The facts which gave rise to the marriage and to the divorce and to the recognition of the validity of the divorce are set out in full in the judgment of this Court delivered on the 8 th August, 2003. It is therefore unnecessary to recite those facts but this court will refer to the facts as found from time to time.
Section 23 of the Act of 1995 applies to a marriage which has been dissolved being a divorce (or legal separation) granted under the law of a country or jurisdiction other than the State which is entitled to recognition as valid within the State. It applies accordingly to the divorce which is the subject of these proceedings.
Subsection 2(a) of s. 23 provides as follows:
Subsection (3), (a) of s. 23 provides as follows:
The "requirement specified in section 27" is not relevant to these proceedings having regard to my earlier finding on jurisdiction.
Section 26 of the Act of 1995 provides inter alia as follows:
Section 16 (2) of the Act of 1995 sets out 12 factors to which the court ". . . shall have regard . . ." in deciding whether to make certain orders and in determining the provisions of such orders. The factors include the following:
It is contended on behalf of the applicant that the respondent, at the time when the Decree of Divorce was granted on the 14 th October, 1996, was obliged to make proper provision for the applicant having regard to his means and, broadly, to the factors identified in s. 16 (2) (a) to (l) of the Act of 1995.
Mr. Hegarty SC on behalf of the applicant says that in October, 1996 the applicant was misled into accepting a lump sum payment of IR£50,000 (to include costs), from the respondent's father. He says that this payment was represented to her as comprising proper provision by the respondent, having regard to his (then) means.
Mr. Hegarty SC says that this sum cannot be regarded as representing proper provision having regards to the means and resources available to the respondent at the date of divorce. He says that these means and resources were not disclosed to the applicant at the time of the granting of the divorce and indeed that they were probably not known to the respondent himself.
It is argued that on the facts as found, the applicant has, from time to time, made substantial contributions to the marriage and to the maintenance of the respondent, the applicant and their daughter. Furthermore it is contended that after a substantial period of separation, the respondent expressly encouraged the applicant and her daughter to disrupt their respective lives and lifestyles and to leave Britain in order to join the respondent in Spain for the alleged purpose of restoring their family unit and relationship.
It is contended that this fact and other facts found in relation to the marriage and its termination provide support for a finding that the respondent failed, on the date of the divorce, to make proper provision for the applicant in accordance with his means. It is accordingly argued that his failure and the applicant's current circumstances warrant the grant of relief of the type which has been sought.
Mr. Corrigan SC on behalf of the respondents contends that leave to make the application which is the subject of these proceedings should not have been granted pursuant to the provisions of subs. (3) (a) of section 23 of the Act of 1995.
A motion is before this court to be heard and determined before or concurrently with the substantive proceedings whereby the respondent seeks an order pursuant to O.19, r. 28 of the Rules of Superior Courts striking out the applicants claim or dismissing it on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action.
In the alternative an order is sought pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court striking out the applicants claim as constituting an abuse of process as a vexatious and unsustainable claim.
In the further alternative Mr. Corrigan argues that the grant of leave made by this Court ex parte pursuant to subs. (3), (a) of s. 23 of the Act, 1995 should be set aside since there was no bona fide ground for the grant of such leave which could be identified as a "substantial ground" within the meaning ascribed to that term by the provisions of the subsection. He contends that this application must fail on the following grounds:
To date there have, apparently, been no cases reported within this jurisdiction where consideration of s.23 of the Act of 1995 has been required.
However in England, the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 contains provisions similar to the provisions of s. 23 and s. 26 of the Act of 1995.
Section 13 of the Act of 1984 in England is similar (but not quite identical) to s. 23 of the Act of 1995 and s. 16 of the Act of 1984 is similar but not identical to section 26 of the Act of 1995.
Applications made pursuant to s. 13 and 16 of the English Act of 1984 have been litigated in the English courts and some of the reported cases resulting from that litigation have been relied upon by the parties in these proceedings.
It should be noted also that s. 18 (3) of the Act of 1984 in England incorporates into applications for ancillary reliefs on foot of foreign decrees provisions of the English Matrimonial Clauses Act 1973 which mirror corresponding provisions of s. 16 of the Act of 1995.
It is important to note that in both jurisdictions the legislature has imposed the following significant restrictions upon the exercise of the court's discretion to grant the reliefs which have been sought in these proceedings;
The following facts are relevant to this application.
