R v Tammy Richards

On 7 February 2007, having pleaded guilty in the Magistrates' Court, the applicant (then aged 24) was committed for sentence to the Crown Court.

On 7 March 2007, in the Crown Court at Leicester, she was sentenced as follows: for making threats to kill, imprisonment for public protection, pursuant to section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 , with a minimum term of 16 months (less 28 days spent on remand); and for possessing an offensive weapon, a concurrent term of 16 months' imprisonment.

The applicant now renews her application for an extension of time (6239 days) in which to apply for leave to appeal against sentence.

The facts of the case are as follows. The applicant and Christine Buckley lived in the same building. In July 2006, the applicant was convicted and imprisoned for offences of making threats towards Ms Buckley. She was released from custody on 18 October 2006. She was, however, arrested at the prison gates for similar threat-based offences committed whilst in custody. She remained in custody until February 2007, when she was returned to approved premises.

She bought a kitchen knife from a shop and travelled to Ms Buckley's home address. Ms Buckley was not there. The applicant went to a police station holding the knife.

Shortly before leaving custody, she had made threats to kill in correspondence. She admitted what she had done when interviewed and pleaded guilty in the Magistrates' Court.

The applicant had a number of previous convictions, going back to 2002. The convictions were for offences including common assault, using disorderly or threatening behaviour, assaulting a constable and breach of an antisocial behaviour order. In June 2006, she was convicted of using threatening behaviour and having a bladed article. In July 2006, she was convicted of harassment.

The author of a pre-sentence report explained that the applicant and the victims had been friends but then fell out. The applicant had had a difficult upbringing. She had been expelled from school and she had been diagnosed with a personality disorder. She had used alcohol on occasions when unable to cope emotionally. The author concluded that the risk to Ms Buckley, to police officers and, to a lesser extent, the general public was high and said: "It is suggested that the test for dangerousness, as set out in the case of Lang , may be passed."

The judge had a psychiatric report prepared by Dr di Lustro. The applicant told the doctor that she heard voices in her head telling her to harm herself or other people. She said that she was much more likely to be aggressive after drinking alcohol. She said that she had reached the point of wanting to hurt Ms Buckley badly. She said, "I don't know if I would kill her until it happens, but I wish I could at this precise minute". She said that she had made physical threats towards Ms Buckley since April 2006 and said: "I said I was going to kill her – kick her head in – and I meant it". She said that she had had difficulty managing her feelings of anger, and that violence was the only way of sorting Ms Buckley out. She said that she had carried weapons in the past and would use a knife on her if she had the opportunity to do so. It was the doctor's view that the applicant had an emotionally unstable personality disorder and that the risk of her committing further similar offences (as it was put) was high, because she had a previous history of committing similar offences against the same victim. She remained angry with the victim. She had said that she intended to confront and harm the victim if the opportunity arose. She expressed little victim empathy and appeared to have little concern about the consequences of her behaviour.

"And I would add that it is not just Christine Buckley, although she has been the focus of your hostility in recent times, but, bearing in mind your behaviour towards her, it is plainly a risk that this sort of hostility will be directed at someone else if similar circumstances were to arise, and there is a real risk that threats will turn into the actual application and use of a weapon such as a knife, and so cause serious harm."

It is now argued on the applicant's behalf that the imposition of imprisonment for public protection was wrong in principle because full reasons were not given for the judge's conclusions, the psychiatrist had spoken of the commission of further similar offences, rather than further specified offences, and most of the previous convictions were for low level antisocial behaviour. It is said that the judge was in error in relying on the pre-sentence report which had spoken of a great deal of violent or disorderly offending, when what was required was a future risk arising from the commission of further specified offences. It is also explained that it is only with the passage of time that it has become apparent to the applicant that there might be grounds to appeal against her sentence.

We are grateful to Mr Duggan for the excellent submissions he has made, for all the assistance he has given to us, and for the work that he has evidently put into the case. He told us that since 2013 the applicant has been in different hospitals. Her conditional release has been recommended recently by a Mental Health Tribunal, but Mr Duggan has explained that there are difficulties, not of the applicant's own making, in finding accommodation and resources to support her in the community, and so at this time she remains in hospital.

Having reflected upon the matter, we are satisfied that the judge gave careful consideration to the contents of the reports, as he was obliged to do. Each report contained a large amount of information about the applicant, her background and the offences which she had committed. This was all relevant to the assessment the judge had to make – and it was of course the judge who had to make the assessment of whether the test in section 225 for imprisonment for public protection was made out. The judge said explicitly that "the criteria for such a sentence set out in that section are satisfied, in my judgment".

"I am satisfied that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by you of further specified offences."

In our judgment, it is clear from all of this that the judge applied the right test. We are also satisfied that he set out the basis for his conclusions and that there was a sufficient basis for the conclusions to which he came, and that they were properly justified. The material included the offences which the applicant had committed; what she had said about her future intentions and about how she felt towards Ms Buckley; what she had actually done, in for example arming herself, having purchased a knife, and going to Ms Buckley's address; and indeed by reference to the diagnosis of an emotionally unstable personality disorder. The doctor had said in the psychiatric report that with this disorder "there is a marked tendency to act impulsively, without consideration of the consequences, and outbursts of intense anger may often lead to violent or behavioural explosions. These are easily precipitated when impulsive acts are criticised or thwarted by others".

For these reasons, after careful consideration, we have concluded that it is not arguable that the sentence passed was wrong in principle. It was passed in accordance with the terms of the legislation then in force.

In these circumstances, no purpose would be served by granting the long extension of time which would be needed. These applications must be refused.