Lord Justice Stuart-Smith:
On Tuesday of this week (17 February 2026) the Court granted leave to this applicant to appeal his conviction for murder. The applicant had also made a renewed application for leave to appeal sentence, namely his imprisonment for life with a minimum term of 18 years, less time on remand imposed for the murder, with concurrent sentences for the offences of child cruelty of which he had been convicted. We will give judgment in respect of that renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence now.
On 31 October 2023, following a trial in the Crown Court at Carlisle before Dove J and a jury, the applicant was convicted of the murder of his son (count 1) and two counts of cruelty to a child (counts 4 and 5). He pleaded guilty on the day of the trial to manslaughter (count 2), which would have been an alternative to count 1 but his plea was not accepted and so the trial continued.
On count 1, he was sentenced to imprisonment for life with a minimum term of 18 years, with days on remand to count towards sentence.
On count 4, he was sentenced to 7 years concurrent.
On count 5, he was sentenced to 6 months consecutive to count 4. Ancillary orders were made, to which it is not necessary to refer further.
On 21 December 2023, the sentence on count 1 was amended under the slip rule to imprisonment for life with a minimum term of 17 years and 23 days pursuant to section 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020 .
The applicant and his co-accused had two young sons, the younger of whom was not quite 5 months old. On the morning of 15 October 2021 the applicant was left in sole charge of both children. At 12.22 pm the applicant made a 999 call, as a result of which paramedics and police officers attended the property. The younger child was taken to hospital and was pronounced dead at 20.40 pm on 19 October following the removal of life support. The cause of death was traumatic head injury. As we have said, at the date of trial the applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter, accepting that he had unlawfully assaulted his son by shaking him and that this unlawful assault had caused his son's death. Notwithstanding that plea the jury convicted him of the murder of his son.
This catastrophe happened against a disturbing background of neglect and drug-induced incompetence in the period before the child's death. Count 4 alleged that the younger child had had a fractured rib for some weeks and that he had been exposed to illicit drugs as detected in hair samples. Count 5 alleged cruelty and neglect in the parents' care for their older child.
When he came to sentence the applicant the trial judge set out the basis in his approach clearly. He was sure that when the child would not settle the applicant lost his temper, held him extremely hard around his chest and shook him very vigorously indeed. In doing so he did not intend to kill the child but did intend to cause him really serious harm. The gripping and shaking caused extensive injuries including swelling of the brain, subdural bleeding, subarachnoid bleeding and extensive damage to his retinas. In addition there were fractures to his ribs as a result of the force with which the applicant held and squeezed him.
The judge held that the applicant's addiction to opiate drugs had a significant impact on his ability to care for his children, and the two defendants had brought up the children in an environment polluted by drugs. The murder was aggravated by the finding of another rib that showed signs of an old fracture that could not realistically have been caused accidentally.
The judge correctly identified that the starting point for the minimum term under schedule 21 was 15 years. As aggravating features, he identified that the offence was committed while under the influence of drugs. Second, there were the earlier injuries for which he found the applicant responsible. Most significantly of all was the fact that the victim was his completely vulnerable little child and that the murder was the ultimate breach of trust by the child's father.
The judge accepted that there was significant personal mitigation including medical conditions that the applicant has to endure, and that his own childhood had been blighted by abuse which continued to cast a shadow over his life. In these circumstances the judge imposed a minimum term on count 1 of 18 years subsequently amended to be 17 years and 23 days under the slip rule. That took into account a sentence of 7 years on count 4 and 6 months on count 5 consecutive to count 4.
The applicant prepared the grounds himself. He said that the sentence of 7 years on count 4 was too long; he should have been sentenced only for exposing his child to drugs and not for causing them injury. He also repeated matters dealt with in his grounds of appeal against conviction and did not address the question of the sentence for murder.
I have considered the papers in your case and your grounds of appeal.
A number of your grounds of appeal against sentence in fact seek to challenge the fairness and safety of your convictions. I put these grounds to one side since you subsequently set out your grounds of appeal against conviction in a separate form NG. ...
Having heard the evidence at trial, it was open to the judge to make appropriate findings of fact that were not resolved by the jury’s verdicts. The judge was then required by law to pass a sentence of life imprisonment for the offence of murder. In setting the minimum term, the judge was right to consider the totality of your criminality on this indictment and then impose shorter concurrent terms of imprisonment for the offences of child cruelty.
The judge was right to find the following aggravating factors: (1) the particular vulnerability of your baby and dependence upon you as his parent and carer; (2) the previous assaults which the judge was sure you were responsible for; and (3) your commission of these offences after having consumed illegal drugs. The judge was right also to find the following mitigating factors: (1) the lack of an intent to kill; (2) the lack of premeditation; and (3) your belated admission that you had unlawfully killed [your son].
Considering this case in the round, it is not properly arguable that a minimum term of 18 years was excessive – let alone manifestly so - after trial for these offences.
While you focus on the sentence of 7 years on count 4, the appeal court will be concerned with the total sentence imposed. Nevertheless, 7 years was within the category range for a category B1 offence.
Accordingly, your appeal is not arguable.
Your appeal is also significantly out of time. While the court would consider granting an extension of time if satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to allow your case to be argued, such extension would serve no purpose in this case."
We have considered with care whether there are any arguable grounds upon which the sentence could be said to be manifestly excessive. We have concluded that there are not. We also have concluded that we agree with the Single Judge in the reasons that he gave which we have just recounted. If we had thought that there was a real merit in any part of the application for leave to appeal against sentence, we would have given earnest consideration to extending time as necessary. However, as there is no merit in the renewed application, which itself was brought out of time, we refuse the necessary extension of time. This renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence is dismissed.