Hérold v. Canada

Hérold v. Canada
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2011-08-18
Neutral citation
2011 FC 1003
File numbers
T-68-09
Decision Content
Federal Court
Cour fédérale
Date: 20110818
Docket: T-68-09
Citation: 2011 FC 1003
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, August 18, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Scott
BETWEEN:
NICOLE (NORA) HÉROLD
Plaintiff
and
HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA ET AL
CANADA REVENUE AGENCY (CRA) AND
THE PARTIES TO THE OFFENCES:
EMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (EI),
HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CANADA (HRSDC)
SUDBURY TAXATION CENTRE
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1] Nicole (Nora) Hérold (the plaintiff) claims that the defendants have been making unlawful deductions from her wages, pension and unemployment benefits since 1999. She seeks $600,000 for injury and punitive damages. The defendants submit that they are entitled to deduct these amounts because the plaintiff defaulted on her student loans. Accordingly, they ask the Court to order the plaintiff to pay them $9,509.28, which amount represents the balance of the student loans in principal and interest.
[2] For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses the plaintiff’s main action and allows the defendants’ counterclaim.
[3] This case raises three issues:
a) Did the plaintiff repay the student loans made to her under the Canada Student Loan Act?
b) Could the defendants recover the monies owing to them by way of set-off against the wages, pension and other amounts due to the plaintiff?
c) Is the defendants’ counterclaim statute barred?
II. Factual background
[4] The chronology of events is as follows:
· Between the months of May and November 1987, the plaintiff entered into a certain number of guaranteed Canada Student Loan agreements with the Bank of Montréal in Vancouver, for an amount totalling $5,355.
· On June 4, 1989, the guaranteed student loans were transferred to the Bank of Nova Scotia, in Burnaby, British Columbia.
· On August 31, 1989, the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student at Simon Fraser University. The interest on her student loans became payable on the first day of the seventh month following the month in which she lost her full-time student status (March 1, 1990), at a fixed rate of 10.5% per annum, or $82.68 per month (see subsection 10(1) of the Canada Student Loan Regulations, in the Appendix).
· On February 10, 1990, the plaintiff signed an agreement with the Bank of Nova Scotia consolidating all of her loans. Among other things, this agreement set the repayment terms.
· On March 1, 1990, the plaintiff began making the required monthly payments, which reduced the balance owing on her consolidated loan to $4,665 in principal and interest.
· On September 5, 1991, the plaintiff went back to school full time and sent the Bank a confirmation of registration, which entitled her to interest-free periods. At that time, the balance owing on the loan was $4,665.
· On October 18, 1991, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loans with the Bank, this time for $3,000.
· On September 8, 1992, the plaintiff signed another confirmation of registration as a full-time student.
· On November 2, 1992, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
· On January 4, 1993, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
· On May 3, 1993, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
· On September 8, 1993, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
· On January 4, 1994, the plaintiff signed another confirmation of registration as a full-time student
· On January 31, 1994, the plaintiff took out another guaranteed Canada Student Loan with the Bank, this time for $1,785.
· At the end of April 1994, the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student. The total amount of her new loans was $11,925.
· Under the Canada Student Loans Act, RSC 1985, c S-3 (the Act), subsection 4(3) applies to the consolidated loans from her first period of studies, from 1987 to 1990. Subsection 4(1) applies to the loans made between October 18, 1991, and May 3, 1993. Subsection 4(2) applies to the loans made between September 8, 1993, and January 31, 1994.
· Under section 14 of the Canada Student Loans Regulations (the Regulations), interest at the fixed rate of 9.375% began accruing on the first day of the seventh month following the month in which the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student (see the Appendix). On the date the loans were consolidated, the plaintiff could either pay this interest or add it to the balance of her loan. Since she failed to pay the interest accrued during that period, the Bank added it to the balance of her loan as of November 1, 1994.
· The Bank also prepared a consolidation agreement in accordance with the Act, which requires that all student loans be consolidated within six months from the date the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student. Despite having undertaken to sign this consolidation agreement under section 9 of the Regulations, the plaintiff did not sign it.
· The plaintiff was required to start repaying her loan as of November 1, 1994.