On the 14 th October, 1996, when the parties were divorced under the civil law of Spain the applicant and the respondent knew of the existence of a trust fund in favour of the respondent. It is probable that neither knew the value of the trust fund or the extent of the respondent's beneficial interest in the trust fund.
On that date the applicant, as the (then) lawful wife of the respondent, also had a beneficial interest in the trust fund. Whilst she knew then that she had an interest in the fund neither she nor the respondent had any realistic understanding of the extent of their respective interests in the fund.
By agreeing, in return for the sum of IR£50,000, not to contest the respondent's application for divorce the applicant permanently extinguished her interest in the trust fund. The payment of IR£50,000 was made by the respondent's father.
The applicant stated in evidence that when she agreed not to contest the respondent's application for divorce she believed that the respondent was dying and wished to legitimise his two youngest children. She said that she thought then that he had no more than a few months to live.
The applicant was professionally represented and had the benefit of professional advice when she agreed not to contest the respondent's application for divorce and to accept, in return, the sum of IR£50,000.
When considering the respondent's application for divorce in Spain, the presiding magistrate did not acquaint himself with the financial situations of the parties. This was because he had been advised that no application would be made to him on behalf of the applicant for the payment by the respondent of any monies to the applicant.
At the time of the divorce no application was, in fact, made on behalf of the applicant to the presiding magistrate for the payment of any sum or sums by way of maintenance from the respondent either in respect of the applicant herself or in respect of the daughter of the marriage.
Ms. Pilar De Paz who is an expert in the civil law of Spain on family and divorce matters and, in particular, upon divorce law within that jurisdiction indicated, in evidence, that currently, a spouse occupying the applicant's position in Spain, may apply for maintenance payments from her former spouse ".unless it can be proved that (the applicant) .has already got money at the time (of the divorce) and it has not been reflected in the sentence"
She was asked the following question:
She answered:
Upon her father's death within the past two years M.R. received a bequest in the amount of €120,000 before tax.
The respondent's mother died on the 17 th May, 2001. By her will (proved on the 14 th June, 2002,) she bequeathed a sum in excess of IR£300,000 to the respondent.
On behalf of the respondent Mr. Corrigan S.C. claims that, on the evidence, the applicant's claim discloses no cause of action and is bound to fail.
In the alternative he argues that the order of this Court made on 12 th December, 2003, granting the applicant leave to seek the reliefs sought herein should be set aside because, on the evidence, no " substantial ground …" within the meaning of s. 23(3)(1)(a) of the Act of 1995 exists which empowered the court to grant that leave.
He says that the order was made on foot of an ex parte application and can be set aside after consideration of all of the evidence which is relevant.
In support of his contention he relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Holmes v. Holmes [1989] FAM 47 (C.A.) and in particular the following extracts from the judgment of Purchas L.J:
Later in his judgment Purchas L.J. observed that:
I would respectfully adopt the foregoing passages as applicable to the similar provisions of the Act of 1995 within this jurisdiction.
However, in the instant case it has not been established that the application for relief "must founder at the first hurdle .."
The "first hurdle" within this jurisdiction is s. 26 of the Act of 1995 which provides that the court shall not ". . . make a relief order unless it is satisfied that in all of the circumstances of the particular case it is appropriate that such an order should be made by the court . . . ".
On the evidence, the court in Spain did not consider the question of the applicant's upkeep, maintenance or welfare or that of N. No request was made for the court to do so. The court did not conduct any enquiry into or examination of the financial means and circumstances of the applicant or of the respondent at the time when the divorce was granted. Accordingly the respondent's means and resources were not disclosed to the court or to the applicant or to her advisors.
Ms. Pilar de Paz stated clearly that, having regard to the nature of the proceedings before the court in Spain in October, 1996, Spanish law now precludes the applicant from making any further application for maintenance or other payments from the respondent.
Must this court, on those uncontested facts, inevitably conclude that it is not "appropriate" to make a relief order in favour of the applicant?
In these proceedings the applicant is not seeking to review or to rectify a decree of divorce which has been obtained under the civil law of Spain and is recognised as valid in this State. The applicant is seeking specific relief pursuant to legislative provisions made in this jurisdiction which are intended to provide relief where it is alleged that hardship, inequity and injustice has resulted from the grant of a Decree of Divorce in another jurisdiction which cannot be rectified by any relief available within the courts within that jurisdiction.
