Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc.

Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc.
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2007-10-12
Neutral citation
2007 SCC 44
Report
[2007] 3 SCR 331
Case number
31321
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; Binnie, William Ian Corneil; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise; Rothstein, Marshall
On appeal from
Ontario
Subjects
Commercial law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 31321
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331, 2007 SCC 44
Date: 20071012
Docket: 31321
Between:
Douglas Kerr, S. Grace Kerr and James Frederick Durst
Appellants
v.
Danier Leather Inc., Jeffrey Wortsman and Bryan Tatoff
Respondents
‑ and ‑
Ontario Securities Commission
Intervener
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 72):
Binnie J. (McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ. concurring)
______________________________
Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331, 2007 SCC 44
Douglas Kerr, S. Grace Kerr and James Frederick Durst Appellants
v.
Danier Leather Inc., Jeffrey Wortsman and Bryan Tatoff Respondents
and
Ontario Securities Commission Intervener
Indexed as: Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc.
Neutral citation: 2007 SCC 44.
File No.: 31321.
2007: March 20; 2007: October 12.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron and Rothstein JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Commercial law — Securities — Prospectus misrepresentation — Company’s prospectus projecting results for fourth quarter — Intra‑quarterly results lagged behind projection after prospectus filed and before public offering closed — Intra‑quarterly results not disclosed — Whether s. 130(1) of Securities Act requires company to disclose “material facts” arising after prospectus filed — Whether change in company’s results amounted to “material change” requiring disclosure — Whether forecast contained implied representation of objective reasonableness — Whether Business Judgment Rule has any application to disclosure requirements of Securities Act — Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 1, 57(1), 130(1).
Danier made an initial public offering of its shares through a prospectus. The prospectus contained a forecast that included Danier’s projected results for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year. An internal company analysis prepared before its public offering closed showed that Danier’s fourth quarter results were lagging behind its forecast. Danier did not disclose its intra‑quarterly results before closing. The appellants therefore brought a class proceeding for prospectus misrepresentation under s. 130(1) of the Ontario Securities Act. The trial judge found Danier liable for statutory misrepresentation. He concluded that the prospectus impliedly represented that the forecast was objectively reasonable, both on the date the prospectus was filed and on the date the public offering closed. The poor fourth quarter results were material facts required by s. 130(1) to be disclosed before closing. The implied representation that the forecast was objectively reasonable, though true on the date the prospectus was filed, was false on the closing date. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the trial judgment.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
The Securities Act is remedial legislation and is to be given a broad interpretation. It protects investors from the risks of an unregulated market, and by its assurance of fair dealing and by the promotion of the integrity and efficiency of capital markets it enhances the pool of capital available to entrepreneurs. The Act supplants the “buyer beware” mind set of the common law with compelled disclosure of relevant information. At the same time, in compelling disclosure, the Act recognizes the burden it places on issuers and sets the limits on what is required to be disclosed. When a prospectus is accurate at the time of filing, s. 57(1) of the Act limits the obligation of post‑filing disclosure to notice of a “material change”, which the Act defines in s. 1 as “a change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities of the issuer”. An issuer has no similar express obligation to amend a prospectus or to publicize and file a report for the modification of material facts occurring after a receipt for a prospectus is obtained that do not amount to a “material change” within the meaning of the Act. A “material fact” is defined in the Act more broadly than a “material change” and includes “a fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of . . . securities”. A change in intra‑quarterly results is not itself a change in the issuer’s business, operations or capital and, for that matter, does not necessarily signal that a material change has occurred. Sales often fluctuate (as here) in response to factors that are external to the issuer. The trial judge rightly found that Danier experienced no material change. Consequently, no further disclosure was required and there was no breach of s. 57(1). [32] [35] [46] [48]