· Between November 1, 1994, and October 31, 1996, the plaintiff applied for and was granted six special interest-free periods, except for the period from February 1, 1996, to July 31, 1996.
· On March 10, 1997, the applicant had still not repaid her loan or the accrued interest. The Bank sent her a formal demand for repayment of all amounts owed to it in principal and interest. The plaintiff did not respond to this demand.
· On May 28, 1997, under sections 7 and 7.1 of the Act and section 28 of the Regulations, the Bank made a claim for loss to the Canadian government.
· On February 25, 1998, the Crown paid the Bank the a total amount of $18,306.58, comprising $16,742.50 in unpaid principal, $1,556.68 in accrued interest and $7.70 in fees. Under section 30 of the Regulations, the Crown then became subrogated in and to all rights of the Bank, and the outstanding guaranteed loan thereby became a debt owed to the Crown. This debt was then managed by the federal Department of Human Resources and Social Development (the Department).
· The Department retained the services of a collections agency. Between May 26, 1998, and July 27, 1998, the plaintiff made three voluntary payments of $10.00 each. The defendants credited $30.00 against the interest owed by the plaintiff.
· Between April 9, 1999, and August 14, 2008, under subsection 164(2) of the Income Tax Act (see Appendix), the Canada Revenue Agency effected a set-off and deducted $8,149 in principal and interest from the plaintiff’s guaranteed Canada Student Loan debt.
· A note in the Department’s accounting system states that between May 15, 2000, and October 15, 2000, a total of $984.00 was credited to the plaintiff’s account (type 140 – non-voluntary payments).
· In June 2004, it was found that the plaintiff had received an Employment Insurance overpayment of approximately $1,991.00. The plaintiff did not appeal that decision and voluntarily repaid the overpayment by cheque payable to the order of the Receiver General for Canada dated July 9, 2004.
· Over the course of the years 2004 and 2005, the plaintiff received several letters regarding her debt from the defendants, more specifically, from the Department. These letters refer alternately to a student loan debt and an Employment Insurance overpayment debt but consistently demand repayment of an amount then totalling $21,118.34. Three different seizure codes appear on the plaintiff’s pay stubs, although all of these are in fact set-off transactions under subsection 155(1) of the Financial Administration Act.
· Between April 6, 2005, and September 30, 2008, the accounting system (DARS) of the Department, one of the defendants, shows that a total amount of $16,343.46 was credited to the plaintiff’s account (type 190 – payments from other sources).
· In June 2008, it was discovered that the plaintiff had received an Employment Insurance overpayment of $383.00. The plaintiff did not appeal that decision and repaid the overpayment on August 19, 2008, by cheque payable to the order of the Receiver General for Canada.
· On January 14, 2009, the plaintiff brought her action in this Court. According to the defendants, the plaintiff still owes $9,182.45 in principal plus $326.83 in interest at a fixed rate of 9.375% per annum, which explains the total of $9,509.28 sought in the counterclaim filed on February 13, 2009. Interest continues to accrue at $2.36 a day.
III. RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[5] The statutory provisions applicable in this case are reproduced in the Appendix to this judgment.
IV. Analysis
a) Does the plaintiff owe the Crown the sums claimed?
[6] The plaintiff testified at the hearing. She stated that she had repaid in full all of her loan, as evidenced by three documents she filed, namely, three excerpts from her Bank of Nova Scotia account statements: one partial statement dated December 30; a second one dated February 1, 1994; and a third covering the period from January 1 to December 9, 1994, at Appendix 5, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4, respectively, of her affidavit dated April 21, 2011.
[7] The plaintiff submits that these documents prove that the student loans made by the Government of Canada and the Government of British Columbia have been repaid in full. She relies on the remark “new” appearing immediately next to two entries: one for $16,742.30 and another for $12,108.00. The same remark “new” appears dated November 1, 1994. The plaintiff submits that these are two sham loans that she never agreed to (Hearing Transcript, page 56).
[8] Furthermore, on the same statement, there are two entries showing balances of zero, one next to an amount of $12,108.00 on November 1, 1994, and another next to an amount of $13,020.35 on the same date. According to the plaintiff, these last two entries support her position to the effect that all her student loans, be they loans from the province of British Columbia or loans entered into under the Government of Canada’s guaranteed student loan program, have been paid back.