In this case it cannot be suggested that the court in Spain in 1996 examined the issues which are before this court ". . . in a way exactly equivalent to the examination which would have taken place if the application had been made in the first instance in the courts here . . .".
There was no provision for divorce within this jurisdiction in 1996.
Accordingly an application for divorce could not have been made on that date within this jurisdiction.
The provisions of Part II of the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996 require inter alia that where an application is made for a decree of divorce within this jurisdiction the court must be satisfied that… "…such provision as the court considers proper having regard to the circumstances exists or will be made for the spouses and any dependent members of the family,…" (see s. 5(1)(c) of the Act).
However, on 14 th October, 1996, that Act had not come into full force and effect.
It follows that no examination was conducted by the court in Spain in 1996 in a way which was equivalent to any similar examination required by Irish law 1996.
Section 23 (3) (a) of the Act of 1995 precludes an application for relief of the type which has been sought in the absence of leave granted ex parte . It provides that "the court shall not grant such leave unless it considers that there is a substantial ground for so doing…" .
Referring to the identical provisions of s. 13 of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act, 1984 Russell L.J. declared (in Holmes v. Holmes [1989] Fam. 47 (C.A.)) that "[p]rima facie the order of the foreign court should prevail save in exceptional circumstances, and a good case for any interference with it or adjustment of it or any supplementation of it should be apparent before any leave is granted under s. 13 where the foreign court is properly seized of the dispute, as it was in this case. So far as is possible, duplicity of proceedings should be avoided in this as in all other fields in the interests of the parties and their children as well as in the interests of justice and the comity of nations."
I am satisfied that there are " exceptional circumstances " present in this case.
Those circumstances include the failure of the respondent to disclose the means and resources available to him at the date of divorce, the applicant's current reduced circumstances and means of livelihood and, in particular, the fact that, on the evidence, no remedy is now available to the applicant under the civil law of Spain where the decree of divorce was granted.
The "ultimate objective" of the legislation in England was declared by Bodey J. to be "… to provide for a very small residuum of cases where the English Court, bearing in mind all the warnings and cautions set out in the authorities, nevertheless feels that the outcome achieved in the foreign jurisdiction is simply not a just one as between the parties … [t]hat must ultimately turn on the circumstances of each individual case and raise issues essentially of fact and degree." ) See A .v. S. (Financial Relief after Overseas U.S. Divorce and Financial Proceedings) [2003] 1 F.L.R. 431 (at p. 451).
I am satisfied that it will be "appropriate" for the court to intervene in the manner contemplated by s. 26 of the Act of 1995 only in exceptional circumstances and when the court is satisfied by way of evidence, that the outcome achieved in foreign proceedings has been unfair or unjust in the circumstances and that no remedy is available to the applicant within the foreign jurisdiction.
The case made out on behalf of the applicant in the instant proceedings must be deemed sufficient to require this court to enquire whether the outcome of the divorce in Spain was a fair and just outcome in the circumstances.
Accordingly this court is satisfied that the applicant has proved that a
The court is satisfied also that the applicant's claim as constituted discloses a reasonable cause of action and is not vexatious or frivolous within the meaning ascribed legally to that term.
The court, therefore, declines to strike out the claim on those grounds.
Section 26 of the Act of 1995 provides that this court shall not grant the relief sought "unless it is satisfied that in all of the circumstances of the particular case it is appropriate …" to grant such relief.
In making that determination the court "… without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing" is required to ".. have regard to.." to the provisions of sub-sections (a) to (i) of section 26 of the Act.
If the court, having had regard to those matters is satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order then it is empowered to make " … any order under Part II … (in this Act referred to as a relief order) that it could have made if the court had granted a decree of judicial separation in relation to the marriage." (See sub-s. 2 (a) of section 23 of the Act).
Sub-sections (b) and (c) of s. 23(2) of the Act of 1995 apply, as modified to such orders in the manner outlined earlier herein.
I have already indicated that I am satisfied on the evidence that at the time when the parties were divorced on 14 th October, 1996, the applicant knew of the existence of a trust fund. It is probable that neither she nor the respondent had any realistic understanding of the extent of their respective interests in that fund.
By agreeing, in return for the sum of IR£50,000 not to contest the respondent's application for divorce, the applicant permanently extinguished her interest in the trust fund.
