R v Tahir Yasin & Ors

The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to these offences. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of the offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the Act . We shall refer to the victims in this case as "C1" and "C2".

On 5 June 2024, following a trial in the Crown Court at Sheffield before His Honour Judge Slater and a jury, eight defendants, including the present applicants and appellants, were convicted of a number of historical sexual offences against two young girls in Rotheram. Tahir Yasin was convicted unanimously of eight counts of rape against C2 (counts 18 to 25). Mohammed Amar was convicted unanimously of two counts of indecent assault against C1 (counts 1 and 2). Yaser Ajaib was convicted unanimously of one count of indecent assault against C1 (count 4). Abid Saddiq was convicted unanimously of one count of sexual assault against C1 and three counts of rape against C1 and C2 respectively (counts 13, 15, 16 and 17). Without intending any disrespect, we shall refer to each of these men by their surnames in this judgment.

On 13 September 2024 they were sentenced by the trial judge as follows: Yasin to a total of 13 years' imprisonment; Amar to a special custodial sentence of 16 years, comprising a custodial term of 14 years and an extension period of two years; Ajaib to a special custodial sentence of seven years, comprising a custodial term of six years with an extension period of one year; and Saddiq (after a slip rule hearing on 1 November 2024) to a total sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, with a consecutive special custodial sentence of nine years, comprising a custodial term of eight years and an extension period of one year. Restraining orders were made preventing contact with C1 or C2, as appropriate. The usual notification and barring provisions applied consequent upon the convictions.

We turn to the current applications and appeals. Yasin renews his application for leave to appeal against conviction following refusal by the single judge. Amar appeals against his sentence and the restraining order with leave of the single judge. Ajaib appeals against the restraining order, having withdrawn his appeal against sentence. Saddiq renews his application for leave to appeal against sentence following refusal by the single judge.

Other defendants were convicted of, and sentenced for, various sexual offences against C1 and C2 but have not sought to appeal. It is relevant to mention that one of these, Ramin Bari, was convicted together with Yasin of rape on count 25; he was refused leave to appeal against his conviction by the single judge and has not applied to renew.

The case, as we have said, concerned the alleged sexual abuse of two girls, C1 and C2, who were aged 11 and 15 years at the time, in Rotherham.

C1 and C2 were vulnerable, the product of fractured or failing families. At times they were being looked after in the care system, without the immediate protection of parents. There were agreed facts at trial giving a chronology of Social Services' involvement with each of C1 and C2. They were, said the prosecution, identified as suitable for exploitation by the defendants. They were picked up by adult men; spent time in their company, often in cars and occasionally in cheap hotels; they were given cigarettes, cannabis, alcohol and sometimes money. In return, they were required to perform sexual acts. These were not, said the prosecution, normal, sexual relationships where consent was clear and obvious; where the parties were on equal terms; and where consent was freely given without inducement, pressure or fear.

In what follows we set out briefly the facts of the particular offences which are the subject of the present appeals and applications.

Over the course of many ABE (“Achieving Best Evidence”) interviews, C1 gave an account of having been introduced to Amar (known to her as "Rudy") by a friend of hers. She said that when she was aged 11 years he forced her to perform oral sex on him whilst in the grounds of Ferham Primary School (count 1) and at a house on James Street, Rotherham (count 2).

"'One day after school, I met up with this friend of mine and there was two or three Asian men outside Ferham Primary School waiting for us. We got into the Primary School and they had, like, flowerbeds, like oval-shaped flowerbed with some trees. They had, like, two or three going down the walls off the back of the playground. This man called Rudy, and I cannot recall the other guy’s name at all – I was forced into giving oral sex in the bush in Ferham Primary School, which that took about ten minutes because obviously I were nervous and I didn't know what to do and so it happened. I had to go down and he forced his thingy into my mouth. There's so much and that's basically where it all started from that day, when I were younger. I used to get bullied by a lot of white people and I've always – from the end, that's when I started hanging around with the older people; the girl of a friend of mine, she was older than I were.