[9] She also relies on two monthly statements from her account at the Bank of Nova Scotia. Balances of zero appear on these statements, again with the remark “new”, next an amount of $12,108.00, which according to the plaintiff establishes once again that she paid back the student loans taken out with the province.
[10] The plaintiff also called as a witness a Bank of Nova Scotia representative, Ms. Kennedy, who contradicted the plaintiff’s statements (Hearing Transcript, pages 19, 23, 26, 30 and 35). Ms. Kennedy explained that the remark “new” was in fact simply due to the consolidation of the plaintiff’s loans. According to this witness, the Bank had to consolidate the loans when the plaintiff ceased to be a full-time student.
[11] Furthermore, Mr. Vananburg, witness for the defendants, stated that the Department conducts a detailed audit of all student loans before reimbursing the Bank, and the plaintiff’s case was no exception. According to him, the plaintiff still owed a total of $16,742.50 in 1998, when the Government of Canada became subrogated in the Bank’s rights.
[12] On a balance of probabilities, the evidence in the record favours the defendants’ version, since two witnesses clearly stated that the student loans entered into by the plaintiff under the federal program had not been repaid in 1997 (Hearing Transcript, page 186).
[13] Moreover, as Ms. Kennedy, representative of the Bank of Nova Scotia, explained, the entries on which the plaintiff relies to assert that she no longer owed the Bank anything are clear. These entries in fact prove that the student loans were consolidated in accordance with the terms of the guaranteed loan program and that on November 1 they were consolidated, not paid back (Hearing Transcript, page 18). As for the plaintiff’s claim that the subrogation could not be valid because she had not signed the consolidation agreements, the Court rejects this argument, considering the testimony of Mr. Vananburg. (see Hearing Transcript, pages 182 to 184 and 192 to 194). Moreover, there is evidence in the record, namely section 9 of the Regulations made pursuant to the Act, which provides that a consolidation agreement is valid even if the borrower refuses to sign it.
[14] Considering these testimonies, the Court finds that the plaintiff did not repay the student loans entered into under the Canada Student Loans Program.
b) Could the defendants recover the monies owing to them by way of set-off against the wages and other amounts due to the plaintiff?
[15] The legislation is clear on this: subsection 155(1) of the Financial Administration Act provides that the appropriate Minister responsible for collecting a debt may effect a set-off against any sum of money that may be due or payable to the debtor by Her Majesty in right of Canada. Subsection 164(2) of the Income Tax Act also allows set-offs against any tax refund or repayment payable to a taxpayer.
[16] In the plaintiff’s case, the two provisions referred to above allow the defendants to recover the monies owed to them directly from amounts owing to the plaintiff, be they wages, income tax refunds or benefits under the plaintiff’s pension plan, which plan is related to wages.
[17] In the circumstances, the Crown may effect a set-off against any amount it owes to the plaintiff.
[18] In the case at bar, the defendants have relied on these statutory provisions repeatedly over the years. The evidence in the record shows that the defendants have indeed deducted several sums owed to the plaintiff.
[19] Of course the plaintiff claims that these amounts were withheld unlawfully. She refers the Court to section 12.2 of the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s policy on the recovery of amounts due to the Crown.
[20] This policy does not apply here because the case at bar deals with a liquid and payable claim, an unpaid student loan, not a claim for damage to Crown property for which an employee is liable. Section 12.2 covers the latter case, not the plaintiff’s situation.
c) Is the defendants’ counterclaim statute barred ?
[21] For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the defendants’ counterclaim is not statute barred.
[22] The defendants rely on Ontario’s Limitations Act. This is incorrect. It is, rather, British Columbia’s legislation that applies in the case at bar because it governs student loans entered into in British Columbia. The agreement giving rise to this dispute was in fact entered into in British Columbia.
[23] The applicable limitation period derives from section 19.2 of the Canada Student Loans Act, RSC 1985, c S-23, in force December 31, 2002. It provides that no action or proceedings shall be taken to recover money owing under a guaranteed student loan more than six years after the limitation period that applied before the coming into force of this section started to run.
