Theft and robbery

Theft requires five elements under s.1(1) Theft Act 1968: (1) appropriation—any assumption of the rights of an owner, even with consent (Gomez, Hinks); (2) property—including money, chattels, and intangibles, but excluding most land; (3) belonging to another—extending beyond ownership to possession, control, and equitable interests; (4) dishonesty—applying Ivey's objective test based on ordinary standards given D's factual beliefs; (5) intention permanently to deprive—not mere borrowing unless the property's value is exhausted (Lloyd). This broad definition collapsed traditional theft/fraud distinctions, making consent irrelevant to appropriation and focusing criminal liability on dishonest exploitation rather than non-consensual taking.

R v Gomez [1993] AC 442: Appropriation occurs despite owner's consent; 'any assumption' in s.3(1) is unqualified. This overruled Morris and made consent relevant only to dishonesty, fundamentally expanding theft's scope.

R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241: Valid gifts can be appropriated—even where D obtains indefeasible title, dishonest receipt constitutes theft. The decision severed criminal from civil law, protecting vulnerable victims despite valid transfers.

Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67: Rejected Ghosh's subjective limb—dishonesty now asks whether ordinary people would consider D's conduct dishonest given D's factual beliefs. D's moral standards are irrelevant.

R v Lloyd [1985] QB 829: Temporary use isn't theft unless property's 'goodness or virtue' is exhausted. Mere borrowing, however dishonest, lacks intention permanently to deprive unless property is fundamentally changed.

R v Hale (1978) 68 Cr App R 415: Appropriation continues while D secures property—force during escape can satisfy robbery's 'at the time of' requirement. This prevents artificial temporal distinctions.

Courts analyse theft systematically through five elements. First, identify any assumption of owner's rights (appropriation)—consent is irrelevant post-Gomez. Second, confirm property falls within s.4 (excluding most land/wild creatures). Third, establish 'belonging to another' broadly—possession, control, or equitable interests suffice (s.5). Fourth, apply Ivey's two-stage dishonesty test: (i) determine D's factual beliefs subjectively, then (ii) assess whether conduct was dishonest by ordinary standards. Check s.2(1) exclusions first. Fifth, prove intention permanently to deprive—s.6 extends this to treating property 'as one's own to dispose of' but Lloyd requires substantial exhaustion of value. For robbery, complete theft analysis first, then add: force/threat immediately before/at time of stealing, used to steal.

Students wrongly think consent negates appropriation—post-Gomez, it only affects dishonesty. Many misapply Ivey by making D's moral views relevant or skipping the subjective factual-belief stage. Section 2(1) provides when D is NOT dishonest, not a complete definition—if none apply, use Ivey. Don't assume lengthy borrowing satisfies s.6—Lloyd requires the property's value be exhausted. For robbery, theft must be complete—no dishonesty means no robbery despite force. Property 'belongs to another' if anyone has possession/control, not just owners. Appropriation continues only while D secures property (Hale), not indefinitely.