LETERME v. FRANCE - 36317/97

On 27 January 1995 Mr Leterme lodged an application with the Commission, registered on 2 February 1995 under file no. 26387/95, in which he complained of the length of the compensation proceedings and relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On 4 July 1995 the Commission adopted a report in which it noted, pursuant to Article 28 of the Convention:

The text of the applicant’s declaration that he accepted the friendly settlement, signed by him on 26 September 1995, reads as follows:

Mr Leterme applied to the Commission on 21 May 1997. He alleged that the reasonable time required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had been exceeded.

The Commission (Second Chamber) declared the application (no. 36317/97) admissible on 16 September 1997. In its report of 28 October 1997 (Article 31), it expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The full text of the Commission’s opinion is reproduced as an annex to this judgment [5] .

In their memorial the Government asked the Court “to recognise that the friendly settlement reached with Mr Leterme necessarily implied on his part the unequivocal waiver of all further proceedings against the State on account of the length of the proceedings” and, in the alternative, to hold that “in order to assess the length of the proceedings which gave rise to the present application, the period covered by the friendly settlement cannot, in any event, be taken into account”.

The applicant asked the Court to hold that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to award him, by way of just satisfaction under Article 50, FRF 200,000 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage and FRF 42,210 for costs and expenses.

The applicant complained of the length of time it had taken for his application for compensation from the State to be considered. He alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which provides:

The Commission agreed in substance with that submission.

In their memorial, the Government submitted that the application was inadmissible on account of the friendly settlement reached before the Commission on 4 July 1995 in respect of the first application (no. 26387/95). They said that by signing the declaration that he accepted the friendly settlement (see paragraph 44 above), Mr Leterme had not only withdrawn from the proceedings relating to his application, he had also unequivocally waived the right to take any further action against the French State concerning the length of the proceedings then pending. They added that the applicant had expressed his intention clearly without stipulating any reserves, and that the Government’s own acceptance had been conditional on their having the assurance that Mr Leterme had waived all rights to bring proceedings on the same grounds.

The applicant submitted that his signed declaration of acceptance related to the application he had lodged with the Commission on 27 January 1995 (see paragraph 43 above) and that he had not waived the right to take action against the French State in respect of the length of the further proceedings or to claim compensation for any future, and as yet unknown, damage that he might sustain as a result.

The Delegate of the Commission observed that the Government had never raised such an objection before the Commission. He emphasised that in their observations on the admissibility of the application the Government had left this question to the Commission’s discretion and had merely pointed out that, in accordance with the Commission’s conclusions in the Pailot v. France and Richard v. France cases, the period to be taken into consideration began to run on the date of adoption of the report taking notice of the friendly settlement reached.

The Court agrees with the Delegate of the Commission and considers that the Government are estopped from raising such an objection before it.

Period to be taken into consideration

The Government maintained that the period to be taken into consideration had begun on 5 July 1995, that being the day after the Commission adopted its report taking notice of the friendly settlement reached (see paragraph 43 above).

That was also the Commission’s view.

According to the applicant, who put forward this argument for the first time before the Court, the period to be considered began on 28 January 1995, that being the day after the introduction of his first application to the Commission, which resulted in a friendly settlement (see paragraph 43 above), since the settlement related only to the length of the proceedings up to that date (see the Pailot v. France and Richard v. France judgments of 22 April 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, p. 802, § 57, and p. 823, § 54, respectively).

The Court reiterates that in order to assess whether proceedings are reasonable in length, both the Commission and the Court look at the actual length of the proceedings up to the adoption of the report or judgment.

In common with the participants in the proceedings, the Court notes that the proceedings before the domestic courts are not yet over, as the applicant appealed on 2 May 1994 to the Conseil d’Etat (see paragraph 21 above), which on 27 February 1996 remitted the case to the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal, before which it is still pending (see paragraph 26 above).

The proceedings in issue have therefore already lasted more than two years and nine months to date.

Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings

The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities. On the latter point, what is at stake for the applicant in the litigation has to be taken into account (see the X v. France judgment of 31 March 1992, Series A no. 234-C, p. 90, § 32; the Vallée v. France judgment of 26 April 1994, Series A no. 289-A, p. 17, § 34; the Karakaya v. France judgment of 26 August 1994, Series A no. 289-B, p. 43, § 30; and the Pailot and Richard judgments cited above, pp. 802–03, § 61, and p. 824, § 57, respectively).

