remove within ten days in virtue of letters granted by the Supreme Court.

The case of Couper v. Bruce, 22d Dec. 1692, Fount. Mor. p. 13,831, does not touch the present; for there the question was, whether a minister, appointed in room of a person who had been deposed, was entitled summarily to remove the latter from the manse during his appeal to the higher church judicatories against the sentence of the presbytery. The case of Hannay v. Rutherford, 6th Feb. 1658, Spott. Mor. p. 14,999, related to the summary removing of the possessors of the glebe at the time of its designation; and, therefore, makes nothing for the respondent's doctrine.

It was found, in the case of Couper v. Bruce, ‘that the manse followed the right of the church, and the stipend; and that the party having right to the one behoved also to have possession of the other.’ There is, however, no principle for distinguishing, in this question, between the glebe and manse, the statute law having placed the right to both on precisely the same footing.

No true analogy exists between the rights of liferenters and ministers. The nature of the former is determined by the rules of the common law, while that of the latter is defined by statute. Besides, the right of the clergyman, upon his induction, summarily to eject possessors of the manse or glebe has its foundation in the uses and purposes for which this part of the benefice was bestowed. It is not the mere privilege of the party inducted, but the best interest of the public which is opposed to any attempt to exclude him from immediate possession.