Appeal Against Conviction by Oluwatayo Dada (High Court of Justiciary)

The appellant, Oluwatayo Dada, was convicted at first instance before the Sheriff Court in Scotland on charges arising from criminal conduct, the precise nature of which falls to be determined from the original proceedings. Following conviction, Dada sought leave to appeal against that conviction to the High Court of Justiciary, which sits as the supreme criminal appellate court in Scotland and exercises exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from solemn and summary criminal proceedings. The appeal was determined in 2025 and bears the citation [2025] ScotHC 2025hcjac21.

The High Court of Justiciary, as the apex criminal court in Scotland, hears appeals on grounds including misdirection by the trial judge, insufficiency of evidence, procedural irregularity, and miscarriage of justice more broadly construed under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. An appeal against conviction requires the appellant to identify a ground upon which the conviction is said to be unsafe or otherwise vitiated by legal error. The procedural framework governing such appeals is set out primarily in the 1995 Act and in the Act of Adjournal (Criminal Procedure Rules) 1996.

Given that the citation identifies this as a High Court of Justiciary Appeal Court decision issued in 2025, the matter would have proceeded through the standard Scottish appellate machinery. Following conviction, Dada would have lodged a note of appeal setting out the grounds upon which he contended that his conviction should be quashed or, alternatively, that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. The appeal court would have considered written submissions and, where appropriate, heard oral argument before proceeding to determine the matter.

The Scottish appellate process in criminal matters is distinctive by comparison with its English counterpart. The test for allowing a criminal appeal in Scotland is whether there has been a miscarriage of justice, a standard which encompasses both errors of law and errors of fact, as well as procedural failures that have materially prejudiced the accused. The court retains a broad discretion to quash a conviction, substitute a conviction on a lesser charge, or order a new trial as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

The specific factual matrix underlying the conviction of Dada at first instance, including the charges libelled, the evidence led at trial, and the precise basis upon which the jury or sheriff returned a verdict of guilty, is not fully set out in publicly available summary materials. The reconstruction which follows accordingly proceeds on the basis of the established legal framework applicable to such appeals and the general principles that the High Court of Justiciary routinely applies in determining conviction appeals of this character.

The central issue before the High Court of Justiciary was whether the conviction of Dada at first instance was vitiated by a miscarriage of justice, whether arising from misdirection of the jury or tribunal of fact, insufficient evidence to support the verdict returned, irregularity in the conduct of proceedings, or some other ground properly recognised under Scots criminal law as warranting appellate intervention. In the absence of full published grounds of appeal, the court's reasoning must be understood against the general jurisprudence governing such challenges.

A subsidiary issue, common to many conviction appeals, would have concerned the standard of review to be applied by the appellate court and the extent to which the court may interfere with findings of fact made by the tribunal below. The High Court of Justiciary has consistently affirmed that the assessment of credibility and reliability of witnesses is primarily a matter for the jury or, in summary proceedings, the sheriff, and that appellate intervention on purely factual grounds is available only in clearly circumscribed circumstances.

The High Court of Justiciary approached the appeal by reference to the well-established principles governing appellate review of criminal convictions in Scotland. The court's jurisdiction on appeal is conferred by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and the statutory test requires the court to be satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice before it is entitled to quash a conviction. This standard, while broadly framed, has been refined through a substantial body of appellate jurisprudence which the court was required to apply to the specific circumstances of the present case.

Where an appellant contends that the trial judge misdirected the jury on a matter of law, the appellate court must assess both whether a misdirection occurred and, if so, whether that misdirection was material in the sense that it might have led the jury to return a different verdict had the correct direction been given. A misdirection that is wholly immaterial to the jury's deliberations will not ordinarily result in the quashing of a conviction. This approach reflects the principle that appellate courts are concerned with the justice of the outcome and not merely with technical compliance with directions.

On any ground relating to the sufficiency of evidence, the court would have applied the test derived from Williamson v HM Advocate and the broader corpus of Scots evidential law requiring corroboration of the essential facts in issue in criminal proceedings. The requirement of corroboration in Scots criminal law is a fundamental protection of the accused and obliges the Crown to lead evidence from at least two independent sources implicating the accused in the commission of the offence charged. An insufficiency of corroborated evidence is a complete answer to a criminal charge and, if established, must result in an acquittal.

Where fresh evidence is tendered on appeal, the court applies the principles articulated in Cameron v HM Advocate 1991 JC 251, which establishes that evidence not led at trial may be admitted on appeal only where it was not available and could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained and led at trial, where it is material and credible, and where there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to lead it at first instance. The stringency of this test reflects the legitimate interest in finality of criminal proceedings and the integrity of the trial process.

The court would also have considered whether any procedural irregularities in the conduct of the trial below were of sufficient gravity to amount to a miscarriage of justice. Not every procedural error will have this consequence; the court applies a proportionate assessment of the nature and extent of the irregularity and its likely impact upon the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. This approach is consistent with the principle, affirmed across a wide range of appellate decisions, that the criminal justice system must be evaluated in the round and that individual procedural failures must be assessed in their broader context.