[24] The subrogated party cannot enjoy more rights than the original holder, in this case, the Bank. The Bank’s claim has been due and payable since November 1, 1994, the date the loans were consolidated. In this case, the interest-free periods between November 1, 1994, and the date of subrogation did not interrupt the limitation period, which in this case began running the moment the plaintiff lost her full-time student status (see Canada (Attorney General) v Simpson, 26 OR (3d) 317 at para 6 [Simpson]).
[25] However, subsection 3 of section 19.2 states that the day of the most recent acknowledgment of a borrower’s liability in respect of the debt is deemed to be the day on which the limitation period started to run if the acknowledgment was made before the coming into force of this section.
[26] Over the years, the plaintiff made several written requests to the defendants, as well as to ministers and members of Parliament. Counsel for the defendants submits that some of those requests constitute acknowledgements of debt that interrupt the limitation period and that, in any event, subsection 4 still allows the Crown to effect a set-off.
[27] The rule is clear: set-off cannot be effected against a debt after the limitation period has expired.
[28] What, then, is the day of the most recent acknowledgment of the debt by the plaintiff? In Simpson, cited above, Justice Charron reminds us that the case law has clearly defined what constitutes an acknowledgment of debt. She relied on the decision of the House of Lords in Spencer v Hemmerle, 1922 2 AC 507. In that decision, it is stated that where an acknowledgment of debt is “coupled with other expressions, such as a promise to pay at a future time or on condition or an absolute refusal to pay, it is for the Court to say whether those other expressions are sufficient to qualify or negative the implied promise to pay”.
[29] The defendants filed more than 267 documents to establish the existence, subrogation and acknowledgment of the debt.
[30] In the Court’s opinion, the correspondence between the plaintiff and the defendants regarding the amounts deducted from her wages and, subsequently, her pension cannot constitute valid acknowledgments of debt since the plaintiff did not consent to these deductions. Therefore, even though she filed budgets to reduce the percentage of the deductions from 30 to 15%, in our view, those documents cannot be used against her. Clearly, the plaintiff found herself in a position which, on its face, left her with no choice. Moreover, on several occasions, she reasserted her position that she did not owe this money.
[31] And what of this ample correspondence between her and the ministers and members of Parliament? Until 2002, the plaintiff acknowledged her student loan debt but asked the government to forgive the accrued interest. Indeed, the Minister of Finance announced changes to the Canada Student Loans Program in 1999. Under this program, the federal government may forgive the interest accrued on certain student loans, under certain conditions. However, since the plaintiff was in default on her loan, she was not eligible for this new program. All of her numerous requests to ministers Martin, Stewart, Volpe, Graham, Marchesi and Stronach were turned down (see Defendants’ Record, tabs 79, 87, 88, 95, 114, 121, 164, 174, 178, 180, 183, 189, 205, 207 and 216).
[32] It is clear that in all of her correspondence from 2004 on, the plaintiff refused to acknowledge the validity of the defendants’ claim (see Defendants’ Record, tabs 191,204, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221 and 230).
[33] The defendants’ counterclaim is dated February 13, 2009. The time to recover the plaintiff’s debt is limited to six years under section 19.2 of the Act, which in the present case refers us to British Columbia’s Limitation Act, since that is where the student loan was entered into.
[34] The cause of action, namely, the loan and the plaintiff’s failure to begin making repayments to the Bank, took place in British Columbia. Therefore, British Columbia’s Limitations Act applies in this case, pursuant to subsection 19.2(3) of the Act.. According to subsection 3(5) of the Limitation Act (see Appendix), the applicable limitation period in this case expires six years after the date on which the cause of action arose.
[35] The validity of the defendants’ counterclaim in this case directly depends on the date of the plaintiff’s most recent acknowledgment of the debt. Thus, February 13, 2003, becomes a pivotal date.