The applicant argued that the case was not at all complex as the criteria for determining State liability for the infection of haemophiliacs had been established by the landmark judgments of the Judicial Assembly of the Conseil d’Etat (see paragraph 39 above) and the Conseil d’Etat ’s judgments of 24 March 1995 concerning the method of calculation of the damages (see paragraph 40 above).

The Government expressed no view on this issue. The Commission agreed in the main with the applicant’s submission.

The Court considers that, even though the case was of some complexity, that fact alone could not justify the length of the proceedings in question as the information needed to determine the State’s liability had been available for a long time (see the X v. France, Vallée, Karakaya, Pailot and Richard judgments cited above, p. 91, § 36, p. 18, § 38, p. 43, § 34, p. 803, § 64, and p. 824, § 60, respectively).

The Court notes that the Government have not made any observations on this point and that the applicant sought on 28 October 1996 to expedite the proceedings, but without success (see paragraph 29 above).

The applicant criticised the length of the proceedings in the Conseil d’Etat and submitted that it could have decided the case itself without remitting it to the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal – before which it was still pending after the quashing of the earlier judgment – simply by following its judgments of 24 March 1995 (see paragraph 40 above) and reproducing word for word the reason given under the heading “deduction of compensation paid for the same damage”.

The Commission agreed in substance with the applicant’s submission and expressed the opinion that in the instant case the issue was not whether there had been unreasonable delays imputable to the court hearing the case, but whether that court had acted with “exceptional diligence”. Before the Court the Delegate of the Commission emphasised that the Conseil d’Etat could itself have ruled on the merits of the case but had remitted the case to the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal so that the latter could calculate how much compensation should be paid. Thus, more than two years after the case was remitted to it the Administrative Court of Appeal has still not given judgment, although all the information it needed was to be found in the judgments the Conseil d’Etat had already given on the question (see paragraph 40 above).

Like the Commission, the Court considers that what was at stake in the proceedings in issue was of crucial importance to the applicant in view of the disease from which he is suffering (see paragraph 10 above). In short, exceptional diligence was called for in this instance, notwithstanding the number of cases to be dealt with, in particular as the facts of the controversy had been known to the Government for several years and its seriousness must have been obvious to them (see the X v. France, Vallée, Karakaya, Pailot and Richard judgments cited above, p. 94, § 47, p. 19, § 47, p. 45, § 43, p. 803, § 68, and p. 825, § 64, respectively).

In that connection, the Court notes that a period of almost two years and three months has elapsed to date since the delivery on 31 January 1996 of the Conseil d’Etat ’s judgment quashing the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal’s judgment of 1 March 1994 and remitting the case to the same court (see paragraph 25 above). In particular, the Court notes that there was a period of inactivity lasting more than ten months between 25 March 1996, when the applicant’s observations were filed with the Administrative Court of Appeal (see paragraph 27 above), and 10 February 1997, when a reporting judge was appointed to investigate the case before that court (see paragraph 30 above). Moreover, since the last-mentioned date no procedural step appears to have been taken and no convincing explanation of this inertia has been supplied by the Government.

The Court also notes that the proceedings had already lasted nearly five years and seven months by the time the Commission adopted its report noting that a friendly settlement had been reached and that they are still pending in the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal.

Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to the applicant’s situation, the Court cannot consider the time taken in the present case to have been “reasonable” .

There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1.

Article 50 of the Convention provides:

The applicant sought FRF 200,000 for non-pecuniary damage.

The Government expressed no view on this subject. The Delegate of the Commission supported the applicant’s claim.

The Court considers that the applicant indisputably sustained non-pecuniary damage. Having regard to the various relevant factors and making its assessment on an equitable basis in accordance with Article 50, it awards him FRF 200,000.

The applicant also sought FRF 42,210 for the costs and expenses he had incurred before the Convention institutions.

The Government made no observation. The Delegate of the Commission found the claim to be justified.

The Court considers the applicant’s claims reasonable and allows them in full.

According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in France at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 3.36% per annum.

Dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection;

Holds that there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

Holds

The case is numbered 111/1997/895/1107. The first number is the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case’s position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.