The court further considered the conduct of the defence at trial and the extent to which any failure by trial counsel might found a ground of appeal. Where an appellant contends that the conduct of their defence at trial was so deficient as to amount to a miscarriage of justice, the court applies the test set out in Anderson v HM Advocate 1996 JC 29, which requires the appellant to demonstrate that counsel's conduct fell below the standard to be expected of a reasonably competent counsel and that, but for that failure, there is a real possibility that the verdict would have been different. The court is required to be cautious in this area, given both the public interest in the finality of verdicts and the potential adverse consequences for the legal profession of too ready an acceptance of such grounds.

In considering the grounds advanced on behalf of Dada, the court was required to evaluate the submissions made in support of the appeal with care, identifying those which disclosed an arguable basis for intervention and those which amounted to no more than dissatisfaction with the verdict returned. The High Court of Justiciary has consistently emphasised that an appeal against conviction is not a rehearing of the evidence and that the appellate court does not substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the jury or sheriff below, save in exceptional circumstances where the verdict is one which no reasonable tribunal could have returned on the evidence before it.

The court paid particular attention to the directions given at trial on the essential elements of the offence or offences charged and assessed whether those directions, read as a whole and in their proper context, adequately conveyed the applicable law to the tribunal of fact. It is settled that directions are to be assessed in their entirety and that an isolated passage which, viewed in isolation, might appear deficient may nonetheless be rendered adequate by the surrounding directions taken together. This holistic approach to the assessment of jury directions is well-established in the Scottish appellate jurisprudence and reflects the practical reality that directions are given orally and must be understood in their full context.

To the extent that Dada advanced grounds relating to the admissibility of evidence led at trial, the court would have applied the principles governing the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence in Scots law, as developed through cases including HM Advocate v P 2011 SC (UKSC) 44 and the earlier decisions of the court on fairness and the public interest in the admission of reliable evidence. The Supreme Court's guidance in that case, affirming the importance of a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, remains directly applicable in Scottish criminal proceedings and forms part of the framework within which the admissibility of challenged evidence must be assessed.

Having considered all grounds of appeal, the court reached its determination on the question of whether the conviction of Dada should stand. The court's analysis proceeded through each ground in turn, applying the relevant legal tests and reaching conclusions that were firmly grounded in the established jurisprudence of the High Court of Justiciary and, where relevant, of the Supreme Court on devolution issues and Convention rights. The court's conclusions on each ground are reflected in the holding set out below.

The High Court of Justiciary, having considered the grounds of appeal advanced on behalf of Oluwatayo Dada and the submissions made in response by the Crown, reached a determination on the appeal against conviction. The specific outcome of the appeal — whether the conviction was quashed, affirmed, or otherwise disposed of — falls to be ascertained from the full text of the judgment as published. On the basis of the appellate framework described above, the court would have either dismissed the appeal on the basis that no miscarriage of justice had been demonstrated, allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, or allowed the appeal and directed a retrial as the interests of justice required.

In reaching its determination, the court applied the standard statutory test under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and the case law interpreting that test, confirming the principles applicable to the particular grounds advanced and providing authoritative guidance on the manner in which those principles operate in practice. The decision forms part of the ongoing body of jurisprudence through which the High Court of Justiciary develops and applies Scots criminal law in the appellate context.

The decision in Appeal Against Conviction by Oluwatayo Dada [2025] ScotHC 2025hcjac21 contributes to the developing jurisprudence of the High Court of Justiciary on the grounds available to an appellant seeking to challenge a conviction in Scottish criminal proceedings. As a 2025 decision, it reflects the current state of Scots criminal appellate law and the manner in which the court applies established principles to the particular factual and legal circumstances of individual appeals. The decision is of value to practitioners and academic commentators as an illustration of the court's approach to the grounds of appeal most commonly advanced in conviction cases.

The case is also of significance as a reflection of the High Court of Justiciary's continuing role as the apex criminal court in Scotland, exercising a supervisory and corrective jurisdiction over the decisions of inferior courts. The court's determination in this case, whatever its precise outcome, forms part of the authoritative body of Scottish criminal law and may be cited in subsequent proceedings where the same or similar grounds of appeal arise. In this respect, the decision illustrates the cumulative, precedent-building function performed by the appellate court in the Scottish criminal justice system.

For students of Scots criminal procedure, the case provides a useful illustration of the procedural and substantive framework within which appeals against conviction are conducted. The requirements of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, the role of the note of appeal in defining the grounds available to the appellant, the standard of miscarriage of justice, and the limitations upon appellate review of findings of fact are all illuminated by an examination of cases such as this one. Students are directed to the official text of the judgment for the specific grounds argued and the court's precise findings thereon, which provide the authoritative account of the decision and its legal basis.

More broadly, the case sits within the wider landscape of Scottish criminal justice reform and the ongoing attention paid to the fairness of the trial and appellate processes in Scotland. The High Court of Justiciary has, in recent years, been called upon to address a wide range of challenges arising from changes in substantive criminal law, evolving standards of fair trial under the European Convention on Human Rights as given effect in Scots law by the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, and the development of new forms of evidence and investigative technique. The decision in this case, read in that wider context, exemplifies the court's ongoing engagement with these issues in the determination of individual appeals.