[36] The Court notes that in all of the documents filed by the defendants, the plaintiff denies the existence of her debt from 2004. However, there are four written documents in the record that warrant closer scrutiny:
a) The letter dated April 21, 2003, from the plaintiff to one of the defendants, namely, the Department (Defendants’ Record, Tab 149). The plaintiff writes, at the beginning of the second paragraph, [translation] “It is true that I borrowed money for my post-secondary education. I do not deny that”. Further on in that same letter, she offers to pay back her debt, at $50.00 per month.
b) Two other written documents, dated June 8, 2003, and November 6, 2003, respectively:
One letter to the Department’s Chief, Revenue Accounting, and another to the Minister responsible for the Department, in which the plaintiff acknowledges her debt. In the letter dated June 8, 2003, however, she states, [translation] “I disagree with the amounts owed” (see Defendants’ Record, Tab 155).
c) In the letter dated November 6, 2003, to the Honourable Jane Stewart, Minister of Human Resources Development, she repeats her offer under the same conditions she made on April 21, 2003. She also asks the Minister to reduce her debt to zero (see Defendants’ Record, Tab 164).
d) Finally, in a letter dated June 17, 2004, to an assistant of MP Bill Graham, the plaintiff repeats her request: “I see no other solution but to be forgiven”. However, she again insists that the Bank’s transfer of her file in 1997 was contrary to the regulations then in force (see Defendants’ Record, Tab 204).
[37] Nevertheless, paragraph 19.2(6)(b) clearly states that for the purposes of subsections (5) and (7), acknowledgment of liability means acknowledgment of the debt after the coming into force of the 2003 amendments: “a written acknowledgment of the money owing, signed by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative, whether or not a promise to pay can be implied from it and whether or not it contains a refusal to pay”.
[38] Considering the wording of paragraph (b), above, there can be no doubt that the written documents in question acknowledge that the debt is due and payable, regardless of whether or not those documents set conditions. The Act is clear, and the evidence in the record, particularly the written documents referred to above, lead us to conclude that the defendants’ counterclaim is not statute barred.
[39] The evidence in the record (see Hearing Transcript, testimony of Ms. Persaud, page 277), establishes that the plaintiff is still indebted to the defendants for a total of $9,500.17 with interest since June 21, 2011. In the circumstances, the Court notes that the plaintiff still owes the amount claimed by the defendants.
[40] The plaintiff also referred us to case law in support of her position. A close reading of those decisions persuades us that those cases do not apply in the case at bar because the facts and the timeline of events are considerably different. The Court therefore cannot consider this case law.
[41] “An award of costs is not an exact science and is rather a matter of discretion based on good judgment and common sense” (see Canada (Attorney General) v Chrétien, 2011 FCA 53 at para 3). Considering the respective means of the parties in this case, the Court finds that each party should pay its own costs.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT IS that
1. It dismisses the main action of the plaintiff.
2. It allows the defendants’ counterclaim and orders the plaintiff to pay the defendants the amount of $9,500.17, with interest at the rate of 9.75%.
3. Each party pays its own costs.
“André F.J. Scott”
Judge
Certified true translation
Michael Palles
APPENDIX
· The following sections of the Canada Student Loans Act, RSC 1985, c S-23, are relevant:
Interest-free period for full-time students
4. (1) Subject to the regulations, no interest is payable by a borrower on a guaranteed student loan made before August 1, 1993 to a full-time student in respect of
(a) any period of studies during which the borrower is a full-time student; or
(b) any subsequent period ending on the last day of the sixth month after the month in which the borrower ceases to be a full-time student.
Idem
(2) Subject to the regulations, no interest is payable by a borrower on a guaranteed student loan made on or after August 1, 1993 to a full-time student in respect of
(a) any period of studies during which the borrower is a full-time student; or
(b) any subsequent period ending on the last day of the month in which the borrower ceases to be a full-time student.
Idem
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) but subject to the regulations, where a borrower has ceased to be a full-time student as described in that subsection and thereafter again becomes a full-time student, no interest is payable by the borrower on a guaranteed student loan made and consolidated before August 1, 1993 in respect of the period commencing on the prescribed day and ending on the last day of the sixth month after the month in which the borrower again ceases to be a full-time student.
