Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A

Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2024-12-20
Neutral citation
2024 SCC 43
Case number
40602
Judges
Wagner, Richard; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Côté, Suzanne; Rowe, Malcolm; Martin, Sheilah; Kasirer, Nicholas; Jamal, Mahmud; O’Bonsawin, Michelle; Moreau, Mary
On appeal from
Quebec
Notes
Case in Brief SCC Case Information
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A, 2024 SCC 43
Appeal Heard: March 19, 2024 Judgment Rendered: December 20, 2024 Docket: 40602
Between:
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse Appellant
and
Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A Respondent
- and -
Attorney General of Quebec, A, B, X, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Official English Translation
Coram: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ.
Reasons for Judgment: (paras. 1 to 122)
Wagner C.J. (Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ. concurring)
Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.
Commission des droits de la personne et
des droits de la jeunesse Appellant
v.
Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A Respondent
and
Attorney General of Quebec,
A, B, X, Canadian Civil Liberties Association and
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association Interveners
Indexed as: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Directrice de la protection de la jeunesse du CISSS A
2024 SCC 43
File No.: 40602.
2024: March 19; 2024: December 20.
Present: Wagner C.J. and Karakatsanis, Côté, Rowe, Martin, Kasirer, Jamal, O’Bonsawin and Moreau JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Status of persons — Child protection — Encroachment upon child’s rights — Corrective powers of tribunal — Tribunal declaring that young person’s rights had been encroached upon in context of social intervention — Tribunal ordering corrective measures — Director of youth protection challenging measures on ground that they did not relate directly to young person’s situation referred to tribunal — Scope of corrective powers conferred on Youth Division of Court of Québec in cases of encroachment upon child’s rights — Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1, s. 91 para. 4.
In the context of social intervention, a young person and her parents filed an application with the Youth Division of the Court of Québec (“tribunal”) for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under s. 91 para. 4 of the Youth Protection Act (“YPA”). That provision states that where “the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected”. The tribunal identified four situations that had encroached upon the young person’s rights, and it recommended and ordered a series of corrective measures. Four of these measures were challenged by the director of youth protection for the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A (“DYP”), who took the view that they went beyond the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA because they did not relate directly to the young person’s situation. To begin with, as regards the first two measures, the tribunal ordered that the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who worked in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health and that these units be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health. Next, as regards the other two measures, the tribunal ordered the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A (“CISSS A”) to implement a protocol within a reasonable time period to set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention and to adapt all isolation rooms so that they were safer and their walls were covered with a material that prevented injury.
The Superior Court allowed the DYP’s appeal in part, holding that the four impugned orders exceeded the powers conferred on the tribunal by the legislature because they applied to children other than the one whose situation had been referred to the tribunal. The Superior Court varied the impugned orders so that they applied specifically to the young person’s situation and they named her expressly. The decision was subsequently appealed by the young person, by her parents and by the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. That commission had intervened for the first time before the Superior Court to argue that s. 91 para. 4 gives the tribunal broad corrective powers allowing it to make general orders not specifically intended to correct the situation experienced by the child before it. Like the Superior Court judge, the majority of the Court of Appeal found that the four impugned orders were general in nature, went beyond the situation of the child who was the subject of the proceedings and therefore had to be narrowed. However, the majority of the Court of Appeal varied two of the impugned measures, as varied by the Superior Court, so that they were ordered against the DYP rather than the CISSS A.
Held: The appeal should be allowed in part.
The legislature intended to confer on the tribunal the corrective powers needed to ensure the fullest protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, that is, protection that applies to both the present and the future and that takes account of the circumstances at the source of the encroachment upon rights as well as the impact of the encroachment on the child’s psychological and physical state. The tribunal may order corrective measures whose purpose is to put an end to the situation of encroachment where it is still encroaching upon the child’s rights, to remedy the psychological or physical consequences for the child resulting from the encroachment upon rights, and to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child. A preventive corrective measure may be ordered only if the child whose rights have been encroached upon is at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again, if the corrective measure can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment and if the measure is related to the protection of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal.
The YPA must be given a large and liberal interpretation that will ensure the attainment of its object and the carrying out of its provisions according to their true intent, meaning and spirit. Every provision of the YPA must also be interpreted in accordance with the Charter of human rights and freedoms, while bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). The starting point in any interpretive exercise is the text of the provision. In the absence of statutory definitions, what should be focused on is the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the text, that is, the natural meaning that appears when the provision is simply read through as a whole.
