St. John's International Airport Authority v. Thibodeau

St. John's International Airport Authority v. Thibodeau
Court (s) Database
Federal Court of Appeal Decisions
Date
2024-11-25
Neutral citation
2024 FCA 197
File numbers
A-114-22
Decision Content
Date: 20241125
Docket: A-114-22
Citation: 2024 FCA 197
[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
CORAM:
BOIVIN J.A.
LEBLANC J.A.
GOYETTE J.A.
BETWEEN:
ST. JOHN’S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Appellant
and
MICHEL THIBODEAU
Respondent
and
COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF CANADA and CANADIAN AIRPORTS COUNCIL
Interveners
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 11, 2024.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on November 25, 2024.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:
BOIVIN J.A.
CONCURRED IN BY:
LEBLANC J.A.
DISSENTING REASONS BY:
GOYETTE J.A.
Date: 20241125
Docket: A-114-22
Citation: 2024 FCA 197
[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
CORAM:
BOIVIN J.A.
LEBLANC J.A.
GOYETTE J.A.
BETWEEN:
ST. JOHN’S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY
Appellant
and
MICHEL THIBODEAU
Respondent
and
COMMISSIONER OF OFFICIAL LANGUAGES OF CANADA and CANADIAN AIRPORTS COUNCIL
Interveners
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BOIVIN J.A.
I. INTRODUCTION [1] The conclusions reached in this appeal illustrate the broad and generous interpretation that must be given to the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp.) (OLA) and related legislation to protect the official languages of Canada. Any unduly restrictive interpretation of language obligations that a federal institution might put forward is outdated and cannot be accepted.
[2] This case concerns an application by Mr. Michel Thibodeau (the respondent) before the Federal Court seeking remedies under section 77 of the OLA on the grounds that St. John’s International Airport Authority (SJIAA) breached its language obligations under that Act. Mr. Thibodeau’s application follows the complaints he filed against SJIAA with the Commissioner of Official Languages (COL), who concluded there had been a violation of sections 22 and 23 of the OLA with respect to the language of communications and services. Mr. Thibodeau, representing himself before the Federal Court, submitted that SJIAA had failed to comply with its language obligations under Part IV of the OLA by communicating in English only on social media and failing to ensure that its website is fully bilingual. Mr. Thibodeau sought various remedies before the Federal Court, including a declaratory judgment, damages, and a letter of apology.
[3] On April 21, 2022, the Federal Court, per Grammond J., ruled in Mr. Thibodeau’s favour, finding that SJIAA had violated its language obligations and consequently awarding him $5,000 in damages (2022 FC 563) (Decision). SJIAA, dissatisfied with the Federal Court’s judgment, has appealed to this Court.
[4] By Orders rendered on November 28, 2022, and June 15, 2022, this Court granted the COL and the Canadian Airports Council (CAC), an association of airport authorities, leave to intervene in this appeal on questions of law limited to the interpretation of subsection 4(1) of the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matter) Act, S.C. 1992, c. 5 (ATA) and sections 22 and 23 of the OLA.
II. BACKGROUND A. Airport Authorities [5] This case relates to the particular situation of airport authorities. In the early 1990s, Canadian airports, including the airport in St. John’s, were operated by the Department of Transport, a federal institution subject to the OLA.
[6] In 1992, the federal government wanted to transfer the operation of some of its airports to local bodies so that they could more easily compete with American airports and contribute to regional economic development. To this end, Parliament enacted the ATA to allow [translation] “the transfer of the administration of airports” to certain designated [translation] “local businesses”. For the purposes of this case, it is useful to note that the ATA, in subsection 4(1) in particular, sets out obligations relating to official languages.
[7] In 1998, after the enactment of the ATA, St. John’s International Airport was transferred to SJIAA, one of these airport authorities. To date, 21 designated airport authorities are subject to the ATA. The designated airport authorities are private not-for-profit entities responsible for operating the 22 airports that have been transferred to them under the ATA.