In relation to the second assault the judge summarised the evidence thus:

"The second occasion (oral sex) happened at a house in Masbrough (James Street) … she was in drink."

Ajaib, who was known as "Des", was introduced to C1 by Abid Saddiq.

"'So I was really young. It were either behind a church or behind Happidayz Nursery. Happidayz Nursery has got like an extended little bit on there. And he were like "You're sucking my dick". I went, "No, I'm not there". And he were … He went, "Yes, you fucking are. You're sucking my dick". I were like "Okay then", and I got down there. I'd shut my eyes and I started. When I opened my eyes, he just had like scabs. And I had to stop. I had to stop. I couldn't do it. And he were like "Don't tell no one. Don't tell no one". I were like "I won't if you don't". Do you know what I mean? And yeah, gruesome'."

C1 said that when she was aged 11 years, in 2002, Saddiq made her have oral sex with him in a house in James Street, Rotherham (count 13). On the second occasion, when she was aged 15 years, he took her back to his house in Walter Street, where he engaged in vaginal sexual intercourse with her whilst his wife was in the house (count 15).

C2 said that she was invited by Saddiq to go to his house, having met in Rotherham Town Centre. She was kept in his attic bedroom for two to three days. Whilst there Saddiq engaged in vaginal sexual intercourse with her on three occasions (count 16 represented the first occasion; and count 17 was a specimen count which covered the two further occasions).

C2 knew Yasin as "Tipper", although she also knew his real name. They met in the summer of 2007 when C2 was aged 14 or 15. C2 described being introduced to him via a friend of hers, an older girl aged 17 years, who was living with her baby in one of the children's homes at which C2 was then living. C2 said that Yasin asked the older girl for her (C2's) number and they met up a few days later in his car. They engaged in vaginal sexual intercourse (count 18).

Thereafter, over the course of a few months, C2 met Yasin regularly and they had sex a number of times. She was unable to say how often; she put the number as high as 50 at one point but said that she did not know and that it could have been more or less. They engaged in vaginal and oral sexual intercourse, and on several occasions anal intercourse: specimen count 19 (vaginal); specific count 20 (first incident of oral sex); count 21 (specimen count (oral); specific count 22 (first incident of anal sex); and count 23 (further incident of anal sex)].

There were also two specific incidents alleging sexual activity in an Etap (later Ibis) Hotel in Sheffield. Those incidents related to alleged occasions when Yasin had had sex with C2 in a hotel room in the presence of another defendant, Bari, and another girl from the children's home: count 24 (first incident at the Etap Hotel on a day between 27 and 30 October 2007); and count 25 (second incident at the Etap Hotel on a day between 1 and 5 January 2008).

When interviewed Yasin answered "No comment" to all questions, on legal advice.

"The [applicant] accepts that at the material time, he was known as 'Tipper'.

Essentially the issue for the jury was one of consent on counts 18 to 24; additionally on count 25, whether Yasin was present at the Etap Hotel on the second occasion.

At the end of the prosecution case, Yasin made a submission of no case to answer in respect of counts 18 to 25. We have seen and considered the submission and the prosecution response to it, along with the judge's ruling that the case should proceed.

It was argued on behalf of Yasin that the prosecution could not show that any of the alleged sexual activity with Yasin was non-consensual. The defence stressed that in her evidence C2 had accepted in terms that she had consented to sex on every occasion. It was acknowledged that where there was evidence of grooming of a vulnerable individual, the authorities indicated that "ordinarily" the question of whether any ostensible consent was genuine consent was a matter for the jury. However, there was a category of case where the evidence that consent was genuine was sufficiently unequivocal that the case should properly be withdrawn from the jury. It was submitted on behalf of Yasin that this was such a case.

On count 25, it was argued that there was no reliable evidence that Yasin was the person with whom C2 had sex at the Etap Hotel between 1 and 5 January 2008. Indeed, the evidence suggested instead that it had been an individual named Imran.