If an issuer has fully complied with its regulatory obligation under s. 57(1), it would be contrary to the scheme of the Act, and to the intent of the Ontario legislature reflected therein, to find civil liability against an issuer under s. 130(1) for failing to disclose post‑filing information that does not amount to a material change. Imposition of civil liability under s. 130(1) for an omission to do what the legislature as a matter of policy has declined to require in s. 57(1) would simply be to substitute the court’s view of policy for that adopted by the legislature. The distinction between “material change” and “material fact” is deliberate and policy‑based. Of course, if a material change arises during the period of distribution, failure to disclose this change as required by s. 57(1) could support an action under s. 130(1). In the case at bar, however, the trial judge found that the intra‑quarterly results did not amount to a material change. [38‑39] [43]
The trial judge, having also found the forecast to be objectively reasonable as of the filing date, erred in proceeding to test the objective reasonableness of the forecast at the date of closing, and assessing damages for its perceived deficiencies as of that later date. The forecast did carry an implied representation of objective reasonableness rooted in the language of the prospectus, but this implied representation extended only until the prospectus was filed. [49] [51]
While forecasting is a matter of business judgment, disclosure is a matter of legal obligation. The Business Judgment Rule is a concept well developed in the context of business decisions but should not be used to qualify or undermine the duty of disclosure. The disclosure requirements under the Act are not to be subordinated to the exercise of business judgment. It is for the legislature and the courts, not business management, to set the legal disclosure requirements. The traditional justifications for the rule are that judges are less expert than managers in making business decisions. Moreover, business decisions often involve choosing from amongst a range of alternatives. In order to maximize returns for shareholders, managers should be free to take reasonable risks without having to worry that their business choices will later be second‑guessed by judges. These justifications — based on relative expertise, and on the need to support reasonable risk‑taking — do not apply to disclosure decisions. [54‑55] [58]
Finally, the appellant D submitted that even if the appeal is unsuccessful no costs should be awarded against him having regard to s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992. However, there is no error in principle that would justify intervening in the discretionary costs order made against D by the Court of Appeal. Class actions have become a staple of shareholder litigation. This case is a piece of Bay Street litigation that was well run and well financed on both sides. Success would have reaped substantial rewards for the representative plaintiff and his counsel. The proper interpretation of s. 130(1) of the Securities Act has from the outset been the time bomb ticking under this case. The respondents attempted to have this issue determined in their favour on a motion for summary judgment heard in December 2000 but were unsuccessful. The result was a very expensive piece of shareholder litigation. There is no magic in the form of a class action proceeding that should in this case deprive the respondents of their costs. The language of s. 31(1) is permissive. [60] [66] [69]
Cases Cited
Referred to: Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557; Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1996); H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2005 SCC 25; Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corp. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177; Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 2004 SCC 68; Re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders’ Litigation, 519 A.2d 669 (1986); Gariepy v. Shell Oil Co. (2002), 23 C.P.C. (5th) 393, aff’d [2004] O.J. No. 5309 (QL); Moyes v. Fortune Financial Corp. (2002), 61 O.R. (3d) 770.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Budget Measures Act (Fall), 2004, S.O. 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 6.
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 31.
Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 131.
Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, ss. 1 “material change”, “material fact”, “misrepresentation”, 3.9, 56, 57, 58, 130, 138.1.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑26, s. 40 .
Authors Cited
Ontario. Ministry of Finance. Five Year Review Committee. Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario). Toronto: Ministry of Finance, 2003.
Ontario Securities Commission. OSC Bulletin, vol. 6 #22/83, “Consolidation of Remarks of Peter J. Dey Concerning Disclosure Under the Securities Act Made to Securities Lawyers in Calgary and Toronto on June 7 and 9”, p. 2361, August 5, 1983.
Orkin, Mark M. The Law of Costs, 2nd ed., vol. I. Aurora, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1987 (loose‑leaf updated November 2006).
Toronto Stock Exchange. Committee on Corporate Disclosure. Final Report: Responsible Corporate Disclosure: A Search for Balance, 1997.
Underwood, Harry, and René Sorell. “Danier Leather Inc. and the Duty to Update a Prospectus” (2006), 43 Can. Bus. L.J. 134.