A. Mr. Thibodeau’s complaints under the OLA [8] The origin of these proceedings are six complaints filed with the COL by Mr. Thibodeau in January 2018 under section 58 of the OLA. They concern (i) SJIAA’s social media accounts, (ii) SJIAA’s website, (iii) SJIAA’s press releases, (iv) documents SJIAA published on its website, (v) SJIAA’s Twitter account, and (vi) the automated teller machines (ATMs) located at St. John’s International Airport.
[9] It is admitted that Mr. Thibodeau observed the violations he alleges against SJIAA while doing online research, specifically on SJIAA’s website, on its social media accounts, and in photos that travellers had posted online. In paragraph 14 of the Decision, the Federal Court cites Mr. Thibodeau’s criticisms of SJIAA in order to outline the violations:
having an exclusively English presence on social media such as Facebook, YouTube and Instagram;
having a website with an English-only URL and of which the French version was not of equal quality to the English;
publishing its press releases in English only;
making certain documents on its website, including its annual reports and master plan, available in English only;
posting content on Twitter almost exclusively in English; and
having certain signs on ATMs in the airport only in English.
[10] Subsequently, Mr. Thibodeau’s complaints were the subject of two reports by the COL, one on the complaint relating to the ATMs at the airport, the other on the complaints relating to SJIAA’s communications. As these complaints invoke sections 22 and 23 of the OLA, it is appropriate to reproduce these provisions here:
PART IV
PARTIE IV
Communications with and Services to the Public
Communications avec le public et prestation des services
Communications and Services
Communications et services
…
[…]
Where communications and services must be in both official languages
Langues des communications et services
22 Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that any member of the public can communicate with and obtain available services from its head or central office in either official language, and has the same duty with respect to any of its other offices or facilities
(a) within the National Capital Region; or
(b) in Canada or elsewhere, where there is significant demand for communications with and services from that office or facility in that language
22 Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que le public puisse communiquer avec leur siège ou leur administration centrale, et en recevoir les services, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles. Cette obligation vaut également pour leurs bureaux — auxquels sont assimilés, pour l’application de la présente partie, tous autres lieux où ces institutions offrent des services — situés soit dans la région de la capitale nationale, soit là où, au Canada comme à l’étranger, l’emploi de cette langue fait l’objet d’une demande importante.
Travelling public
Voyageurs
23(1) For greater certainty, in addition to the duty set out in section 22, every federal institution that provides services or makes them available to the travelling public has the duty to ensure that any member of the travelling public can communicate with and obtain those services in either official language from any office or facility of the institution in Canada or elsewhere where there is significant demand for those services in that language.
23(1) Il est entendu qu’en plus de l’obligation prévue à l’article 22, il incombe aux institutions fédérales offrant des services aux voyageurs de veiller à ce que ceux-ci puissent, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles, communiquer avec leurs bureaux et en recevoir les services, là où, au Canada comme à l’étranger, l’emploi de cette langue fait l’objet d’une demande importante.
Services provided pursuant to a contract
Services conventionnés
(2) Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that such services to the travelling public as may be prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council that are provided or made available by another person or organization pursuant to a contract with the federal institution for the provision of those services at an office or facility referred to in subsection (1) are provided or made available, in both official languages, in the manner prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council.
(2) Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que, dans les bureaux visés au paragraphe (1), les services réglementaires offerts aux voyageurs par des tiers conventionnés par elles à cette fin le soient, dans les deux langues officielles, selon les modalités réglementaires.
[11] The first report from the COL, issued in April 2019, concluded that subsection 23(2) of the OLA had been violated because paragraph 12(1)(b) of the Official Languages (Communications with and Services to the Public) Regulations, SOR/92-48 (Official Languages Regulations) identifies the automated banking machine as a service to the travelling public. The Commissioner made no specific recommendation in respect of this violation because information provided by SJIAA established that it had taken corrective measures by replacing the unilingual English text with universal pictograms of the currency available. The Commissioner therefore closed the file.