In this case, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase “the situation to be corrected” in s. 91 para. 4 leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to grant the tribunal corrective powers that allow it to redress a situation, to restore order or the normal state of affairs. However, this consideration does not make it possible to say with certainty which situation is in question. Furthermore, consideration of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the phrase is of little assistance in determining whether the legislature’s intention in granting the tribunal the corrective powers set out in s. 91 para. 4 was that, in exercising them, the tribunal concern itself exclusively with protecting the rights and interests of the child whose situation has been referred to it, or whether the legislature also intended that the tribunal concern itself with protecting the rights and interests of all other children who, though not the subject of the proceedings, are or may find themselves in the same situation as the child before the tribunal.
An analysis of the scheme of the YPA suggests that the legislature did not intend the tribunal to be able to order corrective measures aimed in whole or in part at protecting the rights and interests of children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The tribunal’s mandate is to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. With a view to ensuring functional complementarity between social intervention and judicial intervention, the tribunal must make decisions that are in the interest of the child and that respect the child’s rights, the ultimate goal being to limit any danger to the child’s security and development, but also to prevent abuse.
The fact that the tribunal is called upon to render justice in an individualized and particularized manner on the basis of a single child’s situation is also clear from all of the provisions relating to the tribunal’s jurisdiction. No provision of the YPA reveals an intention to depart from this logic of individualized and particularized justice that runs throughout the YPA when it comes to encroachment upon rights. The legislature did not intend to grant the tribunal powers going beyond those required to carry out the mandate assigned to it. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that other actors have been given a mandate to examine the system as a whole, to identify its shortcomings and to reform it. The proper functioning of the youth protection system depends on the actions of a range of political, social and legal actors that have been given roles, responsibilities and powers that are both distinct and complementary. There is nothing to suggest that, under the wide‑ranging reform of the YPA, the tribunal’s mandate has been broadened to allow it to take a critical look at systemic issues in child protection and to order corrective measures to reform the system for the benefit of children whose situations have not been referred to it.
The legislative history of s. 91 para. 4 and of other related provisions concerning encroachment upon rights confirms what the scheme of the YPA already reveals: the tribunal can deal with the situation of only one child at a time. Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended to authorize the tribunal to order corrective measures that would apply to children whose situations have not been referred to it but who may find themselves in the same situation of encroachment as the child before it. The legislature’s decision to omit the words “encroaching upon the rights of the young person” within the phrase “the situation to be corrected” in s. 91 para. 4 should not be interpreted as a broadening of the tribunal’s power to order corrective measures to protect the interests and rights of children whose situations have not been referred to it.
The YPA establishes a scheme whose purpose is to protect the interests and rights of children whose security or development is in danger, thereby helping to implement Canada’s obligations under the CRC in domestic law. The CRC weighs in favour of interpreting s. 91 para. 4 in a large and liberal manner so that the tribunal will have all the corrective powers it needs to ensure that the child whose rights have been encroached upon has the fullest and most effective protection possible. However, there is no indication that, in order to comply with the CRC, provincial and territorial legislatures must, in cases of encroachment upon rights, give courts or tribunals the mandate and powers they need to concern themselves with protecting the interests and rights of more than one child at a time. States parties to the CRC possess a margin of discretion in determining what measures are appropriate to promote the best interests of the child and to protect the child’s rights.
In the case of social and judicial intervention, the legislature had in mind that this fundamental purpose of protecting the children who are the most vulnerable in society would be attained through the cumulative effect of individualized and particularized interventions aimed at protecting the interests and rights of one child at a time. The recourse for a declaration of encroachment upon rights is one of the legal tools put in place by the legislature to achieve this purpose. The corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 must therefore be interpreted in a large and liberal manner to ensure the attainment of this purpose, which is clearly affirmed in the Charter of human rights and freedoms. The various types of corrective measures that can be ordered must be conceived of generously to ensure the fullest possible protection for the child whose rights have been encroached upon. Over and above correcting the situation at the source of the encroachment upon rights, the tribunal must also be able to order preventive corrective measures that will follow the child through the system to ensure that the child is adequately protected in the future.
