St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette

St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
2008-11-20
Neutral citation
2008 SCC 64
Report
[2008] 3 SCR 392
Case number
31782
Judges
McLachlin, Beverley; Bastarache, Michel; LeBel, Louis; Deschamps, Marie; Fish, Morris J.; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Charron, Louise
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Property law
Notes
SCC Case Information: 31782
Decision Content
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Citation: St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392, 2008 SCC 64
Date: 20081120
Docket: 31782
Between:
St. Lawrence Cement Inc.
Appellant / Respondent on cross‑appeal
and
Huguette Barrette and Claude Cochrane in their capacity of
representing the designated group
Respondents / Appellants on cross‑appeal
‑ and ‑
Friends of the Earth, Quebec Environmental Law Centre and
Quebec Business Council on the Environment
Interveners
Official English Translation
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache,* LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Joint Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 119)
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella and Charron JJ. concurring)
* Bastarache J. took no part in the judgment.
______________________________
St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 392, 2008 SCC 64
St. Lawrence Cement Inc. Appellant/Respondent on cross‑appeal
v.
Huguette Barrette and Claude Cochrane, in their capacity as
representatives of the designated group Respondents/Appellants on cross‑appeal
and
Friends of the Earth, Quebec Environmental Law Centre and
Quebec Business Council on the Environment Interveners
Indexed as: St. Lawrence Cement Inc. v. Barrette
Neutral citation: 2008 SCC 64.
File No.: 31782.
2008: March 27; 2008: November 20.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache,* LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for quebec
Property _ Neighbourhood disturbances _ No‑fault liability _ Operation of cement plant _ Whether in Quebec civil law scheme of no‑fault civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances under art. 976 C.C.Q. applies where annoyances suffered are excessive _ Whether special statute governing plant’s activities confers immunity on plant for neighbourhood disturbances.
Prescription _ Interruption _ Judicial demand _ Neighbourhood disturbances resulting from operation of cement plant causing damage that spread out over time _ Whether lawsuit interrupted prescription for damage suffered after lawsuit filed _ Whether that damage arose from “same source” _ Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2896.
Damages _ Assessment _ Use of average amounts _ Class action _ Neighbourhood disturbances resulting from operation of cement plant _ Members of group divided into four residential zones to ensure that there some basic injury common to residents of each zone _ Recovery subject to individual claims procedure, but amount to be awarded to each member assessed using average determined for each zone _ Whether it appropriate to use average amounts in assessing damages of members of group covered by class action.
A special statute passed by the Quebec legislature in 1952 authorized SLC to build a cement plant in a municipality. After the plant began operating in 1955, neighbourhood problems arose between SLC and neighbours who were displeased with the consequences of the plant’s activities. The Ministère de l’Environnement stepped in several times in response to citizens’ complaints about problems with dust, odours and noise, and the plant itself produced several environmental incident reports. Alleging various faults in the operation of SLC’s plant and also contending that the neighbourhood disturbances caused by the plant were abnormal or excessive, B and C filed a motion for authorization to institute a class action on behalf of the other residents living in areas near the plant. The motion was granted, and the action was filed on August 1, 1994. SLC stopped operating the plant in 1997.
The trial court allowed the class action on the basis that a scheme of no‑fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances exists under art. 976 of the Civil Code of Québec (“C.C.Q.”). Because, in its view, the evidence showed that there was a common injury, but that it varied in intensity from one zone to another and from year to year, the court awarded damages that varied from zone to zone. It also held that group members would have to file individual claims for the damages being awarded, since it was difficult to determine the exact number of members in each zone. The Court of Appeal allowed SLC’s appeal in part with regard to certain aspects of the assessment of damages, but found the company civilly liable on the basis of proven fault under the general rules of civil liability in light of its failure to comply with certain applicable regulatory provisions. The court rejected the theory of no‑fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances.
SLC appealed with regard to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that it was liable on the basis of fault, and to the method adopted for determining the quantum of damages, to prescription and to the immunity to which it claims to be entitled under the special statute applicable to its plant. B and C cross‑appealed, seeking recognition of a no‑fault liability scheme applicable to neighbourhood annoyances that are excessive, and seeking to restore the trial court’s conclusions on the quantum of damages.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed and the cross‑appeal allowed.