[12] The second COL report, issued in May 2019, concluded that section 22 of the OLA applied to SJIAA as a “head office” but not as an “other office”, and that section 23 of the OLA applied to the airport as an “office” of SJIAA because St. John’s airport saw more than one million passengers a year, thereby meeting the criteria for significant demand under subsection 7(3) of the Official Languages Regulations. Since these facts were not disputed, the Commissioner found that SJIAA had not complied with its language obligations under these provisions of the OLA and the Official Languages Regulations. On that basis, the COL recommended that SJIAA take the necessary actions to rectify the violations of the OLA within six months.
[13] After these two reports were rendered by the COL, Mr. Thibodeau brought an application for a remedy to the Federal Court against SJIAA under section 77 of the OLA. It should be noted that Mr. Thibodeau continued to file complaints with the COL against SJIAA after his application to the Federal Court. In one complaint, he alleged that the ATMs in St. John’s airport still displayed some text in English only. None of the COL’s reports about these additional complaints had been published at the time of the hearing before this Court and as a result, these complaints are not before this Court.
[14] However, in June 2021, after the Federal Court issued its judgment which is under appeal before this Court, the COL issued a follow-up report to evaluate SJIAA’s implementation of its recommendations. In it, the COL concluded that SJIAA had failed to take sufficient action to comply with the recommendations regarding its website and social media accounts. The COL also reminded SJIAA of the principle of substantive equality between the two official languages in such matters.
[15] This was the context in which the Federal Court considered Mr. Thibodeau’s application for remedy for the language violations alleged against SJIAA.
III. FEDERAL COURT DECISION [16] After hearing Mr. Thibodeau’s application under the OLA, the Federal Court firstly set out the legislative background in issue by identifying the applicable principles of statutory interpretation in the language rights context. After referring to the relevant provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 (Charter), the OLA, the Official Languages Regulations, and the ATA, it provided an overview of the facts.
[17] In its analysis, the Federal Court noted that the objective of the remedy under section 77 of the OLA is to ensure the effectiveness of the Act by giving it “teeth” (Decision at para. 22). It stated that although the interpretation of the OLA must follow the usual approach, which requires consideration of the text, the context, the scheme of the Act, and Parliament’s purpose, the Act must also, because of its quasi-constitutional status, be given a “liberal and purposive” interpretation. Consequently, if the application of the usual method of interpretation does not allow one to decide between two possible interpretations of the Act, it is necessary to “choose the interpretation that maximizes the scope of language rights” (Decision at para. 23).
[18] The Federal Court then applied the principles of statutory interpretation to subsection 4(1) of the ATA. Based on a detailed analysis of the text, the context, the scheme of the Act, and Parliament’s purpose, it found that the airport authority should be treated like a federal institution for the purposes of transfer and that, consequently, it must comply with the language obligations that were formerly incumbent on the Department of Transport, including the head office rule under section 22 of the OLA. Accordingly, the Federal Court found that the head office of an airport authority like SJIAA must communicate with the public in both official languages and that, if it provides services directly to the public, these services must also be available in both official languages. Thus, the Federal Court rejected the interpretation put forward by SJIAA whereby airport authorities are deemed to have no head office under the OLA (Decision at paras. 28–40).
[19] The Federal Court also addressed the notion of “services … to the travelling public” / “services [offerts] aux voyageurs” referred to in section 23 of the OLA. Again, it rejected the interpretation put forward by SJIAA that services to the travelling public are limited to those who hold a travel document (Decision at para. 51). Instead, it found that, to determine whether a service or communication is intended for the travelling public, it establish whether the service or communication is offered to or intended for the travelling public, “in the sense that the recipients or beneficiaries of the service or communication are all or mainly members of the travelling public” (Decision at para. 49).
