IA081232021

I turn to the grounds of appeal in turn. Ground 1 is lacking in any detail. It simply says that the judge failed to consider the circumstances as at the date of the application and then sets out general propositions of law as well as citing the relevant paragraph in full. I consider there is no basis on which it can be said that the judge erred materially in his approach to paragraph 276ADE. It is sufficiently clear from how the judge has phrased himself that he bore in mind the relevant test set out in the Court of Appeal's decision in Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 The judge did look at whether the appellant would be able to live and integrate again into life in India and did not find any significant obstacles to that for which he gave adequate and sustainable reasons. It is of note also that in this case the grounds do not identify what those significant obstacles were.

Ground 2. This ground is hopeless. I am at a loss to understand how this ground could have been drafted without any reference to Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The judge was required to attach little weight to the appellant's private life given that it had been developed here whilst her life was precarious. All the factors drawn attention to in the bullet points in paragraph 9 of the grounds are aspects of her private life in the United Kingdom. There is simply no merit in the submission that there was an error in not considering reasonableness as an aspect of proportionality.

It is sufficiently clear that the judge bore that in mind having addressed himself properly as to the questions posed in Razgar and the grounds are simply a disagreement with a properly reasoned decision. There is simply in reality no attempt in the grounds to identify how the relatively high threshold of compelling circumstances has been achieved in this case. Even taken at its highest there is simply no sufficient evidence to show that the appellant would be at risk from her estranged partner or his in-laws and there is in fact no proper challenge to those findings and absent such findings it is difficult to see how the appellant at age 60 who has shown resourcefulness in coming to the United Kingdom and establishing herself here would not be able to re-establish herself in India. It is simply not good enough to say that removal of the appellant to India would be highly disruptive. That is implicit in the Article 8 test, it is just that the consequences have to be significant for an appellant to succeed in overcoming the strong public interest in removing those who have no right to be here.

There is no merit in ground 3. There is no real evidential basis on which it can be said that the appellant would need to rely on a shelter and it is significant that I consider that the appellant did not in this case claim asylum. It was for her to show that she would need to have to rely on a shelter and would not otherwise be able to integrate. The judge found to the contrary for adequate and sustainable reasons. It is in any event sufficiently clear that the judge did have regard to the relevant material and took it into account. The grounds are simply a disagreement as to weight which is a matter for the judge and the grounds fail to identify that the judge's approach was perverse or irrational.

According for these reasons I find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it .