Even though it appears to be absolute, the right of ownership has limits. Article 976 C.C.Q. exemplifies this in prohibiting owners of land from forcing their neighbours to suffer abnormal or excessive annoyances. Two regimes of civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances should be recognized in Quebec law: one, under the ordinary rules of civil liability, is based on the wrongful conduct of the person who allegedly caused the disturbances, while the second is a regime of no‑fault liability based on the extent of the annoyances suffered by the victim for the purposes of art. 976 C.C.Q. [20] [86]
Where fault‑based liability is concerned, civil fault may relate either to the abusive exercise of a right of ownership (art. 7 C.C.Q.) or to a violation of standards of conduct that are often set out in legislative provisions relating to the use of property. However, conduct is not the deciding criterion when it comes to abnormal annoyances under art. 976 C.C.Q. An owner who causes abnormal annoyances without either intent to injure or excessive and unreasonable conduct does not abuse his or her rights, because he or she cannot be accused of wrongful conduct. A finding that abnormal annoyances were caused will therefore not be enough to establish fault in the exercise of a right. On the other hand, an owner who commits a fault may be held liable for damage even if the damage does not reach the level of abnormal annoyances. Article 976 C.C.Q. does not guarantee immunity from the consequences of civil fault. As for the violation of a legislative standard, it will constitute civil fault only if it also constitutes a violation of the standard of conduct of a reasonable person under the general rules of civil liability set out in art. 1457 C.C.Q. [22] [30‑31] [33‑34]
In addition to the general rules applicable to fault‑based civil liability, it is necessary to recognize a scheme of no‑fault civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances under art. 976 C.C.Q. that is based on the annoyances suffered by the victim being excessive rather than on the conduct of the person who allegedly caused them. The inclusion of art. 976 in the book on property confirms that the legislature intended to separate neighbourhood relations from the general rules on obligations. This provision thus relates more to the right of ownership than to the general rules of civil liability. Next, the actual words of art. 976 do not require evidence of wrongful conduct to establish the liability of an owner who has caused excessive neighbourhood annoyances. Moreover, the commentaries of the Civil Code Revision Office and the Minister of Justice support a conclusion that the legislature’s intention was not to limit actions relating to neighbourhood disturbances to cases involving the wrongful exercise of a right. Finally, art. 976 is related to other provisions that focus on the result of an act, not on an owner’s conduct. A scheme of civil liability based on the existence of abnormal neighbourhood disturbances that does not require proven or presumed fault is also consistent with the approaches taken in Canadian common law and in French civil law. What is more, such a scheme is consistent with general policy considerations, such as the objective of environmental protection and the application of the polluter‑pay principle. [3] [20] [37] [72‑75] [80]
The theory of real liability adopted by the Court of Appeal must be rejected. According to this theory, the obligation not to injure one’s neighbours must be treated as a charge on every immovable in favour of neighbouring lands. As soon as the limit of normal annoyances is exceeded, the neighbouring owner can set up his or her right against the owner who is at fault by bringing an immovable real action to put an end to the disturbance. As for claims for compensation of a personal nature, they are governed by the traditional rules of civil liability. There are several problems with this approach: rather than a personal action, only an immovable real action would be possible; a remedy under art. 976 C.C.Q. would not be available to lessees or occupants, since they would not be able to claim to have a real right; and it would as a result be difficult, if not impossible, to institute class actions in situations where art. 976 C.C.Q. applies. [81‑84]
In the instant case, the trial judge concluded that SLC had not committed a civil fault in relation to its statutory obligations. She found that SLC had fulfilled its obligation to use the best known means to eliminate dust and smoke and had taken reasonable precautions to ensure that its equipment was in good working order at all times and was functioning optimally. Her interpretation of the facts is reasonable, and her analysis of the law is correct. B and C have not shown that the judge made an error in this regard that justified reversing her decision. [92‑94]
Regarding no‑fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances under art. 976 C.C.Q., the trial judge said she was convinced that, even though SLC had operated its plant in compliance with the applicable standards, B and C and the members of the group they are representing had suffered abnormal annoyances that were beyond the limit of tolerance neighbours owe each other according to the nature or location of their land. In view of her findings of fact, the trial judge was justified in finding SLC liable under art. 976 C.C.Q. Moreover, she did not misinterpret the word “neighbour” when she concluded that all members living in the neighbourhoods adjacent to the plant were neighbours of the plant for the purposes of art. 976 C.C.Q. on the basis that they lived close enough to it. Although the plaintiff must prove a certain geographic proximity between the annoyance and its source, the word must be construed liberally. [94‑96]