At least three validity criteria govern the exercise of the tribunal’s power to order preventive corrective measures under s. 91 para. 4. These criteria are based on the limits built into this enabling provision. First, for a preventive corrective measure to be ordered, the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal must be at risk of being subjected to the situation of encroachment again. This criterion will generally be met where the child is still the subject of intervention under the YPA. Second, the preventive corrective measure ordered must be able to effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. Once the source of the encroachment upon rights is identified, the tribunal will be able to consider one or more corrective measures that could effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment. These measures will logically focus on one or more of the circumstances shown by the evidence to be at the source of the encroachment. The wide range of corrective measures that can effectively help to prevent the recurrence of the situation of encroachment will, however, be narrowed once account is taken of an additional criterion: any preventive corrective measure must, third, be related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. This requirement flows from the legislative intent discerned from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA. The corrective measure must therefore be primarily intended to protect the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal. The corrective measure must be related to events experienced by the child in environments where the child has spent or might spend time, on the basis of the evidence and the context. The tribunal must confine itself to ordering a corrective measure that reflects the risk of harm faced by the child, as shown by the evidence. That being said, the order, to be valid, does not necessarily have to expressly name the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal.
To effectively protect the child whose rights have been encroached upon, the preventive corrective measures will sometimes have to be broad in scope. At least two types of measures can be contemplated. First, the tribunal may order a corrective measure specifically directed at persons, bodies or institutions that, in light of the evidence, could potentially contribute to the recurrence of the encroachment upon the child’s rights. Second, the tribunal may order a measure that will follow the child through the system, either as an alternative to or in addition to the first type of measure, in light of the evidence in the record, the circumstances of the case and the need to protect the child for the future. Broad corrective measures will generally have the advantage of protecting the interests and rights of many other children in an indirect and incidental manner, but this is of no relevance in determining whether the measures were validly imposed. A preventive corrective measure related to the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to the tribunal may very well have positive indirect and incidental consequences for a large number of children. There is nothing to prevent the tribunal from ordering a corrective measure to eliminate a systemic or institutional practice, provided that the three validity criteria are met. Lastly, the magnitude of the budgetary impact of the corrective measure is not in itself a criterion for the validity of the order. Such a validity criterion has no basis in the YPA, and its application would entail considerable practical difficulties, adding another barrier to access to justice in the youth protection system.
Where rights have been encroached upon, the tribunal has a power to make recommendations that it derives from the text, scheme and object of the YPA. When the circumstances do not lend themselves to stating a conclusion in the form of an order, the tribunal can still make a non‑binding recommendation anchored in the evidence concerning the encroachment upon the rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it. This power to make recommendations is to be exercised with caution and allows the tribunal to point out the existence of a problem relating to an encroachment upon the child’s rights and to encourage the authorities to address it. The recommendation must be based on the situation of encroachment experienced by the child, as shown by the evidence.
In this case, the four corrective measures challenged by the DYP were ordered to prevent abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures from being used again, where it was established that the young person was at risk of being subjected to the identified situations of encroachment again. As regards the first two orders, the tribunal erred by not limiting the scope of these measures so that they were related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. Nothing in the evidence adduced supported the conclusion that such broad orders were necessary to protect the young person’s interests and rights in the future. The Superior Court properly intervened to narrow the scope of these orders so that they were related to the protection of the young person’s interests and rights. As for the third order, the tribunal exceeded its powers by ordering the CISSS A to implement a protocol that set out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention. The order as worded was not related to preventing the recurrence of the situation of encroachment for the young person. In light of the findings of fact, the order should have been directed at the rehabilitation centres for young persons with adjustment problems (“RCYPAPs”) of the CISSS A and at any other RCYPAP that would be responsible for the young person. The order should also have been made against the DYP. Finally, as regards the fourth order, which required that the isolation rooms be made safer, this corrective measure was not sufficiently anchored in the evidence and the context. The order should have been varied to direct the DYP, and not the CISSS A, to have at least one isolation room, covered with a material that prevented injury, available for the young person at all times in units A and B of the CISSS A and in the other RCYPAP units to which she would be entrusted. Other alternative orders were also available and acceptable and could therefore have been made. However, since the young person is no longer the subject of social intervention under the YPA and never will be again given that she is now an adult, no order will be made.
Cases Cited
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Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting health services and social services, CQLR, c. S‑4.2, s. 118.1.
Act to amend the Youth Protection Act and other legislation, S.Q. 1984, c. 4, ss. 10, 12, 38, 46.
Act to amend the Youth Protection Act and other legislative provisions, S.Q. 2022, c. 11.
Act to modify the organization and governance of the health and social services network, in particular by abolishing the regional agencies, CQLR, c. O‑7.2, Sch. I.
Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C‑12, ss. 39, 53, 80.
Civil Code of Québec, arts. 32, 186, 199.
Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25, art. 5.
Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C‑25.01, arts. 17, 50.