[20] Accordingly, the Federal Court found that Mr. Thibodeau’s six complaints were well founded, particularly since some of SJIAA’s communications were not available in French or were not of equal quality in the two languages (Decision at paras. 55, 60, 64–65). It also found that one of the services at the airport, namely the ATM, was not offered in French (Decision at para. 66).
[21] Having found that SJIAA had committed several breaches of the OLA, the Federal Court went on to note that, under section 77 of the OLA, the Federal Court could award damages according to the analytical framework set out by the Supreme Court in Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (Ward). Although it acknowledged that Mr. Thibodeau had suffered no personal injury, the Federal Court was of the view that, based on Ward, in this case a damage award was necessary to ensure vindication of the language rights at issue and deterrence. The Federal Court noted in passing that, although SJIAA had made some effort to implement the recommendations of the COL, its conduct “gives the impression that respecting bilingualism is not an important value” and that it “consciously adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of its duties and … ignored the Commissioner’s recommendations” (Decision at paras. 87 and 94).
[22] According to the Federal Court, SJIAA’s efforts were insufficient to serve as a counterweight to the objectives of vindication of rights and deterrence that underlie an award of damages. Accordingly, the Federal Court granted a remedy of $5,000 in damages to Mr. Thibodeau and opined that the declaratory judgment he sought would add nothing useful and that a letter of apology from SJIAA “would not be sincere” (Decision at paras. 89–94 and 102).
[23] In addition to damages, the Federal Court also awarded Mr. Thibodeau $6,000 in costs.
[24] This Court has also heard a related appeal brought by the Edmonton Regional Airports Authority against Mr. Thibodeau and renders judgment simultaneously with the judgment in this case: Edmonton Regional Airports Authority v. Thibodeau, 2024 FCA 196.
IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW [25] As this is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Court, the applicable standards of review are those set out by the Supreme Court in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235. Questions of law must be assessed on a standard of correctness, and questions of fact or of mixed fact and law are subject to a standard of palpable and overriding error, unless the judge made an extricable error of law, in which case it is reviewable on a standard of correctness.
V. ISSUES [26] SJIAA’s appeal raises the following issues:
Did the Federal Court err in deciding that airport authorities are subject to the “head office” rule set out in subsection 4(1) of the ATA?
Did the Federal Court err in its interpretation of section 23 of the OLA?
Did the Federal Court err in the award of damages?
Did the Federal Court grant an “appropriate and just” remedy?
Did the Federal Court err in the award of costs?
VI. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN CANADA [27] The process leading to the recognition of the official languages of Canada began in the 1960s with the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which set out the following vision of Canada’s two official languages, French and English (Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. General Introduction, Book I: The Official Languages (Ottawa: Privy Council Office,1967) at 93):
The administration in Ottawa must be able to communicate adequately with the public in both languages. All government publications, as well as forms and notices, must be simultaneously available in either language. Federal government offices and Crown corporations across the country must be able to deal with people in either French or English. For example, in the immigration and customs offices at all ports of entry, in important transportation terminals, on Canadian National’s trains, and on Air Canada’s airplanes—everywhere, even in the completely unilingual sections of the country, where there is contact with the travelling public—services should be available in both languages as a matter of course.
[28] The work of the Commission subsequently led to the enactment of the OLA in 1969. Thus, it was 55 years ago when French and English were enshrined as the official languages of Canada by the OLA. The statute also conferred on the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages the task of overseeing compliance by federal institutions with their language obligations set out in the OLA.
[29] Upon the patriation of the Constitution of Canada in 1982, language rights were constitutionally enshrined through sections 16 to 20 and 23 of the Charter, which contain various language guarantees for Canadians that are binding on the federal government.
[30] The OLA was overhauled in 1988, nearly 20 years after its first version, to modernize it in light of the new language rights under the Charter. That same year, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed that language rights are fundamental rights (R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234 at 268). It is important to note that the OLA was recently amended in 2023, but after the decision of the Federal Court. That version is therefore not at issue in this appeal.