The 1952 special statute respecting SLC did not grant SLC immunity from actions in damages relating to its industrial activities. Although that statute authorized the operation of the plant while requiring that the best means available be used, it in no way exempted SLC from the application of the ordinary law. When the legislature excludes the application of the ordinary law, it generally does so expressly. There is no provision in the special statute precise enough to justify a conclusion that the law of civil liability has been excluded for all consequences of the plant’s activities. [97‑98]
Damage relating to events subsequent to the judgment authorizing the class action is not subject to prescription. The application for authorization to institute a class action suspended prescription until the judgment granting the motion was no longer susceptible of appeal (art. 2908 C.C.Q.), and the filing of the action then interrupted prescription (art. 2892 C.C.Q.). According to art. 2896 C.C.Q., such an interruption continues until judgment and has effect in respect of any right arising from the “same source”. These words must be interpreted liberally. Here, the source of the continuing damage suffered by B and C, namely the acts that generated their right of action, remains the same: activities of SLC that caused excessive neighbourhood annoyances. Since those activities continued until 1997, it would make no sense, in addition to being impractical, to ask B and C to repeat their motion every three years for each annoyance suffered. [99‑103] [106]
Finally, given the trial judge’s discretion and the difficulty of assessing environmental problems and annoyances, the trial judge’s use of average amounts in determining the quantum of damages was reasonable and appropriate in the circumstances. SLC has not shown that its liability increased as a result, and there is no indication that the amount awarded was based on a wholly erroneous estimate of the injury. The trial court’s conclusions on the assessment of damages must therefore be restored. [116]
Cases Cited
Distinguished: Lapierre v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 241; Christopoulos v. Restaurant Mazurka Inc., [1998] R.R.A. 334; considered: Drysdale v. Dugas (1896), 26 S.C.R. 20; Canada Paper Co. v. Brown (1922), 63 S.C.R. 243; Katz v. Reitz, [1973] C.A. 230; Sirois v. Lévesque‑Gagné, [1996] Q.J. No. 2669 (QL); Gourdeau v. Letellier de St‑Just, [2002] R.J.Q. 1195; referred to: Houle v. Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122; Brodeur v. Choinière, [1945] C.S. 334; Air‑Rimouski Ltée v. Gagnon, [1952] C.S. 149; Lessard v. Dupont Beaudoin, [1997] R.D.I. 45; Morin v. Blais, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 570; Compagnie d’assurance Continental du Canada v. 136500 Canada inc., [1998] R.R.A. 707; Union commerciale Compagnie d’assurance v. Giguère, [1996] R.R.A. 286; St‑Louis v. Goulet, [1954] B.R. 185; Comité d’environnement de Ville‑Émard (C.E.V.E.) v. Domfer Metal Powders Ltd., [2006] Q.J. No. 13631 (QL), application for leave to appeal granted, [2007] 1 S.C.R. viii, appeal discontinued, [2008] 2 S.C.R. v; Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34; Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Quebec (Minister of the Environment), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 624, 2003 SCC 58; St‑Pierre v. Daigle, [2007] Q.J. No. 1275 (QL), 2007 QCCS 705; Coalition pour la protection de l’environnement du parc linéaire “Petit Train du Nord” v. Laurentides (Municipalité régionale de Comté des), [2005] R.J.Q. 116, motions for appeal and cross‑appeal denied, [2005] Q.J. No. 9042 (QL), 2005 QCCA 664; Dicaire v. Chambly (Ville), [2000] Q.J. No. 884 (QL); Bouchard v. Corp. Stone Consolidated, [1997] Q.J. No. 4574 (QL); Arseneault v. Société immobilière du Québec, [1997] Q.J. No. 4570 (QL); Carey Canadian Mines Ltd. v. Plante, [1975] C.A. 893; Théâtre du Bois de Coulonge inc. v. Société nationale des québécois et des québécoises de la Capitale inc., [1993] R.R.A. 41; Ouimette v. Canada (Procureur général), [2002] R.J.Q. 1228; Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining Ltd., [1981] 1 All E.R. 353; Manchester Corporation v. Farnworth, [1930] A.C. 171; Hammersmith and City Railway Co. v. Brand (1869), L.R. 4 H.L. 171; Ryan v. Victoria (City), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 201; Tock v. St. John’s Metropolitan Area Board, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1181; Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Roy, [1902] A.C. 220; Laforest v. Ciments du St‑Laurent, [1974] C.S. 289; ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., [2005] R.J.Q. 2267, 2005 QCCA 733; Quebec (Public Curator) v. Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital St‑Ferdinand, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211; Hollick v. Toronto (City), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158, 2001 SCC 68; Thompson v. Masson, [2000] R.J.D.T. 1548; Curateur public v. Syndicat national des employés de l’hôpital St‑Ferdinand, [1990] R.J.Q. 359; Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting Atlas Realties Co. — La Compagnie d’Immeubles Atlas, S.Q. 1951‑52, c. 131, s. 5.
Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases, R.S.Q., c. A‑3.001, s. 438.
Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.Q., c. A‑25, s. 83.57.
Civil Code of Lower Canada, arts. 1053, 2233a.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 7, 976, 988, 991, 1457, 1458, 1611, 2892, 2896, 2908.
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C‑25, arts. 59, 67, 494, 999(d), 1003, 1028, 1031, 1037‑1040, 1045.
Quebec Companies Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 276.
Regulation respecting pits and quarries, R.R.Q. 1981, c. Q‑2, r. 2, s. 34.
Regulation respecting the application of the Environment Quality Act, (1993) 125 G.O. II, 5997, s. 12.
Regulation respecting the quality of the atmosphere, R.R.Q. 1981, c. Q‑2, r. 20, ss. 10, 11, 42.
Authors Cited
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Lafond, Pierre‑Claude. Le recours collectif, le rôle du juge et sa conception de la justice: impact et évolution. Cowansville, Qué.: Yvon Blais, 2006.
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Lamontagne, Denys‑Claude. “Special Rules on the Ownership of Immovables and Servitudes”, in Reform of the Civil Code, vol. 1‑A. Translated by J. Daniel Phelan. Texts written for the Barreau du Québec and the Chambre des notaires du Québec. Montréal: Barreau du Québec, 1993.
Linden, Allen M., and Bruce Feldthusen. Canadian Tort Law, 8th ed. Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006.
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APPEAL and CROSS‑APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal (Forget, Pelletier and Morissette JJ.A.), [2006] R.J.Q. 2633, SOQUIJ AZ-50396994, [2006] Q.J. No. 13603 (QL), 2006 CarswellQue 9389, 2006 QCCA 1437, allowing in part an appeal and dismissing an incidental appeal from a decision by Dutil J., [2003] R.J.Q. 1883, SOQUIJ AZ-50173892, [2003] Q.J. No. 5273 (QL), 2003 CarswellQue 994. Appeal dismissed and cross‑appeal allowed.
François Fontaine, Andres C. Garin and Gregory Bordan, for the appellant/respondent on cross‑appeal.
Jacques Larochelle, for the respondents/appellants on cross‑appeal.
Michel Bélanger and William Amos, for the interveners Friends of the Earth and Quebec Environmental Law Centre.
Guy Du Pont, Marc‑André Boutin and Brandon Wiener, for the intervener Quebec Business Council on the Environment.
English version of the judgment of the Court delivered by
LeBel and Deschamps JJ. —
I. Introduction
A. Nature of the Case
[1] Dust they are, and unto dust they shall return, yet human beings have difficulty resigning themselves to living in dust. Sometimes, weary of brooms and buckets of water, they are not unwilling to turn to the courts to get rid of it. This case is proof of that.
[2] In this case, Huguette Barrette and Claude Cochrane (the “representatives”), residents of the city of Beauport (now a borough of the city of Québec), instituted a class action against St. Lawrence Cement Inc. (“SLC”) for neighbourhood disturbances related to the operation of a cement plant in that city. The Superior Court allowed the class action on the basis that a scheme of no‑fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances exists under art. 976 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64 (“C.C.Q.”). The Court of Appeal allowed SLC’s appeal in part with regard to certain aspects of the assessment of damages, but found the company civilly liable on the basis of proven fault under the general rules of civil liability.
[3] In an appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision, this Court must now determine whether in Quebec civil law there is a scheme of no‑fault civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances under art. 976 C.C.Q. that applies where the annoyances suffered are excessive. We answer this question in the affirmative and, on that basis and for the reasons that follow, dismiss SLC’s appeal. However, the cross‑appeal is allowed and the damages awarded by the Superior Court are restored.
