Non-fatal offences against the person

The law of non-fatal offences against the person establishes a graduated hierarchy of offences reflecting increasing harm and culpability: common assault and battery (common law offences charged under s 39 CJA 1988), assault occasioning actual bodily harm (s 47 OAPA 1861), unlawfully wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm (s 20), and causing grievous bodily harm with intent (s 18). The critical doctrinal rule, established in Savage/Parmenter, is that sections 47 and 20 impose constructive liability: the prosecution need not prove mens rea as to the level of harm actually caused. For s 47, intention or recklessness as to unlawful force suffices, even if ABH results; for s 20, foresight of some harm suffices, even if GBH ensues. This violates the correspondence principle but reflects Parliament's judgment that defendants who choose to act unlawfully assume the risk of graver consequences.

R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699: Sections 47 and 20 require mens rea only for the underlying act (assault/battery) or some harm, not the actual harm caused. This constructive liability principle remains controversial but binding.

R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147: Silent telephone calls can constitute assault if they cause apprehension of immediate violence; psychiatric injury may amount to bodily harm/GBH; 'inflict' (s 20) does not require direct force. Watershed case recognising psychological harm.

R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689: ABH includes psychiatric injury if clinically recognised, not mere emotions. The harm must be more than 'transient or trifling' — foundation case for prosecuting psychological harm under s 47.

Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172: Battery requires unlawful force; ordinary physical contact 'generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life' falls outside the offence. Essential for understanding the battery threshold.

JCC v Eisenhower [1984] QB 331: A wound requires breaking both layers of skin (dermis and epidermis); internal bleeding alone insufficient. Illustrates the technical, archaic nature of statutory language.

Courts apply a two-stage analysis: (1) identify which offence tier the harm falls within — battery (any unlawful touching), ABH (harm interfering with health/comfort), wound (break in whole skin), or GBH (really serious harm); (2) match the correct mens rea — for assault/battery: intent or recklessness as to force; for s 47: same as assault/battery (constructive liability); for s 20: 'maliciously' meaning intent or recklessness as to some harm; for s 18: specific intent to cause GBH. Common triggers include: one-punch cases (often s 47 if injury results), glassing (s 20 wounding), sustained attacks (s 18 if intent to cause serious harm proved), psychiatric harm from harassment (ABH/GBH if clinical condition established). Consent negatives assault/battery but not ABH+ unless within recognised categories (sport, surgery, etc). Intoxication may negate s 18 intent but not basic intent offences.

Assuming correspondence: Students wrongly require foresight of ABH for s 47 or GBH for s 20. Savage/Parmenter explicitly rejects this — state the constructive liability rule clearly. Confusing assault/battery: Assault requires apprehension of force; battery requires contact. They often coincide but are distinct offences. 'Maliciously' ≠ spite: In s 20, it means subjective recklessness as to some harm, not ill-will. Wound vs GBH: These are alternatives in s 20 — a papercut is a wound but not GBH; a fractured skull may be GBH but not a wound. Consent scope: It negatives assault/battery but not ABH+ unless within recognised lawful activities (Brown). Don't assume consent always applies.