McCarthy J.������������������������������������������������� �������� Neutral Citation Number [2026] IECA 5
Allen J.
Burns J.
BETWEEN/
LINDA ROGERS
APPLICANT/APPELLANT
- AND �
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, PATRICK MCMENAMIN,
KIVA MCGING, FINBARR THOMPSON, LORCAN COWEN, SONIA BUGGY, ADRIAN O'REILLY, ADRIAN KILDEA, DAVE FREEMAN,
�MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND COMMUNICATIONS, MINISTER FOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND REFORM,
MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM,
MINISTER FOR CHILDREN, EQUALITY, DISABILITY, INTEGRATION AND YOUTH OF IRELAND, �NATIONAL DISABILITY AUTHORITY, THE SUPERIOR COURTS RULES COMMITTEE, PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT, THE COURTS SERVICE, NIAMH HYLAND, EPIQ GLOBAL,
THE OFFICE OF PUBLIC WORKS
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Allen delivered on the 23rd day of January, 2026
1. This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court (Gearty J.) ([2025] IEHC 258) which refused an ex parte application by Ms. Linda Rogers for leave to apply by way of judicial review for a total 186 reliefs, listed in 28 pages; on 49 grounds, listed in eight pages of her statement of grounds.� �This was the appellant's third judicial review application arising from essentially the same complaints.� As will be seen, the High Court application and this appeal are obviously an abuse of process.
2. On 15 March 2023 the appellant was arrested at Store Street Garda station and brought to the Criminal Courts of Justice where she was charged with two offences under the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act 1994, as amended.� On 29 March 2023 the District Court judge made a disclosure order.� The appellant was dissatisfied with the disclosure which was made and the adequacy of the disclosure was revisited in the District Court on 24 May 2023 and again on 31 July 2023.� The appellant's trial was listed for hearing before the District Court commencing on 14 November 2023.
3. On 3 November 2023 the appellant filed a judicial review application in the Central Office of the High Court, which was assigned Record Number 2023 No. 1268 JR.� The named respondents were the five Garda� who had been on duty at Store Street Garda station on 15 March 2023, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, and the District Court judge. �Like the application the subject of the appeal, it was prolix.� The 154 grounds set out a long list of complaints about what the appellant claimed had happened in the Garda station and in the District Court on each occasion on which her case had been listed.� The list of reliefs was long and varied but the primary relief sought was an order prohibiting the appellant's trial. �
4. The first judicial review application was listed before the High Court (Hyland J.) on 6 November 2023 when she directed that the DPP be put on notice.� On 13 November 2023 Hyland J. refused to stay the criminal trial, directed the appellant to file an amended statement of grounds naming the DPP as a respondent, and adjourned the leave application to 12 December 2023.� I mention at this point that the High Court order of 13 November 2023 as drawn did not correctly reflect the order pronounced by the judge - it suggested that what had been refused was the application for prohibition, rather than the application for a stay on the criminal prosecution pending the hearing of the leave application - but the parties were in no doubt as to the order pronounced.
5. The appellant's trial was postponed owing to her illness from 14 November 2023 to 29 November 2023, from then until 15 December 2023, and from then until 29 January 2024.� In the meantime the High Court order refusing to stay the trial in the District Court had been perfected on 21 November 2023 and on 19 December 2023 the appellant had filed what was to be her first appeal to this Court, Record No. 2023 322.� Although the order under appeal was limited to the refusal to stay the trial, the appellant's 38-page notice of appeal sought to agitate all of the complaints which had been listed in her first statement of grounds.
6. On 1 February 2024, following a three-day trial, the appellant was convicted by the District Court and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three months, which suspended on a number of conditions.
7. On 11 March 2024 the appellant filed the papers in her second judicial review application, 2024 No. 359 JR. �Her statement of grounds listed 289 reliefs and 62 grounds over 64 pages.� �The twenty named respondents included the DPP, the five Garda�, the Minister for Justice, the District Court judge, various other Ministers, the Superior Courts Rules Committee, the President of the High Court, the Garda S�och�na Inspectorate and the Office of Public Works.� There was considerable overlap in the litany of complaints and reliefs sought and the reliefs and grounds which had been sought in the earlier application but the primary relief claimed was an order of certiorari of the appellant's conviction.�
8. The appellant's second judicial review application was heard by Hyland J. on 13 May 2024 and, for the reasons given in a written judgment delivered on 16 May 2024 ([2024] IEHC 316) it was refused.� At para. 33 of her judgment Hyland J. found that:-
"In conclusion, I have decided to refuse the applicant leave to seek judicial review on the basis set out in this judgment: that insofar as the applicant makes complaints that are known to law, those complaints are more appropriately ventilated in the context of her appeal against conviction. None of the grounds identified by her demonstrate, even to the low standard of arguability, that the proceedings in the District Court were so fundamentally flawed as to deprive her of a trial in due course of law."