Idem
(4) Notwithstanding subsection (1) but subject to the regulations, where a borrower has ceased to be a full-time student as described in that subsection and thereafter again becomes a full-time student, no interest is payable by the borrower on a guaranteed student loan made before August 1, 1993 and consolidated after that day in respect of the period commencing on the prescribed day and ending on the last day of the month in which the borrower again ceases to be a full-time student.
Exemption de paiement
4. (1) Sous réserve des règlements, les prêts garantis consentis à un étudiant à temps plein avant le 1er août 1993 ne portent pas intérêt pour l’emprunteur durant les périodes suivantes :
a) la période d’études accomplie comme étudiant à temps plein;
b) toute période subséquente se terminant le dernier jour du sixième mois suivant celui où il cesse d’être étudiant à temps plein.
Idem
(2) Sous réserve des règlements, les prêts garantis consentis à compter du 1er août 1993 à un étudiant à temps plein ne portent pas intérêt pour l’emprunteur durant les périodes suivantes :
a) la période d’études accomplie comme étudiant à temps plein;
b) toute période subséquente se terminant le dernier jour du mois où il cesse d’être étudiant à temps plein.
Idem
(3) Par dérogation au paragraphe (1) mais sous réserve des règlements, lorsqu’un emprunteur cesse d’être étudiant à temps plein dans le cas visé à ce paragraphe et redevient par la suite étudiant à temps plein, les prêts garantis consentis et consolidés avant le 1er août 1993 ne portent pas intérêt pour lui durant la période commençant à la date fixée par règlement et se terminant le dernier jour du sixième mois suivant celui où il cesse une nouvelle fois d’être étudiant à temps plein.
Idem
(4) Par dérogation au paragraphe (1) mais sous réserve des règlements, lorsqu’un emprunteur cesse d’être étudiant à temps plein dans le cas visé à ce paragraphe et redevient par la suite étudiant à temps plein, les prêts garantis consentis avant le 1er août 1993 et consolidés après cette date ne portent pas intérêt pour lui durant la période commençant à la date fixée par règlement et se terminant le dernier jour du mois où il cesse une nouvelle fois d’être étudiant à temps plein.
Guarantee by Minister
7. Subject to this Act and the regulations, the Minister is liable to pay to a lender the amount of any loss sustained by it as a result of a loan made to a qualifying student if
(a) the loan was made pursuant to an application to a lender, signed by the borrower, stating that the borrower has not received any other loan pursuant to the certificate of eligibility referred to in paragraph (b), or pursuant to any other certificate of eligibility relating to the period of studies specified in the certificate of eligibility referred to in paragraph (b), except any such loan the amount of which, when added to the amount of the loan applied for, did not exceed the applicable loan limit set out in section 3 for that period of studies;
(b) the loan was made to a borrower who filed with the lender making the loan a document that purported to be and was accepted by a responsible officer of that lender, in good faith, as a certificate of eligibility issued or caused to be issued by an appropriate authority relating to that borrower for the period of studies specified in that certificate;
(c) the amount of the loan did not exceed the lesser of the amount set out in the certificate of eligibility and the applicable loan limit set out in section 3 for the relevant period of studies;
(d) no fee, service charge or charge of any kind, other than interest calculated in the prescribed manner and on the prescribed amount and not exceeding the prescribed rate, was by the terms of the loan payable in respect of the loan, except as provided in the regulations in any case where the borrower is in default;
(e) the loan was repayable in full by the terms thereof
(i) in the case of a loan made to a full-time student, subject to the regulations, in accordance with practices of the lender in respect of repayment, subject to the right of the borrower to repay at any time all or any part of the principal amount of the loan outstanding at that time and any interest then accrued, and
(ii) in the case of a loan made to a part-time student, within a period of not more than two years after the loan was made, subject to the right of the borrower to repay at any time all or any part of the principal amount of the loan outstanding at that time and any interest then accrued; and
(f) the loan was made in accordance with an agreement in prescribed form between the borrower and the lender making the loan, containing
(i) in the case of a loan made to a full-time student, provisions respecting payment of the principal amount of the loan and interest thereon by the borrower as described in sections 4 and 5, and such other provisions as may be prescribed, or
(ii) in the case of a loan made to a part-time student, such provisions as may be prescribed.