[31] In any event, in the 1991 decision of this Court in Canada (Attorney General) v. Viola, [1991] 1 F.C. 373 (Viola), quasi-constitutional status was conferred on the OLA because of the nature of the rights it protects. Viola was later cited with approval by a unanimous Supreme Court in Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773 (Lavigne); see also Thibodeau v. Air Canada, 2014 SCC 67, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 340 (Thibodeau 2014).
[32] Nevertheless, it should be noted that, in its first post-Charter decisions involving the interpretation of language rights, the Supreme Court of Canada took a narrow approach, emphasizing that language rights were born of “political compromise”. Based on this approach, language rights had to be addressed “with more restraint” than other Charter rights such as those under section 7, for example (Société des Acadiens v. Association of Parents, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 at paras. 63, 64 and 65). The Supreme Court continued to apply the narrow approach for more than a decade, but it has since abandoned it in favour of a more generous interpretation of language rights in Canada.
[33] In 1999, the Supreme Court changed course, advocating a broad and generous approach, so that language rights may be interpreted “purposively, in a manner consistent with the preservation and development of official language communities in Canada” (R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 768 at para. 25 (Beaulac)). Beaulac marked a turning point in the interpretation of language rights by the courts in subsequent years (Michel Doucet, Michel Bastarache & Martin Rioux, “Les droits linguistiques : fondements et interprétation” in Michel Bastarache & Michel Doucet, eds., Les Droits linguistiques au Canada, 3rd ed. (Cowansville, Que.: Yvon Blais, 2013) at 62).
[34] Since then, the case law of the Supreme Court has resolutely followed the legal reasoning developed in Beaulac and reaffirmed the principle of the broad and generous interpretation of language rights that courts must adopt. Accordingly, it has been established that language rights are not frozen in a historical context and, to the extent that a restrictive interpretation is sought, it is to be rejected (Beaulac at para. 25; see also Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1, [2000] S.C.R. 3; Charlebois v. Mowat, 2001 NBCA 117; Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 14, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 201; DesRochers v. Canada (Industry), 2009 SCC 8, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 194 (DesRochers); Caron v. Alberta, 2015 SCC 56, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 511; Mazraani v. Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc., 2018 SCC 50, [2018] 3 S.C.R. 261 (Mazraani); Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie‑Britannique v. British Columbia, 2020 SCC 13, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 678; R. v. Tayo Tompouba, 2024 SCC 16, 491 D.L.R. (4th) 195).
[35] The interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions in this case will therefore follow the teachings of the Supreme Court in language rights cases since the seminal decision in Beaulac.
VII. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS [36] The relevant provisions of the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act, S.C. 1992, c. 5, are reproduced here:
Application of Official Languages Act
Loi sur les langues officielles
4(1) Where the Minister has leased an airport to a designated airport authority, on and after the transfer date Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and X of the Official Languages Act apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to the authority in relation to the airport as if
(a) the authority were a federal institution; and
(b) the airport were an office or facility of that institution, other than its head or central office.
4(1) À la date de cession par bail d’un aéroport à une administration aéroportuaire désignée, les parties IV, V, VI, VIII, IX et X de la Loi sur les langues officielles s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, à cette administration, pour ce qui est de l’aéroport, au même titre que s’il s’agissait d’une institution fédérale, et l’aéroport est assimilé aux bureaux de cette institution, à l’exclusion de son siège ou de son administration centrale.
Idem
Idem
(1.1) Where the Minister has sold or otherwise transferred an airport to a designated airport authority, on and after the transfer date Parts IV, VIII, IX and X of the Official Languages Act apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to the authority in relation to the airport as if
(a) the authority were a federal institution; and
(b) the airport were an office or facility of that institution, other than its head or central office.