Waddams, S. M. The Law of Contracts, 4th ed. Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1999.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Laskin, Goudge and Blair JJ.A.) (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 321, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 400, 205 O.A.C. 313, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 1, [2005] O.J. No. 5388 (QL), reversing a judgment of Lederman J. (2004), 46 B.L.R. (3d) 167, 23 C.C.L.T. (3d) 77, [2004] O.J. No. 1916 (QL). Appeal dismissed.
George S. Glezos, Peter R. Jervis, Karen W. Kiang and Jasmine T. Akbarali, for the appellants.
Alan J. Lenczner, Q.C., and Jaan Lilles, for the respondent Danier Leather Inc.
Benjamin Zarnett and Jessica Kimmel, for the respondents Jeffrey Wortsman and Bryan Tatoff.
Kelley McKinnon and Jane Waechter, for the intervener.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Binnie J. —
I. Introduction
1 This appeal raises questions about the continuous disclosure obligations of an issuer seeking to sell its shares to the public by a prospectus governed by the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5. Purchasers under a prospectus are given a statutory right of action if the prospectus or any amendment contains a misrepresentation against the issuer and officers of the issuer who signed the prospectus.
2 The genesis of this case was the unseasonably warm weather in the spring of 1998 across central and eastern Canada. It coincided with Danier’s first ever offering of its shares to the public. Not surprisingly, hot weather resulted in lower than expected sales of leather garments at Danier’s stores and put at risk achievement of the end of year (June 27) sales forecast contained in its prospectus. When Danier management analysed the intra-quarterly results as of May 16, 1998, it concluded that the year-end forecast could and would still be met. The trial judge found that this assessment was made in good faith. The Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) closed on May 20, 1998, about half-way through the fourth quarter of the company’s 1998 fiscal year.
3 The trial judge held that even though management honestly believed the year-end forecast would be met, its belief became objectively unreasonable in a narrow window of time during the course of the distribution when it became aware of a shortfall in expected sales, and at that point the company had a duty to disclose this downturn before closing. Even though the issuer did substantially achieve the forecasted sales on June 27, as management had predicted, its lapse of judgment in failing to amend the prospectus with updated sales information (intra-quarterly results) prior to the closing constituted, he held, actionable misrepresentation.
4 However, the trial judge also found that the issuer had complied with all of the regulatory requirements of Part XV (ss. 56 to 58) of the Act governing the contents of its prospectus. In essence, the legal question is whether a compliant issuer can be held civilly liable for statutory misrepresentation for failing to update its prospectus with information that comes to light during the period of distribution (i.e., after the prospectus was filed on May 6, 1998 but prior to closing) to correct a statement that was correct when made but which has become misleading. More succinctly, is compliance with the regulatory demands of ss. 56 to 58 a shield against an action for statutory misrepresentation under s. 130(1)?
5 The Court of Appeal answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act. In my view, the Court of Appeal is correct. Although disclosure lies at the heart of an effective securities regime, the extent of the disclosure is a matter of legislative policy. Balancing the needs of the investor community against the burden imposed on issuers, the Ontario legislature adopted a policy governing the continuous disclosure requirements of an issuer that drew the line at “material change” in the “business, operations or capital of the issuer” (s. 1). The trial judge found that the temporary slump in sales implicated none of these things. Given that finding, and given the trial judge’s further finding that Danier’s prospectus did not contain a misrepresentation on the date of filing (May 6), the class action was rightly dismissed.
II. Overview
6 The warm days of spring are not a blessing for everyone, it seems. As temperatures rise, the sales of leather clothing can lag even in otherwise prospering leather goods retail stores. The downturn in sales may simply reflect the weather and indicate nothing negative about the strength of the underlying business, as turned out to be the case here. Nevertheless, about two weeks after closing, the respondents did issue a revised forecast indicating that Danier would fall short of the sales and net income figures in the original forecast. Danier’s share price dropped by about 22 percent. It took until August 2000 for the shares to get back to their issue price. By then, Danier’s business had grown substantially.