Garantie du ministre
7. Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi et de ses règlements, le ministre indemnise le prêteur de toute perte occasionnée à celui-ci par un prêt consenti à un étudiant admissible, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
a) dans la demande de prêt qu’il a signée, l’emprunteur déclarait n’avoir reçu, aux termes du certificat d’admissibilité visé à l’alinéa b) — ou de quelque autre certificat d’admissibilité ayant trait à la période d’études précisée dans le certificat d’admissibilité visé à l’alinéa b) — aucun autre prêt supérieur à la différence entre le plafond prévu à l’article 3 et le montant du prêt demandé;
b) l’emprunteur avait remis au prêteur un document censé être, et accepté à ce titre de bonne foi par un responsable de l’organisme prêteur, un certificat d’admissibilité délivré par ou pour une autorité compétente pour la période d’études en cause;
c) le montant du prêt ne dépassait pas le montant indiqué dans le certificat d’admissibilité ou, s’il est inférieur, le plafond prévu à l’article 3;
d) les seuls frais afférents au prêt — exception faite des frais prévus par règlement en cas de défaut — étaient le montant de l’intérêt calculé de la façon prévue par règlement sur le montant prévu par règlement et égal ou inférieur au taux prévu par règlement ou déterminé de la façon prévue par règlement;
e) le contrat de prêt prévoyait le remboursement intégral :
(i) s’agissant d’un prêt destiné à un étudiant à temps plein, sous réserve des règlements, en conformité avec les pratiques du prêteur en matière de remboursement, le remboursement, en tout ou en partie, du principal impayé, ainsi que de l’intérêt couru, restant toutefois possible avant l’échéance,
(ii) s’agissant d’un prêt destiné à un étudiant à temps partiel, dans un délai maximal de deux ans à compter de la date où le prêt a été consenti, le remboursement, en tout ou en partie, du principal impayé, ainsi que de l’intérêt couru, restant toutefois possible avant l’échéance;
f) le contrat de prêt, établi en la forme déterminée par le ministre, contenait :
(i) s’agissant d’un prêt destiné à un étudiant à temps plein, les dispositions prévues aux articles 4 et 5, et les dispositions réglementaires,
(ii) s’agissant d’un prêt destiné à un étudiant à temps partiel, les dispositions réglementaires.
Limitation period
19.1 (1) Subject to this section and section 19.2, no action or proceedings shall be taken to recover money owing under a guaranteed student loan more than six years after the day on which the money becomes due and payable.
Deduction and set-off
(2) Money owing under a guaranteed student loan may be recovered at any time by way of deduction from or set-off against any sum of money that may be due or payable by Her Majesty in right of Canada to the borrower or the estate or succession of the borrower.
Acknowledgment of liability
(3) If a borrower’s liability for money owing under a guaranteed student loan is acknowledged in accordance with subsection (4), the time during which the limitation period has run before the acknowledgment does not count in the calculation of that period.
Types of acknowledgments
(4) An acknowledgment of liability means
(a) a written promise to pay the money owing, signed by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative;
(b) a written acknowledgment of the money owing, signed by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative, whether or not a promise to pay can be implied from it and whether or not it contains a refusal to pay;
(c) a part payment by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative of any money owing; or
(d) any acknowledgment of the money owing made by the borrower, his or her agent or other representative or the trustee or administrator in the course of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or any other legislation dealing with the payment of debts.
Acknowledgment after expiry of limitation period
(5) If a borrower’s liability for money owing under a guaranteed student loan is acknowledged in accordance with subsection (4) after the expiry of the limitation period in respect of the loan, an action or proceedings to recover the money may, subject to subsections (3) and (6), be brought within six years after the date of the acknowledgment.
Limitation period suspended
(6) The running of a limitation period in respect of a guaranteed student loan is suspended during any period in which it is prohibited to commence or continue an action or other proceedings against the borrower to recover money owing under the loan.
Enforcement proceedings
(7) This section does not apply in respect of an action or proceedings relating to the execution, renewal or enforcement of a judgment.
2003, c. 15, s. 13.
