IA018802014 & ors

This is an appeal against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Narayan promulgated on 5 th September 2014, following a hearing at Stoke-on-Trent on 26 th August 2014. In the determination, the judge allowed the appeal of Waheed Murad, of Catherine Wahid, of Meekail Joshua Gill, and of Asahel Jeremiah Gill. The Respondent Secretary of State subsequently applied to, and was granted, permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, and thus the matter comes before me.

The Appellants are citizens of Pakistan. They comprise a family of two parents and their children. The first Appellant, the father, was born on 1 st April 1971. The second Appellant, the mother, was born on 20 th February 1968. Their two dependent children, the third and fourth Appellants were born on 19 th May 2002 and 20 th May 2004 respectively. All appeal against the decision of the Respondent dated 17 th December 2013 to refuse their applications for variations of leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom.

The Appellants� claim is that they cannot relocate back to Pakistan, given that there are two young children, who would face many difficulties, of social, cultural, and family ties in that country, in circumstances where these children are at school, the eldest having been in the UK for six years and eleven months at the date of the decision before the judge. They have thrived at school and have progressed well in their education.

The judge referred to the relevant law applicable before him. The judge refers to Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules and paragraph 276ADE, as well as to Article 8 of the ECHR (see paragraphs 8 to 11). He observes, �I have also considered, in accordance with Section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014, Section 117B Article 8, public interest considerations applicable in all cases� (paragraph 16). The judge also refers to the obligations upon a decision-maker under Section 55 of the BCIA 2009 in relation to the welfare of children (see paragraph 25).

In a very long determination (running into nineteen pages) the application of these provisions are not, however, properly brought together at the end of the determination. Section 117B, for example, is not mentioned again in the determination when the judge makes his �findings of fact and conclusions� (see paragraphs 27 to 34). There is a reference to paragraph 276ADE and the judge recognises the requirement to consider �exceptionality� in terms of the �unjustifiable harsh consequences for the individual or their family� which must �encompass the best interests of the child� (paragraph 30).