7 A number of purchasers had sold their new shares soon after the announcement and lost money. The appellants then initiated a class action against the respondents for failure to disclose material information, i.e., the disappointing intra-quarterly results. They argued that the prospectus contained a misrepresentation on the closing date (May 20), because even though the year-end sales forecast was reasonable on the filing date (May 6), lagging sales thereafter rendered it misleading to management’s knowledge at the date of closing. The respondents, they argued, “omi[tted] to state a material fact [i.e., lagging sales] that is . . . necessary to make a statement [i.e., the sales forecast in the prospectus] not misleading in the light of the circumstances in which it was made”, and this constituted an actionable misrepresentation within the meaning of ss. 1 and 130 of the Act.
8 The respondents reply, in essence, that they fully complied with their regulatory obligations. The legislature cannot have intended to punish under s. 130(1) what it has permitted under s. 57(1). Moreover, they say a sales forecast is not a “fact” but reflects the opinions of management, and such opinions when held in good faith (as here) are protected by the Business Judgment Rule. The issues were thus joined.
III. Facts
9 Danier designs, manufactures and sells leather clothing and accessories. In 1998, it had 55 retail stores in various cities across Canada and operated two manufacturing plants. At the relevant time, the respondent Jeffrey Wortsman was a director and the President and Chief Executive Officer of Danier. The respondent Bryan Tatoff was its Chief Financial Officer and Secretary.
10 In 1997, Danier decided to go public. In preparation for its IPO, Danier filed with the Ontario Securities Commission (“O.S.C.”), three preliminary prospectuses, each of which contained a forecast. The forecast in the April 6 preliminary prospectus was dated April 2, 1998, and was included, unchanged, in the (final) prospectus, which was receipted by the O.S.C. on May 6, 1998 (herein “prospectus forecast”).
11 The prospectus forecast is at the centre of this litigation. Danier’s 1998 fiscal year ran from June 29, 1997 to June 27, 1998. The prospectus forecast included the company’s actual results for the first three quarters, as well as projected results for the fourth quarter (which ran from March 29 to June 27) and projected final results for the 1998 fiscal year. Pursuant to National Policy 48, adopted by Canadian securities regulators, this forecast was also accompanied by standard cautionary language advising investors that “[a]ctual results achieved during the forecast period will vary from the forecast results and such variations may be material. There is no guarantee that such forecast will be achieved in whole or in part” (Final Prospectus, at p. 8). The following are the key figures from the prospectus forecast (at p. 27):
The Forecast Figures Contained in the Prospectus
13 Weeks Ending
June 27, 1998
(Projected)
Year Ending
June 27, 1998
(Projected)
Revenue
$17,410,000
$90,280,000
Net Earnings (Loss)
($384,000)
$4,500,000
An increase in revenue of $5,000,000 was projected for the 1998 fourth quarter over that of the 1997 fourth quarter. There were four more stores than in fiscal year 1997, the square footage of store floor space had expanded and sales per square foot had increased over the previous year.
12 The IPO was a “bought deal”, i.e., fully subscribed by the underwriters, and closed on May 20. Danier sold 6,040,000 subordinated voting shares, priced at $11.25 per share, for total gross proceeds of $67,950,000.
13 During the week before closing, Wortsman asked Tatoff to assemble and analyse the financial results for the first half of the fourth quarter. The underwriters had not requested a due diligence review, but Wortsman thought that this “was the prudent course of action to take” (R.R., at p. 39). Tatoff prepared an analysis as of May 16, and Wortsman admitted that he received the results “certainly before closing” (R.R., at p. 41). These results were worse than the results projected in the store budgets (which were the basis of the sales forecast). In particular, as of May 16, Danier’s actual fourth-quarter revenue was 24 percent behind projections. Moreover, the company had as of May 16 posted a fourth-quarter net loss of $240,000 instead of the projected (as of May 16) fourth-quarter net earnings of $259,000. Nonetheless, Wortsman and Tatoff testified that, at closing, they still believed that by year end Danier would achieve or exceed the prospectus forecast. As they explained, store budgets are “front-end loaded”. Adjusting for that fact, the gross revenue shortfall as of May 16 was really only about $700,000, they said, which put the net earnings disappointment in a better light. With two major sales promotions planned for the second half of the fourth quarter, Wortsman and Tatoff thought that Danier would at least make up this shortfall.