B. Origin of the Case
(1) Establishment of the Cement Plant
[4] This case originated when SLC implemented a plan to establish a large cement plant in Villeneuve (which was later amalgamated with the city of Beauport and then with the city of Québec). SLC was incorporated in 1951 under the Quebec Companies Act, R.S.Q. 1941, c. 276, and began building its plant in 1952. Although many lots were still vacant in the area where SLC established its plant, some houses had been built on land adjacent to its property. Moreover, a special statute passed by the Quebec legislature authorized the company to establish its plant in the “municipality of the village of Villeneuve” and conferred additional corporate powers on it (An Act respecting Atlas Realties Co. — La Compagnie d’Immeubles Atlas, S.Q. 1951‑52, c. 131 (“SLC Special Act”)).
(2) Development of Neighbourhood Problems for the Plant
[5] The plant began operating around 1955. Neighbourhood problems quickly arose between SLC and neighbours who were displeased with the consequences of the plant’s activities. The evidence shows that environmental incidents occurred as early as 1956 ([2003] R.J.Q. 1883 (Sup. Ct.), at para. 10). In 1974, the Superior Court ordered SLC to compensate a citizen for negligence in firing its cement kilns. The Ministère de l’Environnement then stepped in several times in the 1980s in response to citizens’ complaints about problems with dust, odours and noise. In the spring of 1990, SLC agreed to wash houses that had been dirtied during the winter by debris and dust from the plant. It also offered, in 1991 and 1992, to pay to have some residents’ cars washed.
[6] The Ministère de l’Environnement received many complaints about environmental incidents (dust from the plant, foul odours) between June 8, 1991 and February 1, 1996. And the plant produced several environmental incident reports between February 6, 1992 and May 16, 1996 (Sup. Ct., at paras. 243‑45; [2006] R.J.Q. 2633, 2006 QCCA 1437, at paras. 27‑28).
[7] The evidence also shows that SLC invested several million dollars for environmental protection purposes. In particular, it spent more than $8 million between 1991 and 1995, mostly on the installation of new dust collectors for the kilns (Sup. Ct., at para. 257). SLC stopped operating the plant in 1997, but the disputes with its neighbours continued in the courts.
(3) The Class Action
[8] On June 4, 1993, the representatives filed a motion in the Quebec Superior Court for authorization to institute a class action. The motion was granted on March 31, 1994, and the action was filed on August 1, 1994. The representatives alleged various faults in the operation of SLC’s plant but also contended that the neighbourhood disturbances caused by the plant were abnormal or excessive. The proposed group was made up of Beauport residents living in areas near the plant. SLC denied any liability and contested the action both at the authorization stage and on the merits.
C. Judicial History
(1) Superior Court
(a) Judgment Granting Authorization
[9] The application for authorization to institute a class action came before Thibault J., who held that the four conditions set out in art. 1003 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C‑25 (“C.C.P.”), had been met. First, regarding the requirement that identical, similar or related questions of law or fact be raised, Thibault J. accepted that the claims for damages were based on the same sources of injury and that the evidence on the plant’s liability would be common. She then found that the evidence showed a strong appearance of right and thus that the facts alleged seemed to justify the conclusions sought. Next, the large number of people in the group made the application of art. 59 or 67 C.C.P. difficult and impracticable. Finally, Thibault J. concluded that the representatives were in a position to represent the group’s members adequately. She therefore granted the motion for authorization to institute a class action and ascribed the status of representative to Huguette Barrette and Claude Cochrane.
(b) Judgment on the Merits, [2003] R.J.Q. 1883
[10] A few years later, Dutil J. heard the action on the merits. She affirmed the judgment authorizing the institution of a class action. She also found that events subsequent to the filing of the motion for authorization, up to 1997, were relevant to the proceedings.
[11] Dutil J. held that SLC was liable on the basis that the annoyances suffered by the representatives and the members of the group were excessive. Despite SLC’s efforts to comply with the relevant standards in operating its plant, its emissions of dust, odours and noise had caused abnormal annoyances for its neighbours and it was therefore civilly liable under art. 976 C.C.Q. However, Dutil J. did not find that SLC had committed a fault.
[12] Dutil J. found that the scheme of liability under art. 976 C.C.Q. was available to all SLC’s neighbours, both lessees and owners. In her opinion, all the group’s members lived close enough to SLC to be considered “neighbours” for the purposes of that scheme. Even those who had moved near SLC’s plant after it opened were entitled to damages. Dutil J. also held that the statutory authorization given to SLC to operate a cement plant did not give it immunity for damage suffered by its neighbours, and she rejected a prescription argument made in relation to some of the damage.