It is probable also that the applicant agreed not to contest the respondent's application for divorce because she believed the respondent was dying and wished to legitimise his two youngest children. I accept on the evidence that she agreed to dissolve the marriage in order to accommodate the wishes of the respondent whom she believed was dying. She was, at that time, misled, perhaps inadvertently, as to the full extent of the respondent's means at the date of divorce.
Mr. Hegarty S.C. says that the respondent failed to make proper provision for the applicant under the terms of the decree of divorce in 1996. He says that the applicant is now suffering financial and other hardship as a result of that failure and has no remedy available to her under the civil law of Spain.
In determining whether it is appropriate for this court to grant the relief sought the court must have regard to the matters set out in s. 26(a) to (i) of the Act of 1995.
In that regard it is of some significance that the parties were married in Ireland and the applicant is presently resident here. The parties have, however, rarely lived together within this State.
The respondent's principal asset (the trust fund) is located within or is accessible from this jurisdiction. The respondent has been domiciled and resident in Spain (where the marriage was dissolved) for most of the time which is material to this application.
The applicant is a French national who enjoys dual French and Irish citizenship. She received IR£50,000 (IR£46,000 after deduction of costs) as a consequence of the divorce. She has never received any other financial benefit or payment from the respondent towards her upkeep, welfare or maintenance or towards the upkeep, welfare and maintenance of N. during the marriage or thereafter. She would appear now to have no right to apply for financial relief from the respondent under the civil law of Spain.
Mr Corrigan, S.C., places particular reliance upon the provisions of sub-ss. (g), (h) and (i) of s. 26 of the Act of 1995 in support of his contention that the applicant should not be granted the relief which she seeks.
He says that this court must have regard to
He says that the respondent is domiciled and resident in Spain and has no property within this jurisdiction in respect of which a relief order in favour of the applicant can be made. He argues that, for that reason, a relief order is unlikely to be enforceable against the applicant. He says that in the circumstances, having regard to those two factors, this court should not make a relief order in favour of the applicant.
In the earlier proceedings it was established in evidence that by the 1966 deed of trust the respondent's father settled certain monies, investments and property upon trustees for the benefit of his "… children, their respective wives, husbands and issue …" on particular terms.
In November, 1999 sub-trusts were created whereby the trust fund was divided in a manner intended to provide individual trust funds for certain parties, including the respondent. In consequence, a separate sub-trust comprising three-sixteenths of the 1966 trust fund was established for the benefit of the respondent "… his wife and issue including N." . This sub-trust is entitled "The P … R … Trust Fund" and it is located within or accessible from this jurisdiction.
In evidence during the course of the earlier proceedings the respondent's solicitor, who was and remains a trustee in respect of the fund, indicated that the trust would comply with any order of this court affecting the assets and property of the trust.
In T.M. v. T.M. (Unreported , the High Court, McKechnie J., 22 nd June, 2004) held that an instrument of trust comprised a "settlement" within the meaning of s. 9(1)(c) of the Act of 1995 and was susceptible to a property adjustment order made under that section.
I am satisfied, in the light of that authority and on the evidence in this case, that the "P.R. Trust Fund" comprises property which is available within or accessible from the State in respect of which a relief order in favour of the applicant can be made.
Mr Corrigan says that the respondent has recently been the beneficiary under the terms of his late mother's will of an amount exceeding IR£300,000.
In response, Mr. Corrigan points out that no evidence has been adduced indicating the whereabouts of that bequest. Anecdotally he has indicated that the proceeds of the bequest have now been dissipated by the respondent.
In light of my finding as to the status of the trust fund it is unnecessary for me to consider that bequest.
Almost 9 years have now elapsed since the date when the parties were divorced in Spain in October of 1996. That fact has a relevance to the court's determination having regard to the provisions of section 26 of the Act
On the evidence adduced in the earlier proceedings the applicant lived in Spain between 1996 and the year 2000 when she came to Ireland following the birth of her grandchild.
In October of 1996 when the applicant agreed not to contest the respondent's application for divorce in Spain, she believed that the respondent was dying and wanted a divorce in order to legitimise his two youngest children.
After the divorce the applicant lived in Spain until the year 2000. Thereafter she travelled to Ireland and subsequently to France and back to Spain.
In November of 2001 she returned to Ireland. She has been principally resident within this jurisdiction, living in rented accommodation, since that date.
It is of significance that in the divorce proceedings issued by Special Summons dated 6 th April, 2001, the applicant sought relief which was broadly analogous to the relief which has been sought in these proceedings.