14 However, the trial judge found that Wortsman and Tatoff made no real effort to examine the root causes of the poor sales as of May 16. They turned “a blind eye to the cause[s] of those results” ((2004), 46 B.L.R. (3d) 167, at para. 259), he said. For all they knew, it seems, the causes could have been serious, internal and permanent and not necessarily something external and transitory like the weather. They did not know, and apparently did not choose to find out. That was his criticism.
15 Immediately after closing, Danier held the first of these planned promotions, its annual Victoria Day Sale, which began on Thursday, May 21. When he checked the results on Monday, May 25, Wortsman discovered that, except in British Columbia, sales were down significantly as compared to the previous year. He testified that these results were “completely unexpected” (R.R., at p. 59). After some investigation, Wortsman concluded that there was no problem with the company’s merchandise, but that the weather across the country, except in British Columbia, had been unusually hot. Higher temperatures (which management did not routinely monitor) meant decreased store traffic and decreased sales. Wortsman at this point became concerned that a hot spell, if prolonged, might jeopardize the company’s ability to achieve the prospectus forecast. He explained this concern to the underwriters and to his lawyers. The lawyers advised Wortsman that it would be prudent to issue a revised forecast because of the risk that the hot weather would continue for the rest of the fourth quarter.
16 Accordingly, on June 4, 1998, Danier announced in a press release and a material change report that it had revised downwards its forecast for the 1998 fiscal year. The company advised that, “[d]ue to unseasonably warm weather in most regions of the country with the exception of Vancouver, the company believes that it will fall short of the previous sales and net income forecast” (A.R., at p. 931). The following are the key figures from this revised forecast, which was prepared as of June 2 and approved by the board of directors on June 4:
Impact of the Revised June 4 Forecast
13 Weeks Ending
June 27, 1998
(Projected)
Year Ending
June 27, 1998
(Projected)
Difference Between Prospectus Forecast and June 4 Forecast
Revenue
$12,630,000
$85,500,000
($4,780,000)
Net Earnings (Loss)
($1,149,000)
$3,735,000
($765,000)
17 The trial judge described the magnitude of the shift that underlay the revised forecast:
The revised forecast differed significantly from the original forecast. The revised expected revenue for the fiscal year was lower by about 5%; revised net income was lower by about 17% and revised EBITDA was lower by about 13%. As for the fourth quarter, revenues were now forecast to be about 28% lower than had been expected in the Prospectus; the net loss for the quarter was now expected to be almost three times larger than the original forecast; and EBITDA was now expected to be a loss of approximately $1 million instead of a positive $445,000. [para. 16]
18 The market quickly demonstrated the “materiality” of this information. Prior to June 4, the company’s shares had been trading above their issue price of $11.25, but the share price dropped immediately upon release of this revised forecast. The trial judge found that the market had fully absorbed the revision (and the share price stabilization activities carried out by the underwriters) by June 10, when the shares closed at $8.90. The appellant investors concluded that Danier had sat on the bad news to ensure the success of its IPO, and that those who had purchased in ignorance were entitled to compensation.
19 However, in the remaining weeks of the fourth quarter, Danier’s sales improved significantly. The weather cooled, and the company held a successful 50 percent discount promotion. In the end, the trial judge found that Danier “substantially achieved” the prospectus forecast.
