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This judgment, therefore, is concerned solely with the point which Abbott J. ordered should be preliminarily determined pursuant to his said direction of the 13 th June, 2002. It does not, as a result, purport to deal with the substance itself of the said judicial separation proceedings.
The said trust, in para. 3 under the heading "Renunciation by/and Nomination of Beneficiaries" states the following:-
The jurisdiction to make this type of order was grounded upon inter alia a decree of judicial separation in the 1857 Act but not so in the 1859, 1925 or 1950 Acts. This power was again extended to judicial separation in the 1973 Act but nothing turns on its absence in the intervening period. As can, therefore, be seen the court in England has power to vary for the benefit "of the parties" to the marriage any "post-nuptial settlement" which was made "on the parties" to the marriage.
These quotations from both Bromley and Jackson have attracted judicial approval.
Shatter's , Family Law 4 th Ed. , (Dublin, 1997) at paras. 17.33 and 17.34 very much echoes these views and when discussing the courts power under both s. 15 of the 1989 Act and s. 9 of the 1995 Act, goes much further and suggests that the same is very extensive indeed.
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