Here the only difficulty arises from the fact that the pursuer fixed upon a date as the time of conception which is about a month before the defender returned to Inverness. It is now admitted that she was mistaken, and it is submitted that the true date must be held to be about a month later than that to which she deponed. That might very well be fatal to the pursuer's case, for it might be shown that the date deponed to had been fixed upon from a corrupt motive, and that would be sufficient to taint her whole evidence as untrustworthy. But this is not a case of that kind. Neither the Sheriff-Substitute nor the Sheriff suggest any corrupt motive on the part of the pursuer. Both are of opinion that the mistake in the date was an innocent blunder on the part of the pursuer. Now, if we hold with the Sheriffs that on the evidence as it stands, it is made out that the pursuer's mistake was an innocent one, one or other of two results must follow; we must either accept the actual date as proved or allow further proof so as to save the defender from being prejudiced by having been misled by the erroneous statement of the pursuer. As the defender is satisfied to take the proof as it stands, I think we must hold that the actual date of conception was the 30th of August.
As to the evidence of the doctor, are we to hold that anything has been proved regarding the condition of the child at birth which makes necessary for us to decide that it was a nine months' child and not an eight months' child ? I see no ground for arriving at that conclusion. This child, for anything that appears in the evidence, might have been an eight months' child. To base conclusions upon evidence such as that of the doctor in this case would not be safe.
I come to the conclusion that there is no ground for interfering with the judgment of the Sheriffs.
The Court adhered.
Counsel for the Pursuer— Anderson. Agent— Frank M. H. Young, Solicitor.
Counsel for the Defender— Cullen. Agent— Henry Wakelin, Solicitor.