Our attention has also been drawn to Jean Sorrell Ltd v. Ryback [1991] IRLR 153, which deals simply with the case of wrong advice from an official of the Industrial Tribunal. But it is fair to point out that the approach of Mr Justice Knox also takes account of the fact that the way in which the advice is being given is from an organisation appointed in law to deal with this type of procedure.
It seems to us at least a possible view that in the case of the Joint Industry Board one has a parallel jurisdiction to which very similar considerations might, in the appropriate case, apply.
In our view therefore, there was an error of law, which proceeds from the error of fact. The appropriate procedure, in our view, is that this matter should be sent back to a tribunal differently constituted to consider a number of matters:
(1) Whether the excluded Joint Industry Board dismissal procedures agreement did apply to the Appellant.
(2) In what respect was Mr Davison's advice erroneous and misguided.
(3) Whether the Board, in wrongly assuming jurisdiction over the Appellant's unfair dismissal claim, and in communicating that assumption to him, impliedly represented that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction.
(4) Whether there were two identical misrepresentations made to the Appellant with respect to the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal each one coming different source.
(5) Whether the Appellant relied upon the misrepresentation from the Joint Industry Board.
(6) Whether if he had so relied upon that misrepresentation it was reasonable for him to have done so without independently ascertaining the accuracy of the representation or advice.
(7) Whether it was reasonable so to rely the sole or substantial reason that the Appellant submitted his Originating Application out of time was because he did rely upon the Joint Industry Board's misrepresentation, and whether if that was the sole or substantial reason, it was in those circumstances reasonably practicable to submit the Originating Application in time.
For that reason we shall allow this appeal.