Fraud and the Fraud Act 2006
A systematic analysis of false representation, failure to disclose, and abuse of position under the Fraud Act 2006, with critical assessment of dishonesty, gain and loss, and the mental element
§01 Overview
The Fraud Act 2006 marks a watershed in the law of dishonesty offences, replacing the sprawling and piecemeal deception offences under the Theft Acts 1968 and 1978 with a single, tripartite offence of fraud. Enacted following the Law Commission's Report No 276 Fraud (2002), the Act addresses the failure of the old law to keep pace with modern methods of dishonest conduct, particularly in the digital economy.
Under the 2006 Act, fraud is committed in one of three ways: by false representation (s 2), by failure to disclose information (s 3), or by abuse of position (s 4). Each route constitutes the actus reus of the single offence contrary to s 1. The mens rea is uniform: dishonesty (now governed by the test in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67), coupled with intention either to make a gain or to cause loss or risk of loss. Critically, fraud is a conduct crime rather than a result crime: no actual gain or loss need materialise, and no person need be deceived. This represents a radical departure from the pre-2006 law of deception and aligns fraud with inchoate liability, criminalising the dishonest act itself.
This note traces the structure of the offence, examines the case law on dishonesty (particularly the shift from Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 to Ivey), analyses each of the three forms of fraud, and engages with academic criticism concerning over-criminalisation, fair labelling, and the blurring of conduct and result elements. It is essential to read this note alongside your earlier work on theft (Week 8): the two offences share the dishonesty requirement but diverge sharply in structure and scope.
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