THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
14. Defence counsel, in his final submissions to the trial court, contended that the undercover police officer V. had acted unlawfully and that the applicant had been incited to commit the offence. Consequently, the officer's evidence could not be relied on. Furthermore, counsel contended that the applicant had never been involved in drug dealing before.
“[T]he Criminal Conduct Simulation Model is used to collect evidence about the criminal activities of a particular person. That is what happened in the present case. Having obtained information that M. ... was selling psychotropic substances, the police officer - whose identity was concealed - expressed his wish to get some drugs. The subsequent activities of [both the applicant and his accomplice], i.e. the selling of a large quantity of drugs, were in part determined by the conduct of the police officer.”
“The court finds the [applicant's] arguments that he was drawn into committing the crime by M. unfounded. The evidence shows that M., as the person who carried out the crime, had already been detected when drug-related crimes were being investigated. The case file shows that both M. and Lalas actively carried out the crime. ... [I]n establishing the persons involved in drug-dealing, [the officers] did not overstep the limits of the Criminal Conduct Simulation Model. ... [T]he police have only uncovered the ring of persons committing crimes and brought to an end their criminal activities. The officers joined in the crime that was already taking place ... Having established the group of accomplices, the officers brought to an end their criminal activities, but did not influence or incite them.”
on 14 October 2003. As regards the lawfulness of the Model, it held:
“In the present case, the Criminal Conduct Simulation Model ... was applied in order to protect society and the State from the challenges posed by the consumption and illegal circulation of drugs and psychotropic substances. The model was sanctioned by the Prosecutor General, in view of the possession of information about M. selling narcotic substances. Such data ... is a lawful ground for the use of the model.
By entering into contact with M. and offering to buy psychotropic substances from him ..., V. only joined in the criminal activity of M. and uncovered his accomplice. Such actions cannot be considered as entrapment (nusikaltimo provokavimas): it appears from the case file that M. and Lalas were not subject to any pressure ... [The applicants'] allegation that the police undercover agent drew into the crime (paskatino) persons who had never offended before to commit a serious crime, is unsubstantiated. On the contrary, the use of [the model] helped to stop the criminal activity. ...
The information which is obtained by use of the [model] constitutes a State secret ... and is accessible only to persons who have special authorisation. Neither [the applicant] nor his lawyer has such authorisation. Consequently, the fact that secret operative information was not disclosed to them cannot be regarded as a violation of the applicant's defence rights. It should be noted that the first instance court acquainted itself with the secret operative information and its sources, and properly evaluated the lawfulness of the model.”
As regards the qualification of the offence the Supreme Court held that “the activities [of Malininas and Lalas] which constituted the objective part of the norm of § 2 of Article 260 of the Criminal Code were controlled by the officials and partially realised under their influence.” The applicant's conviction was again re-classified as an attempt to sell drugs in large quantities (Articles 22 § 1 and 260 § 2 of the new Criminal Code), and the sentence of eight years' imprisonment was maintained.
on 18 December 2008 after the judgment of the Court in the Malininas case (Malininas v. Lithuania, no. 10071/04, 1 July 2008).
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE, AND RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW
of 5 February 2008 in the case of Ramanauskas v. Lithuania ([GC]
no. 74420/01, §§ 31-37).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. The parties' submissions
1. The Government
co-defendant. V.'s testimony did not have such significant relevance in respect of the applicant because it mostly concerned M.
no. 27052/95, § 52, 16 February 2000).
2. The applicant
B. Admissibility
C. Merits
§§ 49-74) in which it elaborated the concept of entrapment in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as distinguished from the use of legitimate undercover techniques in criminal investigations. In respect of the former, there must be adequate safeguards against abuse, as the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence obtained as a result of police incitement (Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 9 June 1998, §§ 34-36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 IV). The Court has established that its function under Article 6 § 1 is to review the quality of the domestic courts' assessment of the alleged entrapment and to ensure that they adequately secured the accused's rights of defence, in particular the right to adversarial proceedings and to equality of arms (Edwards and Lewis v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, §§ 46-48, ECHR 2004 X). Moreover, the Court recalls that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law and for assessment by the domestic courts (Windisch v. Austria, 27 September 1990, § 25, Series A no. 186).
“Police incitement occurs where the officers involved – whether members of the security forces or persons acting on their instructions – do not confine themselves to investigating criminal activity in an essentially passive manner, but exert such an influence on the subject as to incite the commission of an offence that would otherwise not have been committed, in order to make it possible to establish the offence, that is, to provide evidence and institute a prosecution (see Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, [judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV], ... p. 1463, § 38, and, by way of contrast, Eurofinacom v. France (dec.), no. 58753/00, ECHR 2004 VII).”
no. 10071/04, §§ 36-37, 1 July 2008). The Court had regard to the following considerations: there was no evidence that M. had committed any drug offences beforehand; the Criminal Conduct Simulation Model was not fully disclosed before the trial court, particularly regarding the purported suspicions about M.'s previous conduct; it was Officer V. who took the initiative when he first approached M., asking where he could acquire illegal drugs, and M. then offered to supply them himself; as the transaction progressed, M. was offered a significant sum of money – USD 3,000 – to supply a large amount of narcotics – this obviously represented an inducement to produce the goods; and the first instance court recognised the decisive role played by the police.