The contentions advanced on her behalf in those proceedings were similar to those advanced in these proceedings. The applicant can scarcely be criticised for the fact that those proceedings were not concluded until August 2003. She commenced the instant proceedings in December 2003.
The respondent complains that five years elapsed between the date of the decree of divorce in 1996 and the date when the applicant issued her earlier proceedings on the 6 th April, 2001.
Undeniably the nine year period between the date of the divorce and the date of these proceedings is a very substantial period of time. This Court is required to take the entire of that period "into account" when reaching a determination as to whether or not it is "appropriate" for this Court to make a relief order in the circumstances.
However, the fact that more than four years of that period elapsed through no fault attributable to the applicant is relevant to the "..length of time which has elapsed since the date of the divorce" and to the requirement that the court take that factor into account.
In Lamagni v. Lamagni [1995] 2 F.L.R. 452 (CA) the Court of Appeal in England (Butler-Sloss L.J.) considered similar provisions of s. 16(2)(1) of the English Act, 1984.
She observed (at p. 455) that:
In that case the court held that a wife who was . . . "prima facia . . . entitled to make an application for financial relief with some prospect of success if the husband had any assets from which she could obtain such financial relief…." should not have been refused leave to make an application for relief for want of a "substantial ground" because a period of 13 years had elapsed between the date of divorce and the date of application for leave. It is not without significance that Butler-Sloss L.J. also observed (at p. 454) that:
The requirement within this jurisdiction for the court to have regard to the provisions of s. 26(i) of the Act of 1995 must be construed also as requiring the court to analyse the circumstances which gave rise to any apparent delay in seeking relief.
In this case on the evidence it has been established that at the time of the divorce in October of 1996, the applicant believed that the respondent was dying. He had been diagnosed HIV positive and was extremely unwell.
His lifestyle in Spain was unstable and it continued to be characterised by drug abuse.
Although the applicant lived in Spain between 1996 and 2000 she had no contact with the respondent. She came to Ireland in the year 2000 following the birth of N.'s child.
The applicant commenced proceedings seeking relief under the Act of 1996 on the 6 th April, 2001.
The respondent's actual means and financial circumstances were not fully disclosed to the applicant until an " affidavit of means " was delivered on behalf of the respondent during those proceedings. On the evidence, therefore, it is probable that the applicant did not become aware of the full extent of the respondent's means and financial circumstances until some time in 2001.
If the outcome of the divorce proceedings in October 1996 has worked an injustice upon the applicant then the length of time which has elapsed between the date of the divorce in 1996 and the date when these proceedings were commenced in 2003 should not preclude her from seeking the relief which she has sought.
The elapse of that period of time is explicable having regard to the applicant's state of knowledge and to the other proceedings upon which she embarked in this jurisdiction in April 2001.
This court is now required to determine whether the outcome of the proceedings in Spain in October, 1996 was "unjust" in the circumstances so as to require intervention by this court in the manner sought.
The evidence in these and the earlier proceedings has established that the parties lived together for less than 8 years. During that time their relationship was volatile, their lifestyle was unstable and characterised by drug abuse and they drifted from location to location with no obvious source of income and no fixed abode. Neither party assumed responsibility for the upkeep, welfare or maintenance of the other.
The marriage subsisted for 20 years. During that time the parties co-habited for approximately 3 years.
At all material times throughout the marriage the applicant was required to make provision for her own upkeep, accommodation, welfare and maintenance and for that of the daughter of the marriage who was N.
A striking feature of the earlier proceedings and of these proceedings is the fact that no evidence has been adduced indicating that any financial or other contribution has ever been made by or on behalf of the applicant towards the upkeep welfare and maintenance of N. Some evidence has been adduced indicating that between 1989 and 1996 the respondent's mother made some intermittent educational arrangements for N. in Ireland. In the main, however, throughout the duration of the 20 years of marriage the upkeep, accommodation, welfare and maintenance of N. has been provided by and at the expense of the applicant without assistance from the respondent.
In 1989, the respondent travelled to Glastonbury where the applicant had established a home with N. On the invitation of the respondent the applicant permanently vacated her home in Glastonbury and travelled with N. at the respondent's expense to Spain where they lived with the respondent and his new family for a brief period. Thereafter the applicant resumed responsibility for her own upkeep, accommodation and welfare and for that of N.
