R v Evans

Facts

Evans supplied heroin to her half-sister. The half-sister injected herself and became unconscious. Evans and her mother attempted to revive her but did not call emergency services for several hours. The half-sister died.

History

Evans was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter at the Crown Court. She appealed against conviction.

Issue

Whether a person who supplies a controlled drug to another who voluntarily self-administers it owes a duty of care to seek medical assistance when the recipient overdoses, and whether a grossly negligent failure to do so can constitute the actus reus of gross negligence manslaughter.

Held

Appeal dismissed; conviction for gross negligence manslaughter upheld.

Ratio

• A person who creates or contributes to the creation of a life-threatening situation owes a duty to take reasonable steps to preserve the victim's life, and a grossly negligent failure to discharge that duty can constitute the actus reus of gross negligence manslaughter.

The judgments

Key reasoning

• The court applied the principle from R v Miller that a person who creates a dangerous situation owes a duty to take reasonable steps to counteract it.
• The duty arose from the creation of the risk, not from any assumption of responsibility or special relationship.
• The victim's voluntary act of self-injection did not constitute a novus actus interveniens because the risk of overdose was the very danger created by the supply.
• The gross negligence test from R v Adomako was satisfied: the omission to call for help fell far below the standard of a reasonable person and involved a risk of death.

Obiter

• The court suggested that the duty to act may be limited to situations where the defendant is aware of the life-threatening situation and has the capacity to summon help.

Where it fits in the module

Evans sits alongside Miller and Stone and Dobinson in the module's exploration of omissions liability in homicide. It illustrates creation of danger as a basis for a duty of care, contrasting with assumption of responsibility in Stone and Dobinson. The case sharpens the debate about whether voluntary victim conduct (self-injection) should negate the defendant's duty, and how far the criminal law should penalise failures to rescue in drug-supply contexts. It also connects to the causation discussion in Kennedy (No 2) (2007) on the role of the victim's free will.

Criticisms

• The decision blurs the line between acts and omissions by treating the supply as a continuing act that generates a duty to act, potentially expanding liability indefinitely.
• It may create perverse incentives: a supplier who stays to help risks prosecution for gross negligence manslaughter if the help is inadequate, while one who flees avoids the duty altogether.
• Creation of danger as the rationale for a duty proves difficult to contain: many lawful activities create risks, yet do not generate criminal duties to rescue.
• The gross negligence standard provides insufficient guidance on what positive steps are required, leaving juries to impose retrospective moral judgments.