20 On November 13, 1998, an action for prospectus misrepresentation was commenced under s. 130(1) of the Act, claiming that the results of the May 16 analysis should have been released before the IPO closed. On December 3, 2002, the action was certified as a class proceeding with the “class” defined as:
(a) Those persons in Canada who purchased shares of Danier Leather Inc. in the distribution under its initial public offering which closed on May 20, 1998, and who continued to hold those shares on June 4, 1998, but not including [the defendants and certain persons associated with the defendants].
James Frederick Durst was appointed as the sole representative plaintiff for this class.
IV. Relevant Statutory Provisions
21 See Appendix.
V. Judicial History
A. Ontario Superior Court of Justice
22 The trial judge said that he agreed with Cumming J., who had certified the class action, that “it is the truthfulness of the Forecast as at May 20, 1998, that is relevant to establishing liability under s. 130(1) of the [Act]” ((2004), 46 B.L.R. (3d) 167, at para. 29). The trial lasted 44 days.
23 Lederman J. held that the sales forecast, while not itself a “fact in the sense that actual results are facts” (para. 65), nevertheless includes the following implied assertions of fact:
i. the forecast represents the forecaster’s best judgment of the most probable set of economic conditions and the company’s planned course of action . . . ,
ii. the forecast is sound and reliable in the sense that the forecaster made it with reasonable care and skill . . . , and
iii. the forecaster generally believes the forecast, the forecaster’s belief is reasonable and the forecaster is not aware of any undisclosed facts tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the forecast . . . .
In his view, “a forecast is an untrue statement of material fact if any of the factual assertions implied in the forecast are untrue” (para. 77).
24 As of May 6, the date on which the prospectus was receipted, Lederman J. found that management had complied with its obligation under s. 56(1) to provide “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts” in the prospectus. None of the implied assertions underpinning the forecast was untrue as of that date. In particular, the appellants had failed to prove that the forecast was not prepared with reasonable care and skill, or that management’s subjective belief in the forecast was objectively unreasonable as of that date.
25 Lederman J. agreed that the cause of the poor results was the weather, which is not a change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer. Accordingly, the sales results did not amount to a “material change” requiring that an amendment to the prospectus be filed under s. 57(1). Nonetheless, Lederman J. held that s. 130(1) imposed an obligation (independent of ss. 56(1) and 57(1)) to disclose material facts arising during the period of distribution that become necessary to make any of the implied assertions in Danier’s prospectus not misleading as of the closing date, May 20. In this regard, he stated that under s. 130(1) (as this provision read in 1998), liability attached to a misrepresentation “if it was a misrepresentation at the time of purchase”. The time of purchase is typically the date of closing. Thus, even if the prospectus contained no misrepresentation when it was receipted, and no obligation to amend it prior to closing was imposed by Part XV of the Act, there could still be liability for misrepresentation. As Lederman J. wrote, “[i]f a statement is true when made, but subsequent facts make it untrue to the knowledge of the representor, then the subsequent facts must be disclosed” (para. 94).
26 In this case, Lederman J. found that, because of management’s analysis as of May 16, it knew that not all of the implied assertions of fact were true, and this awareness continued until May 20. Though he accepted the testimony of Wortsman and Tatoff that at closing they continued to believe that the forecast was achievable, he found that this subjective belief was no longer objectively reasonable:
Given the sheer magnitude of revenue that was required in the last 6 weeks of the quarter if Forecast was to be met, the little time remaining in the quarter, the history of sales in that period and the fact that the cause of the decline could continue, the May 16th Analysis does not provide a reasonable basis for management’s optimism. This information should have been disclosed prior to the closing of the IPO. [para. 269]
27 Lederman J. held that the cautionary language in the prospectus did not relieve the defendants of liability, because “no mention is made in the cautions, assumptions or risk factors of the impact that weather may have on Danier’s sales” (para. 199). With regard to damages, Lederman J. found that those shareholders who sold their shares after June 10 were entitled to the difference between the IPO price ($11.25) and the price at closing on June 10 ($8.90), for a total loss of $2.35 per share.