In response to the submission the prosecution contended that there was sufficient evidence for the case to proceed in respect of all counts. C2 said that she had consented, and this was evidence which the jury would no doubt consider. But there were other matters which the jury would need to take into account including the circumstances of the sexual activity, C2's age and what was happening to her at the time, all of her vulnerabilities including the fact that she was in the care system and was regularly self-harming, along with the fact that she had experienced behaviour which the jury could conclude amounted to sexual grooming including buying of gifts and giving both alcohol and drugs.

As to count 25, the prosecution case was that there was evidence upon which a jury properly directed could conclude that it was Yasin who had had sex with C2 in the Etap Hotel in early January 2008.

In refusing the application, the judge concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could be sure that Yasin was the person with whom C2 had sex at the Etap Hotel between 1 and 5 January 2008.

"Mr Wood's application provides, if I may say so, a very helpful and accurate exposition of both the law and the evidence relevant to the application and there is an equally valuable response on both topics from the prosecution as well. Having carefully considered both in conjunction with my own reading of the case, I take the view that, notwithstanding her age, intelligence and seemingly robust character, this was in fact a vulnerable, isolated young teenager who craved attention and friendship. She was without a settled home, spending most of her time in local authority residences, and absent of any family support. Such were the concerns of the authorities about her and her behaviour that in August of 2007 she was referred to [a special organisation] over concerns of sexual exploitation. On the authorities to which I have been helpfully referred, it seems to me that by the time of the alleged offences in counts 18 to 25 she had been groomed to facilitate sexual exploitation, whether by these defendants or whether by others is something I need not explore at this stage. In such circumstances I do not regard her assertions of any sexual activity being consensual with any one of these defendants as being determinative in the case. I do not find therefore that this is one of those rare cases mentioned in Usman [2021] EWCA Crim 502 where it is said a jury could not properly conclude that she did not truly consent. I am therefore in agreement with the response of the prosecution in relation to this part of the application."

In sentencing the judge had the benefit of sentencing notes from the prosecution and from the defendants. He also had Victim Personal statements from C1 and C2, all of which we have read. We summarise below the judge's reasoning regarding each of the defendants whose appeals against sentence we have considered at this hearing.

"It seems to me that in all the circumstances a consecutive sentence is justified, you having first of all been introduced to the hapless complainant and then going back for more, when she was aged 11."

Ajaib was aged 18 at the time of the offending. The judge held that the single offence of indecent assault fell between categories 2A and 2B, as for Amar. The nature of the offending required him to treat Ajaib as an offender of particular concern. Taking into account Ajaib's youth at the time and his mitigation, the judge reduced the sentence by a further year to arrive at a sentence of six years' imprisonment, with a one year extended licence.

In the cases of both Amar and Ajaib the judge made an indefinite restraining order preventing any contact with C1.

The judge noted that Saddiq was to be sentenced for one count of indecent assault against C1 when she was aged 12, a rape of C1 when she was aged between 14 and 15, and two offences of rape against C2 when she was aged 15 to 16. He recorded that he, the same judge, had sentenced Saddiq in August 2019 to 20 years' imprisonment for offences of a similar nature committed against different complainants between July 1998 and December 2002. The judge said that he had described him then as a "cunning and determined sexual predator". The sentence which he passed on Saddiq in September 2024 was amended at a slip rule hearing on 1 November 2024. For the rapes against C1 and C2 he passed concurrent sentences totalling 12 years' imprisonment. The indecent assault against C1 when she was aged 12 required him to pass a sentence for an offender of particular concern; for this offence he passed a consecutive sentence of nine years, comprising a custodial element of eight years and an extended one year licence. The judge said that he had carefully considered whether to order the sentence for these offences to run consecutively to the sentence which he had passed in 2019 but had decided "having regard principally to totality" that the sentence would run from the date on which he passed it.

Mr Wood, who appears for Yasin on this renewed application for leave, as he did at trial, advances two grounds of appeal: first, that no properly directed jury could have been satisfied to the criminal standard that Yasin had sex with C2 in the Etap (later Ibis) Hotel between 1 and 5 January 2008; and second, that no properly directed jury could have been satisfied to the criminal standard that C2 had not consented to the sexual activity which took place with Yasin. He submits that a reasonable jury could not have dismissed the possibility on the evidence that C2 had consented.