(1.1) À la date de cession autrement que par bail d’un aéroport à une administration aéroportuaire désignée, les parties IV, VIII, IX et X de la Loi sur les langues officielles s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, à cette administration, pour ce qui est de l’aéroport, au même titre que s’il s’agissait d’une institution fédérale, et l’aéroport est assimilé aux bureaux de cette institution, à l’exclusion de son siège ou de son administration centrale.
[37] The relevant provisions of the OLA are reproduced here again:
PART IV
PARTIE IV
Communications with and Services to the Public
Communications and Services
Communications avec le public et prestation des services
Communications et services
…
[…]
Where communications and services must be in both official languages
Langues des communications et services
22 Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that any member of the public can communicate with and obtain available services from its head or central office in either official language, and has the same duty with respect to any of its other offices or facilities
(a) within the National Capital Region; or
(b) in Canada or elsewhere, where there is significant demand for communications with and services from that office or facility in that language.
22 Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que le public puisse communiquer avec leur siège ou leur administration centrale, et en recevoir les services, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles. Cette obligation vaut également pour leurs bureaux — auxquels sont assimilés, pour l’application de la présente partie, tous autres lieux où ces institutions offrent des services — situés soit dans la région de la capitale nationale, soit là où, au Canada comme à l’étranger, l’emploi de cette langue fait l’objet d’une demande importante.
Travelling public
Voyageurs
23(1) For greater certainty, in addition to the duty set out in section 22, every federal institution that provides services or makes them available to the travelling public has the duty to ensure that any member of the travelling public can communicate with and obtain those services in either official language from any office or facility of the institution in Canada or elsewhere where there is significant demand for those services in that language.
23(1) Il est entendu qu’en plus de l’obligation prévue à l’article 22, il incombe aux institutions fédérales offrant des services aux voyageurs de veiller à ce que ceux-ci puissent, dans l’une ou l’autre des langues officielles, communiquer avec leurs bureaux et en recevoir les services, là où, au Canada comme à l’étranger, l’emploi de cette langue fait l’objet d’une demande importante.
Services provided pursuant to a contract
Services conventionnés
(2) Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that such services to the travelling public as may be prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council that are provided or made available by another person or organization pursuant to a contract with the federal institution for the provision of those services at an office or facility referred to in subsection (1) are provided or made available, in both official languages, in the manner prescribed by regulation of the Governor in Council.
(2) Il incombe aux institutions fédérales de veiller à ce que, dans les bureaux visés au paragraphe (1), les services réglementaires offerts aux voyageurs par des tiers conventionnés par elles à cette fin le soient, dans les deux langues officielles, selon les modalités réglementaires.
[38] Finally, the relevant provisions of the Official Languages Regulations are in sections 5 and 7 defining the notion of significant demand referred to in sections 22 and 23 of the OLA. These provisions of the Official Languages Regulations are extremely detailed and it is neither necessary nor useful to reproduce them here in full. The Federal Court accurately summarizes each of the provisions as follows:
[10] Section 5 of the Regulations provides that, for the purposes of section 22 of the Act, there is significant demand for services provided by an office of a federal institution in the minority official language where, among other things, the minority language population in the relevant census metropolitan area is at least 5,000 or where at least 5% of the demand for service is in that language. It is not disputed that these conditions are not met in St. John’s.
[11] Section 7 of the Regulations provides that, for the purposes of section 23 of the Act, there is significant demand for services provided by an airport in the minority official language when at least 5% of the demand for service is in that language. There is also significant demand for these services in both languages when the total number of passengers per year exceeds one million. It is not disputed that the total number of travellers at St. John’s Airport has exceeded this threshold for several years. Furthermore, in 2019, after Mr. Thibodeau’s complaints were filed, section 7 was amended by the addition of subsection 7(5), which provides that there is significant demand for both official languages if the services are offered at an airport located in a provincial or territorial capital, such as St. John’s.
[39] This is the legislative framework for this case, where the issues concern primarily the interpretation to give to language obligations under the various legislative provisions at issue.