28 In a subsequent judgment on costs, Lederman J. awarded partial indemnity costs up to April 25, 2003 (the date of a settlement offer of $1.50 per share versus the judgment award of $2.35 per share) and substantial indemnity costs thereafter: (2005), 76 O.R. (3d) 60. Lederman J. also awarded the appellants a cost premium of $1,000,000.
B. Ontario Court of Appeal (Laskin, Goudge and Blair JJ.A.)
29 In a unanimous judgment, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the trial judgment on three separate bases: (2005), 77 O.R. (3d) 321. Firstly, the court said that while investors were entitled to assume that as of the filing date (May 6) the prospectus provided “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts”, thereafter they were entitled only to notice of material changes, and here no material changes arose during the period of distribution. The trial judge had misinterpreted the phrase “if it was a misrepresentation at the time of purchase” in s. 130(1). Properly construed it meant only that investors “cannot sue for a misrepresentation in a prospectus that was corrected by an amendment before their purchase or for [a] misrepresentation that may be found in an amendment made after their purchase” (para. 108).
30 Secondly, the court disagreed with Lederman J.’s finding that the forecast contained an implied representation of objective reasonableness. The court wrote that
in this case there is no evidence — and nothing in the language of the prospectus itself — to suggest that the appellants’ subjective belief that the Forecast was reasonable was shared by reasonable business people or was otherwise being put forward as “objectively reasonable” . . . . [para. 141]
31 Thirdly, the court held that in any event the forecast was objectively reasonable as of May 20, the closing date. The fact that the forecast was substantially achieved, in the court’s view, was at least some evidence of its objective reasonableness as of May 20. Moreover, the court believed that Lederman J. erred by failing to give any deference to the “business judgment” of senior management. On this point, the court wrote:
First, given the trial judge’s finding of an implied statement that the forecast was reasonable, the exercise of determining whether there was a misrepresentation has the concept of a business judgment about reasonableness built into it. A forecast is a quintessential example of the exercise of business judgment. This business judgment must be considered. Secondly, the “reasonableness” that is the centrepiece of the business judgment rule involves a “range of reasonableness”. [para. 157]
Applying the Business Judgment Rule, the court found that Lederman J. had wrongly substituted his own view as to whether the forecast was objectively reasonable as of May 20 for management’s view, and also that Lederman J. had overlooked important pieces of evidence that tended to support management’s view. The court therefore allowed the appeal as to liability, and declined to address the issue of damages. As to costs, the court characterized the litigation as “a commercial dispute between sophisticated commercial actors who are well resourced” ((2006), 20 B.L.R. (4th) 1, at para. 6), and subsequently refused the representative plaintiff’s request that no costs be awarded against him based on s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6. Costs were thus awarded to Danier, Wortsman and Tatoff on a partial indemnity basis.
VI. Analysis
32 The Securities Act is remedial legislation and is to be given a broad interpretation: Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557. It protects investors from the risks of an unregulated market, and by its assurance of fair dealing and by the promotion of the integrity and efficiency of capital markets it enhances the pool of capital available to entrepreneurs. The Act supplants the “buyer beware” mind set of the common law with compelled disclosure of relevant information. At the same time, in compelling disclosure, the Act recognizes the burden it places on issuers and in Part XV sets the limits on what is required to be disclosed. The problem for the appellants is that when a prospectus is accurate at the time of filing, s. 57(1) of the Act limits the obligation of post-filing disclosure to notice of a “material change”, which the Act defines in s. 1 in relevant part as
a change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities of the issuer . . . ;
An issuer has no similar express obligation to amend a prospectus or to publicize and file a report for the modification of material facts occurring after a receipt for a prospectus is obtained. That is where the legislature has drawn the line.