Décret 1676‑91, (1992) 124 G.O. II, 51.
Interpretation Act, CQLR, c. I‑16, ss. 40 para. 1, 41.
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S‑26, s. 45.
Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1, preamble [ad. 2022, c. 11, s. 1], ss. 2, 2.3 para. 1(a), 3, Chapter III, 23 to 27, 28 to 30.8 [idem, s. 16], 47.1, 51 to 51.8, 52 et seq., Chapter V, 73 para. 1, 73.1, 74.1, 74.2, 90 et seq., 91, 112, 128, 129, 133 [idem, s. 61], 133.1, 156.1 para. 1, 156.2.
Youth Protection Act, S.Q. 1977, c. 20, s. 23(d), (e).
Treaties and Other International Instruments
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3, Articles 3, 4.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Levesque, Schrager and Hogue JJ.A.), 2022 QCCA 1653, [2022] AZ-51899040, [2022] Q.J. No. 13560 (Lexis), 2022 CarswellQue 21735 (WL), setting aside in part a decision of Poirier J., 2021 QCCS 2251, [2021] AZ-51770110, [2021] J.Q. no 6108 (Lexis), 2021 CarswellQue 8125 (WL), setting aside in part a decision of Roy J.C.Q., 2019 QCCQ 3916, [2019] AZ-51608758, [2019] J.Q. no 5507 (Lexis), 2019 CarswellQue 7385 (WL). Appeal allowed in part.
Catherine Gauvreau, Christine Campbell and Stéphanie Fournier, for the appellant.
Audrey Boctor, Julie Langlois, Vanessa Ntaganda and Mélanie Poulin, for the respondent.
Éric Cantin and Mario Normandin, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Stéphane Pouliot and Gabrielle Gallio, for the interveners A and B.
Charlotte Vanier Perras, for the intervener X.
Karine Joizil and Simon Bouthillier, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Vincent Larochelle, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.
English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by
The Chief Justice —
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
I. Overview
1
II. Factual Background
5
III. Procedural and Judicial History
6
A. Court of Québec, 2019 QCCQ 3916
6
B. Quebec Superior Court, 2021 QCCS 2251
9
C. Quebec Court of Appeal, 2022 QCCA 1653
11
(1) Majority Reasons
11
(2) Concurring Reasons
14
IV. Issues
17
V. Analysis
23
A. Judicial Intervention in Cases of Encroachment Upon Rights: Scope of the Corrective Powers Conferred on the Tribunal Under Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA
23
(1) Principles That Must Guide the Interpretive Exercise
23
(2) Interpretation of Section 91 Paragraph 4 of the YPA
28
(a) Text
30
(i) The Verb “Correct” (“Corriger”)
30
(ii) The Words “the Situation” (“la Situation”)
33
(iii) Conclusion
36
(b) Scheme of the YPA
37
(i) The Tribunal’s Mandate Is To Render Justice in an Individualized and Particularized Manner on the Basis of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to It
38
(ii) Other Actors Are Responsible for Looking at the System as a Whole and Reforming It
43
(iii) Conclusion on the Tribunal’s Role
50
(c) Legislative History
52
(d) CRC
61
(e) Object of the Provision
64
(f) Conclusion
71
(3) Criteria for the Validity of Corrective Measures Ordered for Preventive Purposes
78
(a) The Child Must Be at Risk of Being Subjected to the Situation of Encroachment Again
79
(b) The Corrective Measures Must Be Able to Effectively Help to Prevent the Recurrence of the Situation of Encroachment
81
(c) The Corrective Measures Ordered Must Be Related to the Protection of the Interests and Rights of the Child Whose Situation Has Been Referred to the Tribunal
87
(d) The Budgetary Impact of the Corrective Measure Is Not a Criterion for the Validity of the Order
93
(e) Conclusion
95
(4) Review of the Orders
98
(a) Orders Directed at the Individualized Treatment Units
101
(b) Orders Directed at the CISSS A
105
(5) Tribunal’s Power To Make Recommendations
111
B. Right of the CISSS A To Be Heard or Duly Called
117
VI. Disposition
122
I. Overview
[1] The very idea of a child’s rights being encroached upon in the context of social intervention under the Youth Protection Act, CQLR, c. P‑34.1 (“YPA”),[1] provokes indignation. At such a time, the child is in an extremely vulnerable position. The child may have been sexually, physically or psychologically abused, have been neglected or abandoned, or have serious mental health or behavioural disorders. As author Laurence Ricard notes, encroachment upon the rights of such a child in the course of social intervention seems, in this context, [translation] “like twisting a knife in the wound”: How can it be explained that intervention by the youth protection system may add to the harm already suffered by a child even though the primary mission of this system is to protect them? (“Un regard sur la notion de lésion de droits en matière de protection de la jeunesse” (2021), 62 C. de D. 605, at p. 608; see also YPA, s. 2). This case illustrates, however, how difficult it can be for those involved with a child in the course of intervention under the YPA to prevent such encroachments upon rights from happening or recurring, given that the causes of these encroachments are often numerous and complex.