[13] According to Dutil J., the evidence showed that there was a common injury, but that it varied in intensity from one zone to another and from year to year. As a result, she awarded damages that varied from zone to zone. Because it was difficult to determine the exact number of members in each zone, Dutil J. held that group members would have to file individual claims for the damages being awarded (paras. 417 and 423).
(2) Court of Appeal, [2006] R.J.Q. 2633, 2006 QCCA 1437
[14] SLC appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal. The reasons for judgment were written by Pelletier J.A., and Forget and Morissette JJ.A. concurred in them. Pelletier J.A. rejected the theory of no‑fault liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances and instead found SLC liable on the basis of proven fault. The Court of Appeal also intervened to reduce the amount of compensation awarded by Dutil J.
[15] The Court of Appeal interpreted the Quebec case law on neighbourhood obligations from the standpoint of real liability (responsabilité propter rem) (para. 99). In its opinion, this means that neighbourhood relations impose reciprocal passive charges on the holders of real rights in land, which permits a balance to be struck in the use of neighbouring properties and thus grounds a real rather than a personal action. As a result, only owners can enjoy the protection of art. 976 C.C.Q. Moreover, a class action cannot be based on that provision, because a class action is a procedural vehicle designed solely for exercising rights belonging to persons.
[16] According to the Court of Appeal, a neighbour who seeks to have an owner found personally liable bears the burden of proving fault, a causal connection and injury under the traditional rules of civil liability. Examining SLC’s liability from this standpoint, the court found that Dutil J. had erred in assessing the extent of SLC’s obligations under the regulatory provisions applicable to its facility. The Court of Appeal found that SLC had an obligation to properly maintain its equipment and to ensure that its equipment functioned optimally during production hours. The court therefore found that SLC had to be able to cease operating, either entirely or partially, as soon as a breakdown occurred, and for as long as was necessary to make repairs. In the Court of Appeal’s opinion, the evidence showed that SLC had failed to meet this requirement numerous times during the period covered by the claim. SLC had therefore committed a fault and was, as a result, civilly liable.
[17] The Court of Appeal agreed with Dutil J. that the filing of the action by the representatives had suspended and interrupted prescription and that events subsequent to the filing of the action were relevant. It also held that the method of compensation chosen by Dutil J. was acceptable, and it stressed the importance of the Superior Court’s discretion in choosing the appropriate recovery method. However, the Court of Appeal found that basing the compensation on average amounts was not appropriate where the damage suffered by owners owing to additional painting work was concerned. It accepted SLC’s argument that [translation] “the trial judge wrongly awarded an ‘average’ compensation amount to every owner in each zone for additional painting expenses that were not incurred by all of them” (para. 241). The Court of Appeal therefore struck out the amount the Superior Court had awarded to the owners under this head. It also intervened to reduce the compensation awarded to the group members by a percentage amount. Its analysis of civil liability led it to limit the compensation amounts to injuries resulting from the fact that SLC’s equipment was not functioning optimally. It therefore reduced the awarded amounts to exclude annoyances not resulting from SLC’s fault.
[18] SLC appealed to this Court with regard to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that it was liable on the basis of fault and, in the alternative, with regard to the existence of a causal connection between its fault and the damages claimed. It also appealed with regard to the method adopted for determining the quantum of damages, to prescription and to the immunity to which it claims to be entitled under the special statute applicable to its Beauport plant. The representatives cross‑appealed, seeking recognition of a no‑fault liability scheme applicable to neighbourhood annoyances that are excessive, and of the possibility of instituting a class action under that scheme. They also sought to restore the Superior Court’s conclusions on the quantum of damages.
II. Analysis
A. Issues
[19] In this appeal, the Court must consider the following issues:
(1) Is civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances in Quebec law necessarily based on fault? Is it possible that a no‑fault liability scheme exists? What would the nature of such a scheme be, and how would it apply to the facts of this case?
(2) Does the special statute passed by the Quebec legislature to govern SLC’s activities confer immunity on SLC for neighbourhood disturbances?
(3) Did the representatives’ lawsuit interrupt prescription for damage suffered after it was filed?
(4) Was it appropriate for the courts below to use average amounts in assessing the damage suffered by the members of the group covered by the class action?