9. On 13 June 2024 the appellant filed an appeal to this Court against the judgment and order of 16 May 2024 on the certiorari application.� Her notice of appeal set out 110 grounds of appeal before replicating the 289 reliefs and 62 grounds which had been listed in her statement of grounds.
10. In the meantime, on 30 April 2024 Hyland J. had fixed a new date for the hearing of the first judicial review application, which was heard by Gearty J. on 11 July 2024.� �For the reasons given in a written judgment delivered on 30 July 2024 ([2024] IEHC 474) the appellant's first judicial review application was refused.� There was obviously a great deal of overlap between the grounds on which the appellant sought to rely in support of her first judicial review application and the grounds on which she had sought to rely in support of her second judicial review application which had already been dealt with by Hyland J., but rather than engaging with the overlap, Gearty J. disposed of the application before her on the sole basis that it was clearly out of time, and the appellant had refused to apply for an extension of time.� Gearty J. summarised her conclusions at para. 5:-
"5.1 This Applicant has already applied for leave to stay or prohibit the prosecution in the District Court, which application was refused by Hyland J. but that application was dedicated to the sole grounds of prohibition, injunctions and a stay of the trial. This hearing focused on all other claims made by the Applicant and the application was for leave to judicially review the relevant District Judge, the Director of Public Prosecutions and members of an Garda Siochana.
5.2 The application was made long after the three-month deadline. The Applicant repeatedly refused to apply for an extension of time on the basis that promises of disclosure had been made and that she was entitled to wait until the trial in the hope that she would receive the documentation. As the DAR reveals, the Applicant threatened to institute review proceedings as long ago as last May and should have done so at that point if she had real concerns in respect of the process or the investigation. There being no application to extend time before me, I cannot extend the time for this Applicant.� Furthermore, there is no evidence of a valid reason for such an extension.� On the contrary, the Applicant has led me to consider evidence which suggests that she is not entitled to any relief.� There is no need to comment further on the rules which require parties to judicial review to be honest with the court as it is a discretionary remedy.� The delay issue alone is sufficient to determine the case.
5.3 In these circumstances, it is not necessary to determine if this Applicant can reach the standard of arguability such as to entitle her to leave to judicially review the decisions or actions of any of the Respondents.� Her application is out of time and I have no discretion to extend the time as no such application has been made to me.
5.4 In those circumstances, the Court is obliged to refuse leave."�
11. The final order refusing the first judicial review was made on 8 October 2024 and perfected on 15 October 2024.� There was no appeal.
12. On 21 October 2024 the appellant filed her third judicial review application.� The statement of grounds runs to 38 pages and is largely copied and pasted from the second judicial review application.� Of the twenty named respondents, fourteen were named as respondents to the second judicial review application.� The new respondents are two more Garda�, the Minister for Environment, Climate and Communications, the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform, Epiq Global, and Hyland J.
13. The first substantive relief sought by the third judicial review application is an order of certiorari quashing the appellant's conviction by the District Court on 1 February 2024.� That was the primary relief sought by the second judicial review application, which had been refused by Hyland J. on 16 May 2024, which refusal was at the time of issue of the third judicial review application under appeal to this Court.� It is a textbook example of abuse of process.� Most of the other reliefs and grounds had been the subject of both the first and second judicial review applications which had already been rejected by the High Court.�
14. The third statement of grounds identified the two additional Garda� by name but did not spell out what precisely they were supposed to have done or not done.� Whatever it was, the two new Garda� were added to the list of the Garda� who were on duty at Store Street Garda station on 15 March 2023 so that any application is relation to anything they might have done or not done was long out of time.�
15. There was an entirely frivolous and vexatious complaint that Hyland J. was biased and prejudiced.� There was talk of an application to Hyland J. on 20 June 2024 for her recusal and complaint in relation to the judgment of Hyland J., which can only have been either her judgment of 15 November 2023 refusing to stay the criminal prosecution or her judgment of 16 May 2024 refusing the appellant's application for leave to issue the second judicial review application: both of which, at the time the third leave application was filed, were already under appeal to this Court.� As Gearty J. quite correctly said, Hyland J. was not amenable to judicial review.
16. The appellant's third judicial review application was heard by the High Court (Gearty J.) on 20 January 2025 and judgment was reserved. �The notice of appeal now before the Court suggests that the application was eventually refused on 6 May 2025 for the reasons given in a written judgment of that date but it is clear from the High Court order of 6 May 2025 (as well, indeed, as the judgment of 6 May 2025) that an earlier judgment on the leave application was delivered electronically on 18 February 2025 ([2025] IEHC 94).� To fully understand the judgment of 6 May 2025 it is necessary to look at the judgment of 18 February 2025.