Application
19.2 (1) This section applies only in respect of the recovery of money that became due and payable under a guaranteed student loan before the coming into force of this section.
Limitation period
(2) Subject to this section, no action or proceedings shall be taken to recover money owing under a guaranteed student loan more than six years after the day on which the limitation period that applied before the coming into force of this section started to run.
Prior acknowledgments
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the day of the most recent acknowledgment of a borrower’s liability in respect of money owing under a guaranteed student loan is deemed to be the day on which the limitation period started to run if
(a) the acknowledgment was made before the coming into force of this section; and
(b) under the law applicable at the time of the acknowledgment, the time during which the limitation period ran before the acknowledgment did not count in the calculation of that period.
Deduction and set-off
(4) Money owing under a guaranteed student loan may be recovered at any time by way of deduction from or set-off against any sum of money that may be due or payable by Her Majesty in right of Canada to the borrower or the estate or succession of the borrower.
Acknowledgment of liability
(5) If, on or after the day on which this section comes into force, a borrower’s liability for money owing under a guaranteed student loan is acknowledged in accordance with subsection (6), the time during which the limitation period has run before the acknowledgment does not count in the calculation of that period.
Types of acknowledgments
(6) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (7), an acknowledgment of liability means
(a) a written promise to pay the money owing, signed by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative;
(b) a written acknowledgment of the money owing, signed by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative, whether or not a promise to pay can be implied from it and whether or not it contains a refusal to pay;
(c) a part payment by the borrower or his or her agent or other representative of any money owing; or
(d) any acknowledgment of the money owing made by the borrower, his or her agent or other representative or the trustee or administrator in the course of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act or any other legislation dealing with the payment of debts.
Acknowledgment after expiry of limitation period
(7) If, after the expiry of the limitation period in respect of a guaranteed student loan — including any limitation period that expired before the coming into force of this section — and on or after the day on which this section comes into force, a borrower’s liability for money owing under the loan is acknowledged in accordance with subsection (6), an action or proceedings to recover the money may, subject to subsections (5) and (8), be brought within six years after the date of the acknowledgment.
Limitation period suspended
(8) The running of a limitation period in respect of a guaranteed student loan is, commencing on the day on which this section comes into force, suspended during any period in which it is prohibited to commence or continue an action or other proceedings against the borrower to recover money owing under the loan.
Statutory bar
(9) Subject to subsection (7), if the limitation period in respect of a guaranteed student loan expired before the coming into force of this section, no action or proceeding shall be taken to recover money owing under the loan.
Enforcement proceedings
(10) This section does not apply in respect of an action or proceedings relating to the execution, renewal or enforcement of a judgment.
Prescription
19.1 (1) Sous réserve des autres dispositions du présent article et de l’article 19.2, toute poursuite visant le recouvrement d’une créance relative à un prêt garanti se prescrit par six ans à compter de la date à laquelle la créance devient exigible.
Compensation et déduction
(2) Le recouvrement, par voie de compensation ou de déduction, du montant d’une créance exigible relative à un prêt garanti peut être effectué en tout temps sur toute somme à payer par Sa Majesté du chef du Canada à l’emprunteur ou à sa succession.
Reconnaissance de responsabilité
(3) Si, conformément au paragraphe (4), il est reconnu que l’emprunteur est responsable d’une créance exigible relative à un prêt garanti, la période courue avant cette reconnaissance ne compte pas dans le calcul du délai de prescription.
Types de reconnaissance de responsabilité
(4) Constituent une reconnaissance de responsabilité :
a) la promesse écrite de payer la créance exigible, signée par l’emprunteur, son mandataire ou autre représentant;
b) la reconnaissance écrite de l’exigibilité de la créance, signée par l’emprunteur, son mandataire ou autre représentant, que celle-ci contienne ou non une promesse implicite de payer ou une déclaration de refus de paiement;
c) le paiement, même partiel, de la créance exigible par l’emprunteur, son mandataire ou autre représentant;
d) la reconnaissance par l’emprunteur, son mandataire, son représentant, le syndic ou l’administrateur de l’exigibilité de la créance, dans le cadre de mesures prises conformément à la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité ou dans le cadre de toute autre loi relative au p