VIII. ANALYSIS A. Observations on the interpretive exercise in this case [40] The issue of the interpretation of subsection 4(1) of the ATA must be assessed on the standard of correctness. This exercise must comply with the modern method of statutory interpretation, as it must for any other statutory provision, in that the “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (see Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para. 21 (Rizzo), citing Elmer Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87).
[41] The interpretation of the OLA is also subject to the standard of correctness. However, as mentioned above, because of its quasi-constitutional status, the OLA must be given a “liberal and purposive” interpretation so that it is assigned the weight it deserves, as its purpose is to preserve and develop official language communities (Beaulac at para. 25; DesRochers at para. 31). The interpretation of the OLA must also comply with the method of interpretation set out in Canada (Commissioner of Official Languages) v. Canada (Employment and Social Development), 2022 FCA 14, [2022] 3 F.C.R. 220 at para. 111; Thibodeau 2014 at para. 112; Lavigne at para. 25).
B. Did the Federal Court err in deciding that airport authorities are subject to the “head office” rule in subsection 4(1) of the ATA? [42] For the following reasons, the interpretation given by the Federal Court to subsection 4(1) of the ATA should be upheld. Consequently, all of Part IV of the OLA applies to SJIAA because it is subject to the “head office” rule. This conclusion is confirmed by the interpretive exercise, which includes consideration of (i) the object of the ATA, (ii) the scheme of the ATA, (iii) the intention of Parliament, and (iv) the grammatical and ordinary sense to give to the words used in the ATA.
(i) The object of the ATA
[43] As the Federal Court notes at the outset, the objective sought by Parliament in enacting the ATA was to “facilitate the transfer of airports operated by the Department of Transport to local private organizations” (Decision at para. 29). To achieve this objective, the ATA transferred a limited number of obligations that had been incumbent on the Department of Transport. These included the federal government’s language obligations, which were continued at the time of an airport transfer to a local airport authority. The transfer was necessary because airport authorities, as private entities, are not automatically subject to the OLA.
[44] At the hearing before this Court, SJIAA and the CAC argued that the object of the ATA was to promote economic development and that the transfer of language obligations must be qualified, since there are no absolute rights in this area. Arguing that subsection 4(1) of the ATA imposes the language obligations of airport authority head offices, SJIAA and the CAC submit that the Federal Court erred because the language obligations it imposes are in conflict with economic development and reduce the organizational flexibility of airport authorities.
[45] The arguments of SJIAA and the CAC have no merit. They confuse the economic motivations behind transferring airports with the very specific object of subsection 4(1) of the ATA, which is to ensure the continuity of language obligations, in other words, the preservation of bilingualism. The preservation of bilingualism does not vary depending on the location of the airport the government has transferred under the ATA. Most importantly, there is no basis in the record to conclude that the continuity of the language obligations now incumbent on the head offices of airport authorities hampers the achievement of their economic goals, including regional economic development. In any event, these economic goals cannot be used as pretexts to deviate from the clear and specific objective of subsection 4(1) of the ATA.
(ii) The scheme of the Act
[46] Under the scheme of the Act, the provisions of the OLA apply to airport authorities only to the extent that section 4 of the ATA makes them applicable. In this respect, it is sufficient to rely on the Federal Court’s finding in paragraph 30:
Section 4 does not make the entire [OLA] applicable to airport authorities. Parliament felt that it was necessary to tailor the [OLA] to the reality of local authorities and that only certain parts of the [OLA] would apply to them. However, there is no indication that Parliament intended to make a more precise breakdown. In principle, an airport authority must comply with all the provisions of the parts of the [OLA].
(iii) The parliamentary debates
[47] It is important to include a word on Parliament’s intent with respect to the ATA. The parties and interveners in this case have each referred to several excerpts from the parliamentary debates to support their respective arguments. While it may be evident that these debates were fuelled by the concerns of parliamentarians about the weakening of language protections and the preservation of bilingualism, an attentive reading of the discussions surrounding the enactment of the ATA does not lead to an unequivocal conclusion on how Part IV of the OLA must apply to airport authorities.