17. The focus of the appellant's attention at the High Court hearing on 20 January 2025 appears to have been on seeking a recommendation that she be afforded legal representation under the Legal Aid - Custody Issues Scheme.� In her judgment of 18 February 2025 Gearty J. examined the scheme and in particular emphasised the requirement that the High Court should be satisfied that the case warranted the assignment of a solicitor and counsel.� In the same judgment Gearty J. pointed to the elephant in the room that there had been two previous judicial review applications arising out of the same District Court case.� Starting at para. 3.6, she said:-
3.6 �The law prevents a litigant from relitigating matters which have already been the subject of a final determination by the courts, matters that are res judicata. This preclusion extends to matters newly raised which should have been litigated in the first case, and which have been the subject of a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction.� See Hardiman J. in A.A. v. The Medical Council [2003] IESC 70, [2003] 4 IR 302, where he held that:�� '...the Court requires the parties to [...] litigation to bring forward their whole case and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence or even accident omitted part of their case.'
3.7 �It is well established that a decision of the High Court is not amenable to judicial review.� The Supreme Court has confirmed this principle in Blackall v Grehan [1995] 3 I.R. 208.� Henchy J. identified this limit to the remedy of judicial review in People (DPP) v Quilligan, [1989] IR 46, stating (at page 57): 'The High Court, whether sitting as the Central Criminal Court or otherwise, is not an inferior court subject to corrective orders such as mandamus.'
3.8 �These principles are applicable to the current case and will be considered in coming to a view as to whether the Applicant has a case which warrants the assignment of solicitor and counsel.� As to the test in this regard, while the language used in Woods might suggest that an applicant must have a case of substance, that issue was not argued in Woods and it is a matter for the Board as to whether a recommendation will be followed.� In the circumstances, it appears to me that the same test should be used here as applies in all judicial review applications for leave and to ask: does the Applicant have an arguable case, in the sense that it is has some prospect of success?
�Conclusion
4.1 The case will be listed on 10th March, 2025 at 12.30pm. This Court notes the application for the Scheme made on the 25th of January and will invite the Applicant to make submissions on whether she has an arguable case, one that is not comprehensively answered by the principles set out above:� she may not re-litigate her first case (or a variation of it which could have been litigated in earlier proceedings) and this Court cannot review decisions of the High Court.� If an arguable case remains, I will make a recommendation under the Scheme."�
18. As the judgment and order of 6 May 2025 show, the application came back into the list on 10 March 2025, 8 April 2025 and 29 April 2025.� The appellant appears to have doggedly insisted that she was entitled to legal aid without either (1) engaging with the requirement that she should have reasonable grounds, or (2) engaging with the judge's clear statement of the unquestionably correct principle that she was not entitled to relitigate her first case - in this case, her first two cases - or a variation of it which could have been litigated in the earlier case.
19. In her judgment of 6 May 2025 Gearty J. summarised the appellant's submissions on the later listings before finding, at para. 1.17 and 1.18, that:-
"1.17 �The issues raised by the Applicant have, in every significant particular, been addressed by two High Court judges. If dissatisfied, her redress is to appeal these decisions to the Court of Appeal, which the Applicant tells me she has already done. Separately, she has also appealed her convictions to the Circuit Court. The Applicant submits that she is entitled to start afresh in these proceedings, noting that the Circuit Court does not address failures of public bodies.� But the issue is not the suitability of the remedy of judicial review but the fact that she has already deployed it: that case is over, and it cannot be re-litigated.
1.18 �In conclusion, the Applicant is not entitled to leave to seek any relief in respect of the re-framed application as the essential points she raises either have been dealt with, or could have been dealt with, in the original judicial review proceedings.� Her application must be refused as there is no arguable case for any of the reliefs sought.� Consequently, and having regard to the fact that there is no prospect of success, there is no proper basis on which this court can make a recommendation that the Applicant be provided with legal aid under the Scheme.��
20. On 3 June 2025 the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court on her third judicial review application.� The notice of appeal runs to 64 pages.
21. The recurring theme of the first of the 185 paragraphs under the heading "Grounds of Appeal" is that the case she wished to make in the High Court was not a civil appeal but a criminal appeal from the Circuit Court.� It was neither.� Nor, as the appellant would argue, was it a "Criminal Judicial Review".� The appellant says that she has a right to seek legal advice at all stages.� So she does, but not at the taxpayer's expense for a case in which the assignment of a solicitor and counsel is not warranted.� The fact is that the appellant was granted legal aid for the purposes of the criminal prosecution against her but dispensed with the services of her solicitor.� When asked by the Court at the hearing of this appeal whether she had applied for legal aid for her District Court appeal, the appellant would not give a straight answer.� I infer that she has not sought legal aid but there is no reason to believe that she would not be granted legal aid if she asked for it.