Mr Wood draws attention to the vague and equivocal nature of the evidence regarding sex in the hotel between 1 and 5 January 2008. C2 gave evidence that she would have sex with Yasin in hotels and she said that he had booked the Ibis on a couple of occasions, possibly three. She said that Bari was present on these occasions. But she could put no particular date on any incident of sexual activity (including in hotels). Other evidence tended to lead away from C2 having had sex with Yasin in the time period alleged. Importantly, there was evidence that a person called Imran was a new boyfriend whom C2 had been seeing regularly in the week preceding 5 Jan 2008.

Regarding consent, Mr Wood emphasised the evidence that C2 had consented to sexual activity with Yasin, over and above her description of her relationship with Yasin as "boyfriend and girlfriend" and her frank acceptance in her evidence that she had consented on every occasion. Mr Wood submits that the judge did not properly engage with the details of the evidence, and that had he done so he must have concluded that this was one of the exceptional cases referred to in R v Usman [2021] EWCA Crim 502 . He says that the evidence did not show grooming by Yasin; nor did it show a lack of capacity by reason of alcohol on any of the occasions when sexual intercourse took place. He says, moreover, that there was direct evidence of C2's capacity to choose: there was evidence of her intelligence; there was evidence of a real-time exercise of choice at the first encounter with Yasin when she said "No" to a "blow job", but "Yes" to vaginal sexual intercourse.

In response, Mr Bean (junior counsel who, together with Nicholas Lumley KC, prosecuted the case at trial) emphasised that, as the cases to which counsel have referred us make clear, determining consent or non-consent to sex under particular circumstances can be complex and difficult. Cases where highly vulnerable, often prematurely sexualised young girls are groomed by older men are an example of cases where determining whether there has been proper or real consent is not straightforward. Such girls may, as C2 did here, say that they consented; but a closer examination of all the circumstances, including any factors which may have limited or distorted their appreciation of what was happening, may instead lead to a conclusion that this was not free and informed consent. The judge had all the authorities on "groomed consent" well in mind, he had heard all the evidence, and his decision not to stop the trial vis-à-vis Yasin was correct.

As to the allegation of rape at the Etap/Ibis Hotel between 1 and 5 January 2005, Mr Bean says that there was evidence from which the jury could have been sure that C2 had sex with Yasin on this occasion. In her evidence C2 said that she had had sex with Yasin at that hotel on a couple of occasions and that Bari was present on both occasions. Records from the children's home show that she was reported missing on the night of 4 to 5 January. In her evidence she said that she had no recollection of being in a relationship with a man called Immy, nor was she asked in cross-examination about going to any hotel with a man by that name. A handwritten report dated 5 January 2008 from the children's home records reported that C2 had stayed together with another girl in the Etap Hotel and that two men were there with whom they had engaged in sexual activity. C2 had not named a male but the girl she was with had named Bari.

Questions of capacity and consent should normally be left to the jury. It is only in clear cases that a judge should conclude that there is no evidence on which the jury could properly convict in a case of this kind and accede to a submission of no case. [60]

Where a vulnerable or immature individual has allegedly been groomed by the defendant, the question of whether real or proper consent was given will usually be for the jury unless the evidence clearly indicates that proper consent was given. [61]

Where there has been grooming the prosecution is not obliged to call overt evidence from the alleged victim to the effect that he or she did not consent, given it is possible that the circumstances may have limited or distorted the individual's appreciation or understanding of his or her role in the sexual relations and the true nature of what occurred. [56]

Grooming does not necessarily vitiate consent; it starkly raises the possibility that a vulnerable or immature individual may have been placed in a position in which he or she is led merely to acquiesce rather than to give proper or real consent. One of the consequences of grooming is that it has a tendency to limit or subvert the alleged victim's capacity to make free decisions, and it creates the risk that he or she simply submitted because of the environment of dependency created by those responsible for treating the alleged victim in this way. Indeed, the individual may have been manipulated to the extent that he or she is unaware of, or confused about, the distinction between acquiescence and genuine agreement at the time the incident occurred. [58]

The cases of Usman and R v Adalat [2022] EWCA Crim 1538 are also instructive. Both emphasise the importance of considering the wider context and stress that a complainant's own assessment cannot be taken in isolation from that context: see, for example, Usman at [55] and Adalat at [22] and [24].