(see paragraphs 20 and 22 above). Even if the undercover agent V. had no direct contacts with the applicant, it was foreseeable for the police that in the execution of the model M. was likely to contact other people to participate in the crime because of the associational nature of drug-related crimes. Moreover, the applicant and M. were considered by the national courts as accomplices in the same crime, in which they acted with the same goal and for which both were convicted in the same criminal proceedings using the evidence obtained in execution of the model. The significant sum of money offered by V. to the applicant's accomplice M. then represented an inducement to produce narcotics also in respect of the applicant, as the subsequent activities of the applicant and his accomplice M. were in part determined by the conduct of the police officer. The first instance court recognised the decisive role played by the police in respect of both of the accomplices in inciting the commission of the crime (see paragraph 16 above). In the Court's view, these elements extended the role of the police beyond that of undercover agents to that of "agents provocateurs". They did not merely "join" an on-going offence; in the circumstances of the present case, they instigated it also in respect of the applicant (see Malininas, § 37). Furthermore, the Court notes that the domestic courts when convicting the applicant and his accomplice M. did not make any distinction as regards the fact that the model was authorised only in respect of M.
(see paragraph 38 above). No testimony was presented at the trial to show the co-defendants' prior involvement in this illegal trade. Moreover, the officers had no data about the applicant's involvement in drug dealing or about his prior knowledge of M.'s illegal activity before the moment the police officers initiated their operation. In particular, it appears that the criminal conduct simulation model available to the trial court was not fully disclosed to the applicant, particularly regarding suspicions about the
co-defendants' previous conduct (paragraphs 13, 22 and 32 above). This relevant evidence was thus not put openly before the trial court or tested in an adversarial manner. It follows that the applicant's plea of incitement was not adequately addressed by the domestic courts.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Done in English, and notified in writing on 1 March 2011, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Françoise Tulkens
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) Concurring opinion of Judges Malinverni and Sajó;
(b) Dissenting opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto;
(c) Dissenting opinion of Judge Björgvinsson.
S.H.N.
F.T.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES MALINVERNI
AND SAJÓ
Dissenting opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto
(Translation)
I regret that I cannot follow the approach adopted by the majority of the Chamber in the present case for the same reasons which I expressed in my dissenting opinion in the case of Malininas v. Lithuania, no. 10071/04, 1 July 2008.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BJÖRGVINSSON
I disagree with the majority that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this case.
As explained above in the judgment, this case is closely linked to the case of Malininas v. Lithuania (judgment of 1 October 2008), where the Court also found a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In paragraph 45 above the majority accepts that the Criminal Conduct Simulation Model (the Model) had been authorised only in respect of Mr Malininas, the applicant in the above-mentioned case, and not at any time did the police agents have direct contact with the applicant in this case. In spite of this, the majority comes to the conclusion that, in the case of the applicant, the police agents did not “merely "join" an on-going offence; in the circumstances of the present case, they instigated it also in respect of the applicant.”
My grounds for finding no violation is this case are the following:
Firstly, I believe that in the earlier case it had been sufficiently substantiated that Mr Malininas was predisposed to commit a drug offence before the Model was implemented. I would point out that this Court has accepted that the very circumstances in a particular case may be indicative of a pre-existing criminal activity or intent and thus justify undercover operations of the kind involved in the case. Among such factors is the demonstrated familiarity of a person with the drug market; such as knowledge of prices of different drugs, as well as an ability to obtain drugs at short notice (See Bannikova v. Russia, no. 18757/06, § 42, 4 November 2010, and Shannon v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 67537/01, ECHR 2004-IV). A strong indication of Mr Malininas' primary involvement in drug dealings was his apparent familiarity with the drug market, when approached by the police agent, as he was already well informed about prices of psychotropic drugs, as well as about possible suppliers of such drugs, in particular Mr Lalas, the applicant in the case at hand. For this reason I believe the undercover operations against Mr Malininas were justified1. Thus it cannot be said that the police by way of unjustified undercover operations directed at Malininas instigated an offence in respect of the applicant in this case.
Secondly, as regards the applicant himself, and using the same criteria as above, it is striking that he was ready and able to fulfil Mr Malininas requests for psychotropic drugs worth of 3000 US dollars at relatively short notice. It is hardly conceivable that someone, to whom the world of drug trade was unknown before, would be able push through a deal of this magnitude so quickly. This is enough to show that the applicant was clearly predisposed to commit a drug offence before the Model was implemented against Mr Malininas.
Thirdly, as stated earlier the applicant in this case was never mentioned in the authorisation for the Model (see paragraphs 19 and 45 above). It is furthermore not disputed that the undercover police agents never at any time contacted the applicant directly, but they only had contact with Mr Malininas. Under these circumstances it is of less relevance whether the applicant himself was predisposed to commit drug offences before the police officers approached Mr Malininas. The stark reality is that the applicant, without any direct incitement or pressure from the police agent, agreed to supply Mr Malininas, who was just another private individual, with large quantities of illegal drugs.
For these reasons I come to the conclusion that there has been no violation Article 6 § 1 in this case.
1 See Salduz v. Turkey, [GC] 36391/02 of 27 November 2008, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Spielmann, Ziemele and Lazarova Trajkovska; see also Cudak v.Lithuania, [GC] 15869/02 of 23 March 2010, Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, joined by Judges Casadevall, Cabral Barreto, Zagrebelsky and Popović.
1 See also Judge Cabral Barreto’s dissenting opinion in the case of Malininas v Lihuania, cited above.