22. The management of the appellants' appeals burned up a great deal of time in the directions list.� In the event, the appellant's second appeal (against the refusal of her second judicial review application) was heard first and for the reasons given in a written judgment delivered on 31 July 2025 (Allen J., McCarthy and Collins JJ. concurring) ([2025] IECA 159) was dismissed.
23. The appellant's first appeal (against the refusal to stay the criminal prosecution) was heard on 16 October 2025.� It was obviously moot and for the reasons given by Charleton J. in an ex tempore judgment with which McCarthy and Allen JJ. agreed, was dismissed.
24. At the time of the hearing of the appellant's third judicial review application, her appeals to this Court had yet to be heard.� The insurmountable hurdle to the third judicial review application - as identified by the judge at para. 1.17 - was that the issue by then was not the suitability of the remedy of judicial review but that she had already deployed it.� Over and over again the appellant insists that she was entitled to legal aid as a matter of right without acknowledging the terms of the Legal Aid - Custody Issues Scheme on which her application for a recommendation was based, and without recognising the requirement of the scheme - which was spelled out by the judge - that the case in which the recommendation is sought must be one in which the assignment of a solicitor and counsel is warranted.� In her statement of grounds and notice of appeal the appellant correctly identified the difference between criminal law and civil law but her insistence that she was entitled to legal aid as of right and her reliance on Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings were founded on a failure or refusal to recognise or acknowledge that judicial review proceedings are not criminal proceedings and that different rules apply to civil legal aid.
25. The notice of appeal, from page 8 onwards, returns to the well-trodden litany of complaints in relation to the criminal prosecution, the CCTV footage from Store Street Garda Station and all the rest of it.� The appellant devotes three pages to a lament about the impact on the environment of the waste of paper before replicating the entirety of the 38 pages of the statement of grounds, including the lament in the statement of grounds about the waste of paper.
26. Buried in the morass of repetition in the statement of grounds (but perhaps more readily apparent from the grounding affidavit and emphasised in the notice of appeal) is a wholly vague complaint of non-compliance with a disclosure order made by the Circuit Court judge - presumably in connection with the appellant's District Court appeal - which is mutatis mutandis a repeat of an earlier complaint of non-compliance with the disclosure order made by the District Court judge.� The Circuit Court order is said to have been made "in 2024" and the alleged non-compliance is dated for 4 July 2024: upwards of three months prior to the filing of the third judicial review application.� The relief claimed by reference to this alleged non-disclosure is an order of certiorari quashing the decision - which can only be the decision of the District Court - to convict her.� The appellant is indignant that Gearty J. appears to have overlooked this change but does not contend that she pointed it out to the judge when invited to identify any issue in the third judicial review application which had not been included in the earlier applications.
27. The appellant's plea in relation to the disclosure order made by the Circuit Court is entirely vague.� It does not by itself, still less buried in a statement of grounds which otherwise almost entirely repeats the earlier statement of grounds, meet the requirement emphasised by Murray C.J. in A.P. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] IESC 2, [2011] 1 IR 729 that it is essential in the interests of the good administration of justice that a party applying for relief by way of judicial review should set clearly and precisely each and every relief sought and each and every ground upon which such relief is sought.� That apart, any issue of compliance or non-compliance with any Circuit Court disclosure order is a matter for the Circuit Court judge to deal with. ��As was pointed out in the judgments of Hyland J. in Rogers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] IEHC 316 and of Allen J. in Rogers v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] IECA 159, at para. 50 - in the context of the appellant's complaint of non-disclosure in the District Court - the relevance of the CCTV recordings and other disclosure sought by the appellant, and the adequacy of the disclosure made are quintessentially matters for the trial judge. �In precisely the same way that any complaint as to the adequacy of the disclosure made in the District Court was a matter for the District Court judge, any complaint as to the adequacy of the disclosure made in the Circuit Court on the appellant's appeal to that court by way of rehearing, is a matter for the Circuit Court judge.� And for good measure, any deficit in the disclosure made in the Circuit Court could not possibly go to the validity of the appellant's conviction by the District Court.
28. When asked by the Court at the hearing of this appeal whether her appeal to the Circuit had progressed, the appellant was at first evasive before confirming that it had appeared in a list of cases for mention last week.� I understood her to have confirmed that she had raised in the Circuit Court the issues which she sought to agitate in this Court as to the adequacy of the disclosure made to her.� Whether I am right or wrong in that, the Circuit Court is the appropriate venue in which to do so.
29. The appellant has not advanced any arguable ground on which leave to apply by way of judicial review might be granted, �and this appeal must be dismissed.
30. As this judgment is being delivered electronically, McCarthy and Burns JJ. have authorised me to say that they agree with it.
Result: Appeal Dismissed