As Edis LJ pointed out in Usman , cases involving sexual activity of vulnerable young teenage girls following grooming require careful direction to juries of what the issue of consent or lack of consent requires them to consider and of the evidence that is relevant to that task. In this case everyone agrees that the judge’s directions were clear and full. This was not all an easy case to sum up. The judge is to be commended for the full and clear directions which he gave.

One has only to look at that part of his summing up in which the judge summarised evidence from C2's ABE interviews regarding the sexual activity with Yasin to see that the picture as regards her consent to sex was far more complex and nuanced than the straightforward consent to sex which Mr Wood submitted the detailed evidence demonstrates. The judge's summary of what C2 told police about Yasin starts at Y187 and goes through to Y222 on the Digital Case System. She was introduced to Yasin (whom she called "Tipper") by an older girl when she was aged 14 or 15. He told her that he was just out of prison. He introduced penetrative sex very soon after having met her. She described being given drink and drugs and of his driving high-end cars, BMWs or Audis, which he changed often. She and another girl would be taken to a hotel where they would be given cocaine and there would be "swap and change" sex with different men. She said that "nowt ever happened when we were sober; it were always either drink and drug influence". In reflecting on her experience when older, she said this: "As I got older and had my own family, I thought what Tipper did was wrong. These people were not normal in giving us alcohol and drugs. I felt pressure to have sex with Tipper. I didn't mean pressure literally. It was easier to do it if you had alcohol".

These extracts from the far greater body of evidence serve to demonstrate that there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that C2, despite what she said in cross-examination, had not in fact given proper consent to sexual activity with Yasin. This was just the kind of case which demanded careful attention by the jury to the full circumstances of the sexual activity in question. To borrow and adapt something that Baroness Hale once memorably said, consent requires a full understanding of this person, at this time, in this place. Cases like the present, where there are apparently contradictory strands of evidence, are precisely the sorts of cases where those strands need to be placed before a jury who, properly directed, can then sift through and determine whether this complainant, in those circumstances, with that person, has in fact given free and informed consent to the sexual activity in question. The judge was in our view entirely right to leave the case to the jury.

We can deal shortly with the ground which seeks to challenge the conviction on count 25. We are satisfied that the evidence to which the prosecution referred us was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Yasin was the person with whom C2 had sexual intercourse at the Ibis/Etap hotel in early January 2008.

For these reasons, grateful though we are to Mr Wood for his very full written submissions expertly developed orally today, we refuse the application for leave on both grounds.

Amar has been given leave to appeal against his sentence. Mr McGonigal, who appeared for Amar at trial and sentence, submits that the total sentence of 16 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive. He says that the sentences ought to have been ordered to run concurrently with each other, as each was of the same nature (oral sex) committed against the same victim (C1) and taking place within what C1 said was "a couple of weeks" of each other. Moreover, he had understood from the judge's intervention during mitigation that he proposed to order that the sentences should run concurrently. Alternatively, Mr McGonigal says that there was insufficient regard given to totality and further that the sentence was disproportionately long when compared with the sentences imposed on co-defendants. He emphasises the maximum of ten years' imprisonment for the offence of indecent assault, as compared to a life sentence for rape of a child under the age of 13.

The prosecution, in response, contended that as there were two offences then the sentence for the lead offence, even if the judge had structed his sentence in that way, would have had to have been well above the starting point in the guideline. A custodial element of 14 years for two offences was well within the guideline range for a single 2A or 2B offence.