(iv) The ordinary and grammatical sense of the words used in the ATA
[48] The wording of subsection 4(1) of the ATA is reproduced here for ease of reference:
4 (1) Where the Minister has leased an airport to a designated airport authority, on and after the transfer date Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and X of the Official Languages Act apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to the authority in relation to the airport as if
(a) the authority were a federal institution; and
(b) the airport were an office or facility of that institution, other than its head or central office.
4 (1) À la date de cession par bail d’un aéroport à une administration aéroportuaire désignée, les parties IV, V, VI, VIII, IX et X de la Loi sur les langues officielles s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, à cette administration, pour ce qui est de l’aéroport, au même titre que s’il s’agissait d’une institution fédérale, et l’aéroport est assimilé aux bureaux de cette institution, à l’exclusion de son siège ou de son administration centrale.
[49] First, as the Federal Court correctly pointed out, it is important to note that Parliament explicitly used the terms “designated airport authority” and “airport” in subsection 4(1) of the ATA. These are two distinct terms that are based on the following premise: the airport authority is a corporation, and the airport is a physical facility (Decision at para. 31).
[50] The wording of subsection 4(1) of the ATA relies on this distinction to provide that several parts of the OLA, including Part IV, “apply … to the authority in relation to the airport as if …” / “s’appliquent … à cette administration, pour ce qui est de l’aéroport, au même titre que s’il s’agissait d’une institution fédérale”. This wording reflects Parliament’s intent to maintain the application of the OLA despite the transfer of a given airport. This explicit wording is in fact necessary because, as mentioned above, the OLA does not immediately apply to airport authorities, since they are private corporations.
[51] Similarly, the wording of subsection 4(1) of the ATA provides that Part IV of the OLA applies to the airport authority as a federal institution in respect of its airport operations activities. The English wording is even clearer and confirms the meaning of the provision: “Parts IV [of the OLA] apply to the authority in relation to the airport as if … the authority were a federal institution”. As the Federal Court rightly points out, Parliament thus ensures that airport authorities like SJIAA are deemed federal authorities and are therefore subject to the OLA (Decision at para. 32).
[52] Subsection 4(1) continues: “as if … the airport were an office or facility of that institution [SJIAA], other than its head or central office” / “l’aéroport est assimilé aux bureaux de cette institution, à l’exclusion de son siège ou de son administration centrale”. Despite the wording of the provision setting out the presumption that the airport is deemed an “office” (“bureau” in the French version) and not the “head or central office” of the institution at issue (in this case, SJIAA), SJIAA submits that the wording expresses Parliament’s intention not to create head offices. Further, SJIAA submits that Parliament intended that airport authorities like itself would not have a head office and simply be deemed to have an “other office”, i.e., an airport. According to SJIAA, Parliament’s intention was not to subject privatized airports to greater bilingual communication obligations than the duties that were incumbent on airports operated by the government, i.e., the federal Department of Transport (SJIAA’s memorandum of fact and law at paras. 13–14, 35, 47, 53 and 54).
[53] SJIAA also submits that section 22 of the OLA does not apply to the airport and SJIAA therefore has no duty to communicate with or offer services to the public in both official languages (SJIAA’s memorandum of fact and law at paras. 54 and 59). In other words, SJIAA disputes the distinction drawn by the Federal Court between “airport” and “head office” and submits that, accordingly, airport authorities do not have a “head office” to operate an airport within the meaning of subsection 4(1) of the ATA.
[54] With respect, the interpretation of subsection 4(1) of the ATA proposed by SJIAA is erroneous and must be rejected, for the following reasons.
[55] First, the existence of a head office is mandatory for not-for-profit corporations such as airport authorities. This is a basic principle of corporate law. For example, subsection 20(1) of the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, S.C.