In 1996, the applicant agreed not to contest the respondent's application for divorce in Spain. She did so primarily because she believed that the respondent was dying and wished to legitimise his younger children. The applicant's substantial means were not disclosed to the applicant at that time.
The marriage between the applicant and the respondent followed a 5 year relationship and the birth of a daughter. It was not a satisfactory or harmonious marriage. Nonetheless it remained in existence for 20 years. The obligations and responsibilities which are freely undertaken by those who marry were known to the parties when they married and when their marriage was dissolved. Those obligations and responsibilities rarely end when the marriage ends. That is especially so when there is a child or children of the marriage.
Arrangements and provision made by the parties at the dissolution of a marriage for the upkeep, welfare and maintenance of the affected spouses will almost invariably take into account the means of the parties. That will usually require an enquiry or investigation into those means. No such enquiry or investigation was undertaken by the court in Spain during the divorce proceedings in 1996.
That was because the court was advised that the divorce was not contested and the civil law of Spain does not require any further enquiry by the court in such circumstances. The outcome arising from the grant of the decree of divorce has been that the applicant now has no remedy within the courts in Spain for any wrong or injustice which may have resulted from the fact that the means the respondent were not disclosed to her at the time of the divorce.
On the evidence, the outcome achieved by the Court in Spain in October 1996 was unfair and unjust to the applicant in the circumstances. Having regard to his means and financial circumstances at that time the sum of IR£50,000 (from which the applicant received IR£46,000) was inadequate to discharge the respondents financial and other obligations to the applicant arising out of their marriage.
Since the applicant may not now apply to the Court in Spain for relief I am satisfied that this Court should intervene in order to seek to redress an apparent injustice.
In deciding whether to make relief orders of the type sought in these proceedings this court is required to have regard to the 12 factors set out in section 16 (2) of the Act of 1995.
On the facts of these proceedings the most important of those factors are those identified at subparas. (a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (l) of section 16 (2). On the evidence the respondent has no earning capacity but has financial resources which will provide him with a reasonable income. The applicant has very limited earning capacity. She has, however, been the beneficiary of a bequest from the estate of her father recently.
Neither of the parties enjoyed a good standard of living throughout their marriage.
The respondent has obligations and responsibilities towards his wife by his second marriage (which has apparently now failed) and to the two children of that marriage. The financial needs of the applicant include her own upkeep and maintenance and the capacity to make some small familial contributions towards N. (whose needs are accommodated by the existence of a trust called " the N.R. Trust" ).
The parties are now both in middle age.
It is of relevance to this application that the parties lived together for only 8 years and for 3 years throughout the duration of the 20 years of the marriage. The respondent is in very poor health.
It is undeniable that the applicant contributed, throughout the duration of the marriage, to the welfare of the family out of her limited financial resources and by accommodating and caring for N. No such contribution was made by or on behalf of the respondent.
It follows from what I have earlier found that I am satisfied that the applicant is entitled to relief of the type which has been sought.
This court in granting the relief seeks to redress the apparent injustice which has resulted from the failure on the part of the respondent to disclose the full extent of his means and financial resources in 1996.
In the circumstances of this case it is not appropriate for this court to grant relief based upon the concept of what would in 1996 have been " proper provision " for the applicant's upkeep, maintenance and welfare arising out of the dissolution of the marriage.
The court is required to take into account all of the circumstances of the case (including the statutory factors identified in sections 16 and 26 of the Act of 1995). It should do so as they exist and can be considered at the date of the grant of relief and not at the date of divorce.
The statutory relief granted is not intended to compensate the applicant for past financial or other hardship or inequity. It is intended to alleviate present inequitable financial or other hardship or reduced circumstances caused by a seemingly unjust outcome resulting from divorce proceedings in another jurisdiction where no comparable remedy is now available to the applicant. It is intended to do so in a just and equitable fashion.
In granting relief this court will take into account the factors required by statute and otherwise including the fact that the respondent now has an obligation to contribute towards the upkeep, welfare and maintenance of his (now estranged) second wife and to his two children by his second marriage.
Having regard to those factors, which include the respondent's ill health, the extent of the resources available and the comparatively brief period during which the parties actually lived together the relief to which the applicant will be entitled will necessarily be limited.
In order to establish the full extent of that relief it will be necessary for me to hear evidence on behalf of the parties and submissions from Counsel.
Approved: Quirke J.