B. General Framework for the Discussion on Civil Liability in Respect of Neighbourhood Disturbances
[20] The main issues that arise in this appeal relate to the legal nature of the regime of civil liability in respect of neighbourhood disturbances in Quebec law. In reviewing the disagreements among judges and commentators over the content of this regime, it becomes clear that the basic issue is whether the Court should recognize or reject a liability scheme based on the extent of the annoyances suffered by the victim rather than on the conduct of the person who allegedly caused them. A no‑fault liability regime would be in addition to the ordinary rules of civil liability. Before this form of liability is examined, it must be determined how civil liability based on fault can apply in the context of neighbourhood disturbances.
C. Fault‑Based Liability
[21] Article 1457 C.C.Q. sets out the general rules of fault‑based liability as follows:
1457. Every person has a duty to abide by the rules of conduct which lie upon him, according to the circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to another.
Where he is endowed with reason and fails in this duty, he is responsible for any injury he causes to another person by such fault and is liable to reparation for the injury, whether it be bodily, moral or material in nature.
He is also liable, in certain cases, to reparation for injury caused to another by the act or fault of another person or by the act of things in his custody.
The first rule imposes a general duty to abide by the rules of conduct that lie upon a person having regard to the law, usage or circumstances (Ministère de la Justice, Commentaires du ministre de la Justice: Le Code civil du Québec — Un mouvement de société (1993), vol. I, at p. 886). Civil fault [translation] “is the difference between the agent’s conduct and the abstract, objective conduct of a person who is reasonable, prudent and diligent” (J.‑L. Baudouin and P. Deslauriers, La responsabilité civile (7th ed. 2007), vol. I, at p. 171; see also J. Pineau and M. Ouellette, Théorie de la responsabilité civile (2nd ed. 1980), at p. 7). The standard of civil fault thus corresponds to an obligation to act reasonably, prudently and diligently and can be characterized as an obligation of means (J.‑L. Baudouin and P.‑G. Jobin, Les obligations (6th ed. 2005), by P.‑G. Jobin in collaboration with N. Vézina, at p. 38; P.‑A. Crépeau, L’intensité de l’obligation juridique ou Des obligations de diligence, de résultat et de garantie (1989), at p. 55). The basis for civil liability remains the same whether the impugned conduct is intentional or unintentional (Baudouin and Deslauriers, at p. 165). The purpose of civil liability is [translation] “not to blame or punish but only to compensate for loss” (Baudouin and Deslauriers, at p. 9; see also Pineau and Ouellette, at p. 60). Intent to injure is therefore not necessary to trigger liability (Baudouin and Deslauriers, at p. 9).
[22] In the context of neighbourhood disturbances, civil fault may relate either to the abusive exercise of a right of ownership or to a violation of standards of conduct that are often set out in statutory or regulatory provisions relating to the use of property. We will consider these two types of civil fault.
(1) Abuse of Rights and Fault
[23] Although the doctrine of abuse of rights has long been the subject of debate or dispute, there is no question that it has been accepted in Quebec civil law, in which it now has an important place, as this Court recognized in Houle v. Canadian National Bank, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 122. The doctrine has now been codified in art. 7 C.C.Q.:
7. No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and unreasonable manner which is contrary to the requirements of good faith.
(See Commentaires du ministre de la Justice, vol. I, at p. 8.)
[24] Article 7 C.C.Q. thus gives effect to the principle of the relativity of rights, which applies to rights as absolute in theory as the right of ownership. According to this principle, one person’s right necessarily limits that of another person, and to uphold all such rights concurrently will reduce the absoluteness of each (A. Nadeau and R. Nadeau, Traité pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle (1971), at pp. 227‑28). This is true of all rights that are protected in civil law. Such rights remain limited by their coexistence and by the fact that they conflict with one another. As Albert Mayrand writes, “[a]ll rights have limitations; when a person under the pretense of exercising an actual right goes beyond the sphere of that right, it is said that he has committed an abuse of right” (“Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec” (1974), 34 La. L. Rev. 993, at p. 993; see also J. Ghestin and G. Goubeaux, Traité de droit civil — Introduction générale (3rd ed. 1990), at p. 678).
[25] Article 7 C.C.Q. places two limits on rights: a right may be exercised neither with the intent of causing injury nor in an excessive and unreasonable manner. These limits constitute a codification of the prior case law and establish the point beyond which the exercise of a right becomes ab