33 The appellants no longer dispute the trial judge’s finding that Danier’s prospectus provided “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts” when it was receipted on May 6, 1998. However, they cite Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996), for the proposition that an issuer should not be allowed to “exploit its informational trading advantage, at the expense of investors, by delaying disclosure of material nonpublic negative news until after completion of the offering” (p. 1204). As to intra-quarterly results, Shaw states:
[G]iven that at any point in a quarter, the remainder of the period may not mirror the quarter-to-date, is there a sufficient probability that unexpectedly disastrous quarter-to-date performance will carry forward to the end of the quarter, such that a reasonable investor would likely consider the interim performance important to the overall mix of information available? . . . [T]he question is whether the nondisclosure of interim facts rendered the prospectus materially incomplete. [p. 1210]
The appellants argue that Shaw’s “materially incomplete” test applies at least to the extent of obliging issuers to correct misinformation, and this duty (grounded in s. 130(1) itself) exists independently of the prospectus disclosure requirements of ss. 56 to 58. The separate and continuing obligation on issuers is to disclose any material facts arising after the date of the prospectus and before closing that make any of the factual assertions implied in the forecast untrue. The gist of the appellants’ complaint is succinctly summarized in their factum as follows:
. . . Danier management decided not to disclose this [the intra-quarterly] information to Danier’s board, counsel, auditors, underwriters, or to the market. Rather, they closed the offering and collected $67,950,000 in proceeds. Two weeks after closing, [Danier] finally disclosed the information and a revised, substantially lower, forecast for Q4 and FY 1998. The market price of Danier’s shares immediately fell. In contrast to the Wortsman Family Trust, which reaped $27,500,000, Danier’s investors lost 22% of their investment. [para. 1]
A. Did Section 130(1) of the Securities Act Oblige Danier to Disclose Material Facts Arising After its Prospectus was Filed?
34 The appellants argue that post-filing information falling short of “material change” can nevertheless base an action for prospectus misrepresentation because of the wording, as they interpret it, of s. 130(1) which reads:
130.—(1) Where a prospectus together with any amendment to the prospectus contains a misrepresentation, a purchaser who purchases a security offered thereby during the period of distribution or distribution to the public shall be deemed to have relied on such misrepresentation if it was a misrepresentation at the time of purchase and has a right of action for damages against,
(a) the issuer or a selling security holder on whose behalf the distribution is made;
. . .
(e) every person or company who signed the prospectus or the amendment to the prospectus other than the persons or companies included in clauses (a) to (d), . . .
35 Was the sales forecast, though found not to be a “material change”, nevertheless a “misrepresentation” as of May 16, 1998? According to s. 1, a “misrepresentation” can occur by
an omission to state a material fact that is . . . necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the circumstances in which it was made;
The argument, therefore, is that failure to disclose the intra-quarterly results prior to closing rendered the prospectus forecast “misleading” at the “time of purchase” to the knowledge of the respondents, and therefore actionable under s. 130(1). This is because a “material fact” is defined in the Act more broadly than a “material change” and includes “a fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of . . . securities” (s. 1). The trial judge concluded that the intra-quarterly results constituted a “material fact”.
36 The appellants further submit that nothing in s. 130(1) suggests any legislative intent to alter the basic common law principle that requires a representation that becomes untrue to the maker’s knowledge to be corrected before it is acted upon (see S. M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts (4th ed. 1999), at p. 315). In this vein, the appellants, as did the trial judge, observe that s. 130(1) (as it stood in 1998) deems an investor to have relied on a misrepresentation “if it was a misrepresentation at the time of purchase”. Reference to “the time of purchase”, they say, further indicates that an issuer’s duty to disclose material facts continues until the closing date.
37 In my opinion, with respect, these submissions are not persuasive. Prospective purchasers were entitled to assume that no material changes (as defined in the Act) had occurred to the material facts disclosed in the prospectus between the filing date and the closing date, but that is the extent of the assurance given by the Act to prospective investors.
38 The appellants submit that s. 57(1) should not be used as a guide to the interpretation of s. 130(1), relying in part on the argument that “s. 57(1) says nothing about whether a material fact if disclosed may remain uncorrected if it becomes untrue by the date of purchase, an