[2] This appeal provides an opportunity for this Court to consider the corrective powers conferred by the legislature on the Youth Division of the Court of Québec (“tribunal”) where persons, bodies or institutions have encroached upon a child’s rights in the course of social intervention. The tribunal’s power to intervene in this regard derives from s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA, which states that where “the tribunal concludes that the rights of a child in difficulty have been wronged by persons, bodies or institutions, it may order the situation to be corrected”.
[3] This laconic provision gives the tribunal broad powers that have at times been compared to superintending and reforming powers in the interest of the child and at times been likened to the remedial powers of courts where there has been a violation of fundamental rights. However, the exact contours of these powers remain unclear and are a subject of debate. The present case therefore affords an occasion to circumscribe their scope.
[4] First, the Court must interpret the passage in s. 91 para. 4 stating that the tribunal may order “the situation to be corrected”. More specifically, it must be determined whether the legislature intended that the tribunal be able to order corrective measures only to prevent the recurrence of a situation of encroachment for the child whose rights were encroached upon, or whether it intended that the tribunal also be able to order corrective measures to prevent the same situation of encroachment from occurring for any other child who might be faced with it. Second, the Court must consider a question relating to respect for the right of the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A (“CISSS A”) to be heard or duly called. The Court is being asked to determine whether, in the circumstances, the tribunal could make orders against the CISSS A.
II. Factual Background
[5] On January 17, 2018, the tribunal ordered that a young person, the intervener X, be placed in a rehabilitation centre for young persons with adjustment problems (“RCYPAP”) because her security and development were in danger within the meaning of the YPA (2018 QCCQ 10492). Pursuant to that order, the young person was placed in various RCYPAP units and was also hospitalized for certain periods. During her stays in the units, the young person’s rights were repeatedly encroached upon, a fact not disputed by the respondent, the director of youth protection for the CISSS A (“DYP”). Since the tribunal’s judgment summarized below clearly lays out the facts that led to the encroachments upon rights and since these facts are not in dispute, I see no need to recount them again here in detail.
III. Procedural and Judicial History
A. Court of Québec, 2019 QCCQ 3916
[6] The issue of encroachment upon rights arose before the tribunal in the context of an application by the DYP for the review and extension of the order made in January 2018. In connection with that application, the young person and her parents, respectively, filed an application for a declaration of encroachment upon rights under s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA.
[7] The tribunal allowed in part the application for the review and extension of the order of January 2018, after finding that the young person’s security and development were still in danger. In deciding the applications for a declaration of encroachment upon rights, the tribunal identified four situations that had encroached upon the young person’s rights: the unjustified and unduly long suspension of psychological counselling, in violation of an order made on January 17, 2018; an educator’s unjustified refusal to allow the young person, who had run away from her family home, to take refuge at the RCYPAP to which she had been entrusted, and the inadequate support subsequently offered to her when she reported that she had been sexually assaulted after running away; the fact that the young person’s medical record was poorly kept, and the lack of care and follow‑up for more than two weeks when she had injuries to her hands; and the imposition of abusive or inadequate restraint and isolation measures.
[8] The tribunal recommended and ordered a series of corrective measures. Four of them were later challenged by the DYP, who took the view that they went beyond the corrective powers conferred on the tribunal by s. 91 para. 4 of the YPA because they did not relate directly to the young person’s situation. The four corrective measures in question were worded as follows:
[translation]
AS CORRECTIVE MEASURES:
[340] ORDERS that the youth workers, educators and intervention officers who work in the individualized treatment units be able to receive specific training on mental health and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse;
[341] ORDERS that the individualized treatment units be able to obtain support from a healthcare professional specializing in mental health and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse;
. . .
[345] ORDERS that the Centre intégré de santé et de services sociaux A implement a protocol within a reasonable time period that sets out the steps to be taken when a child spits during an intervention and report back to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse;
[346] ORDERS that the Centre intég