Mr McGonigal also challenges the imposition of a restraining order. He says that no notice was given before he addressed the judge in mitigation and that no reasons were given by the judge for making the order. Had he made submissions, he would, as he did in relation to the Sexual Harm Prevention Order, have submitted that the age of the offending and the time which had now elapsed made such an order unnecessary. We note that the judge did not impose the sexual harm prevention order which the prosecution had proposed.

It is right that the judge, in the course of Mr McGonigal's mitigation (at Y354 of the DCS), affirmed his intention to treat count 2 as the lead offence and to pass a concurrent sentence on count 1. But as this court has said on many occasions, in determining whether a sentence is manifestly excessive, it is concerned with the overall total, and not so much with the route by which that total has been arrived at, save in so far as the route may reveal a misstep which has resulted in an excessive total.

Amar was convicted of two offences of indecent assault under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 , which carries a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment at that time. The assaults consisted in both cases of obliging C1 (then an 11 year old girl) to give him oral sex. He was aged between 21 and 22 at the time. He was not of good character by the time of sentence, having subsequent convictions, albeit for unrelated offences. The comparable offence at the time of sentence was that of rape of a child under 13. There is no complaint about the judge's categorisation of the offences as falling between category A2 and B2 in the relevant guideline, where category A2 has a starting point of 13 years' custody and a range of 11 to 17 years. Category B2 has a starting point of ten years' custody, with a range of eight to 13 years. Mr McGonigal argued, by reference to the sentence of seven years' custody for a single offence of indecent assault against C1 passed on Ajaib, that the judge must have failed to give due regard to totality, by effectively doubling the sentence for the two offences committed by Amar.

The single issue for us on this appeal is whether the custodial element of 14 years was excessive for the two offences against C2. We do not believe that it was, where the guideline provides for a starting point of ten (category B2) or 13 (category A2) years' custody for a single offence. The sentence of 14 years' custody lies well within the range for a category A2 single offence (11 to 17 years) and is only just above the top of the range for a single offence falling within category B2 (eight to 13 years).

As to the restraining order, we acknowledge the complaint that the judge did not give reasons for the order that he made. We note that draft restraining orders were uploaded to the DCS on 13 September 2024, the day after the sentencing hearing had begun. Restraining orders, like other protective orders, can only be made where necessary to protect the victim against future harm, and where the terms are proportionate to that risk.

There is no mention of a restraining order appearing in the prosecution sentencing note and we are told that mention of such an order was only made to the judge on the second day of the hearing. The judge did not in his sentencing remarks explain why he was making the order. Mr McGonigal for Amar, supported by Mr Sandhu for Ajaib, both say that, given the historic nature of the offences committed in 2003, a restraining order was not necessary. We see some force in that. On the material before us, we are not persuaded that it was necessary to make such an order. Moreover, in the absence of any notice of a restraining order being given in advance of the sentencing hearing, counsel were prevented from a consideration of any defence response to those applications at the time.

According, the restraining orders made in the cases of Amar and Ajaib will be quashed

Mr Sandhu today notified us that Ajaib has withdrawn his appeal against the length of sentence. We say nothing further about it, but we dismiss his appeal against sentence.

Saddiq renews his application for leave to appeal against his sentence following refusal by the single judge. He renews the application on one ground; he says that the judge should have ordered the sentence to run consecutively to the sentence that he was already serving and to have reduced it for totality.

"Your only surviving ground is based on a submission that your 21 year sentence for these offences should have been (1) consecutive to a 20 year sentence imposed on you in 2019 and (2) then reduced for totality.

We have seen this morning a handwritten letter sent by Saddiq to the Criminal Appeal Office in which he makes various points, including about his immaturity at the time, the length of his sentence, and the impact of it on his family, his wife and young children, together with the fact that, as he was already serving a sentence of imprisonment, there was no adjustment for time spent on remand.

These are all matters that the judge took into account, both as to the overall length of sentence and in deciding whether or not to order the sentence to start immediately, that is, overlapping with the remainder of the sentence which Saddiq was already serving.

None of the matters which Sadiq has raised in his recent letter affects our conclusion that the final sentence was not arguably manifestly excessive. The renewed application for leave to appeal is refused.